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THE DEVELOPING LAW ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY FOR THE HANDICAPPED: AN
OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR
ISSUES
Jana H. Guyt
This Article examines state and federal law dealing with the
obligation of employers to provide employment opportunities
to handicapped individuals. The author surveys all pertinent
statutes and implementing regulations and explores possible
constitutional arguments available in handicap discrimination cases, analyzing the rights and remedies available to
handicapped employees, the obligations of and defenses
available to employers, and the issues expected to dominate
litigation. The author concludes that the regulations
promulgated by administrative agencies, pursuant to legislative mandate, impose onerous standards for compliance and
may exceed the bounds of statutory authority in some
respects.
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INTRODUCTION

America's handicapped l citizens assert that for 200 years they
have been relegated unnecessarily to a position of virtual dependence upon a society blind to their ability to contribute and deaf to
their demands for a chance to prove their competence. 2 During the
last decade, however, the handicapped have taken a lesson from
other disadvantaged segments of the population and have coalesced
into a highly visible and vocal minority group intent on obtaining
for its members a fair opportunity to achieve independence through
employment. 3 Approximately eleven million Americans between the
ages of sixteen and sixty-four, or one of every eleven, are members of
this newly-identified minority.4 Half of these handicapped Americans are unemployed 5 and their integration into an already
underemployed work force poses a significant problem. This new
minority group is highly sensitized to its rights - in part because of
the massive publicity given to its cause - and its advocacy has
wrought fundamental changes in public, legislative, and judicial
attitudes towards the right of the handicapped to an equal
opportunity for employment. The result has been the enactment of
new, and the revitalization of old, laws to establish rights and
remedies for handicapped employees and job applicants, and
correlative liabilities for employers.
At the federal level, Congress has prohibited discrimination
against the handicapped in programs receiving federal financial

1. The term "handicapped" is used herein both as an adjective, as in "handicapped

2.

3.

4.
5.

citizens," and as a noun, as in "the handicapped." Discrimination on the basis of
a handicap sometimes will be referred to herein as "handicap discrimination"
and "handicapped status discrimination."
See, e.g., F. KOESTLER, THE UNSEEN MINORITY: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BLINDNESS
IN AMERICA (1976); KrIegel, Uncle Tom and Tiny Tim: Some Reflections on the
Cripple as Negro, 38 AM. SCHOLAR 412, 414(1969); Note, Equal Employment and
the Disabled: A Proposal, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 457, 457-58 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Employment and the DisableclJ; Note, Abroad in the Land:
Legal Strategies to Effectuate the Rights of the Physically Disabled, 61 GEO. L.J.
1501, 1501-02 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Abroad in the LanclJ.
Despite the indignities that may have been visited upon the physically and
mentally disabled, federal and state governments periodically have expended
vast resources to provide better and more humane institutionalization, rehabilitation, and training programs for many handicapped citizens. For a lengthy
discussion of the efforts that have' been made to improve the lot of the
handicapped, see Lenihan, Disabled Americans: A History, 27 PERFORMANCE 1
(November-December,01976 and January, 1977) (available from the President's
Commission on Employment of the Handicapped, Washington, D.C., 20210).
Many of the °nihabilitation programs were engendered by the perceived need to
ready the handicapped for employment opportunities. See Achtenburg, Law and
the Physically Disabled: An Update with Constitutional Implications, 8 S.W.L.J.
847, 878 (1976).
PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED, ONE IN ELEVEN HANDICAPPED ADULTS IN AMERICA: A SURVEY BASED ON 1970 U. S. CENSUS
DATA 2 (1977).
Id. at 8-9.
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assistance. 6 In addition, Congress has mandated that government
contractors take affirmative action to assure equal employment
opportunities for the handicapped. 7 Moreover, some courts recently
have looked to federal civil rights statutes and constitutional
guarantees as a basis for invalidating employment practices
discriminatory to the handicapped. 8 Finally, federal tax laws now
contain incentives for employers who hire and accommodate the
needs of the handicapped. 9 State legislators also have responded to
the advocacy of this newly-identified minority. While legal recognition of the employment rights of disabled persons is still limited in
some states to mere public policy statements, such as those set forth
in "White Cane Laws,"l0 a majority of the states have included the
handicapped among those minority groups accorded protection
under fair employment practice statutes.ll
Although still very much in its infancy, the body of law on equal
employment opportunity for the handicapped has matured sufficiently to allow an overview of the legal developments and an
analysis of the emerging major issues. While this article primarily
focuses on the legal and practical effect of the law on Maryland
employers and employees, the discussion and analysis is pertinent to
employment in other states, since a significant portion of the law
derives from federal statutes and constitutional considerations.
Moreover, many of the state statutes regarding employment of the
handicapped are similar, and the courts and administrative agencies
are arriving at common answers to the major issues - the problems
associated with identifying the handicapped, assessing their job

6. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975) and discussion at notes 43-70 and
accompanying text infra.
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 793 (Supp. V 1975) and discussion at notes 18-35 and
accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 83-131 and accompanying text infra.
9. Although the new tax laws are not a principal focus of this article, the
practitioner should note that § 2122 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, LR.C. § 190,
permits a taxpayer to deduct up to $25,000 of any amount paid or incurred by
him in any taxable year beginning after December 31, 1976, and before January
1, 1980, for the removal of certain architectural and transportation barriers in
order to make facilities or public transportation vehicles owned or leased by the
taxpayer for use in connection with its trade or business more accessible to, or
usable by, handicapped or elderly individuals. The Internal Revenue Service has
promulgated temporary income tax regulations to implement § 2122. See Treas.
Reg. §§ 7.190-1 to .190-3.
In addition, § 51 of the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, LR.C.
§ 51, provides for a tax credit to businesses that hire as new employt!es
individuals who have a physical or mental disability that constitutes or results
in a substantial handicap to employment, and who have been referred to the
employer upon completion of, or while receiving, federally funded rehabilitative
services.
10. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1951-1955 (West Supp. 1977). See discussion at
notes 143-146 and accompanying text infra.
11. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 19(a)(I) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See discussion at
notes 137-142 and accompanying text infra.
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qualifications, and ascertaining the validity, nature, and extent of
the duty to "accommodate" the handicapped.
Before the legislative and judicial developments in this area are
analyzed in detail, some unique aspects of the problems involved in
providing equal employment opportunities for the handicapped
should be recognized. The handicapped comprise a novel class of
potential employment discrimination victims. Many handicaps are
not immediately obvious, so that it may be difficult for an employer
to ascertain whether an individual is a member of the protected
class. Moreover, some problems that are being recognized as
handicaps, such as drug addiction,12 are, at least to some degree,
volitional in nature. 13 The minority status of handicapped class
members therefore does not always depend upon an immutable and
inherent characteristic that is in no way attributable to the fault or
lack of self-control of the victim, as has been the case with other
protected minority classes. 14 At the same time, the characteristic
that renders an individual a member of the protected class - his
health - bears a much more intrinsic relation to ability to perform
work than does one's race, sex, religion, national origin, or age. 15
The factors that distinguish this newly-identified minority from
other disadvantaged groups affect significantly the impact that
equal employment opportunity laws for the handicapped may have
on employer liabilities, and provide a background for a more
meaningful discussion of the law.

12. See discussion at notes 209-211 and accompanying text infra.
13. For a more detailed discussion of the volitional nature of some "handicaps," see
Ogden, Justice and the Problem of the Volitional Victim, 1977 LAB. L.J. 417.
14. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1970 & Supp.
V 1975), for example, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. While religion is a matter of choice, and
thus not an immutable and inherent characteristic, one's choice of religion is
protected by the first amendment to the United States Constitution, which is not
the Case with the choice to engage in drug and alcohol abuse to the extent that it
becomes an addiction. Although transsexuality and homosexuality also may be
a matter of choice, the weight of authority holds that discrimination against
transsexuals, e.g., Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1977); Voyles v.
Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975); EEOC Dec. No. 75-030
(1974), and homosexuals, e.g .. Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098
(N.D. Ga. 1975), is not sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.
15. Employment discrimination on the basis of age is prohibited by the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
Obviously, one's age or sex may affect one's strength and, to this extent, these
characteristics may be job-related. It is not, however, the diminished strength
that renders one a member of a minority class based on sex or age, but this is
precisely the type of physical condition that may render one a member of the
"handicapped" minority.

188

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 7

II. OVERVIEW OF LAWS AFFECTING EMPLOYMENT
RIGHTS OF THE HANDICAPPED
A.

FEDERAL

LAws

Advocates of equal employment for the handicapped have failed
thus far to obtain protection for this minority under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,16 although efforts to secure an amendment
to this effect continue. 17 The handicapped nevertheless achieved a
major legislative goal upon enactment of several federal statutes
that affect two specific groups of employers - federal contractors
and federally financed programs and institutions.

1.

Laws Regulating Government Contractors

a.

Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the
Rehabilitation Act)18 contains the first congressional19 affirmative
action requirement imposed upon government contractors. Section
503 of the Act20 requires that any contract exceeding $2,500 for the
16. Several attempts have been made to amend Title VII to prohibit employment
discrimination against the handicapped, e.g., H.R. 13,199, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974); H.R. 10,963, 92d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1971).
17. Several bills to prohibit discrimination in employment practices with respect to
physically handicapped individuals were proposed this past year: S. 1346, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced by Senator Bayh (D, Ind.»; H.R. 264, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced by Representative Conte (R, Mass.»; H.R.
1107, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced by Representative O'Brien (R, Ill.»;
H.R. 1200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced by Representative Roe (D,
N.J.»; H.R. 488, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced by Representative Koch
(D, N.Y.»; H.R. 3504, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced by Representative
Edwards (D, Cal.) and Representative Drinan (D, Mass.».
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (Supp. V 1975).
19. Prior to the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act, affirmative action requirements
had been imposed only by Executive Order. See Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R.
86 (Supp. 1961), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 631 app. at 362 (1964), superseded by Exec.
Order No. 11,246 as amended, 3 C.F.R. 167 (Supp. 1965).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (Supp. V 1975). The section states:
(a) Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal
department or agency for the procurement of personal property and
nonpersonal services (including construction) for the United States shall
contain a provision requiring that, in employing persons to carry out
such contract the party contracting with the United States shall take
affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified
handicapped individuals as defined in section 706(6) of this title. The
provisions of this section shall apply to any subcontract in excess of
$2,500 entered into by a prime contractor in carrying out any contract for
the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (including construction) for the United States. The President shall implement
the provisions of this section by promulgating regulations within ninety
days after September 26, 1973.
(b) If any handicapped individual believes any contractor has
failed or refuses to comply with the provisions of his contract with the
United States, relating to employment of handicapped individuals, such
individual may file a complaint with the Department of Labor. The
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procurement of personal property and non-personal services (including construction) entered into by any federal department or agency
must contain a provision (an "affirmative action clause") requiring
the contractor to take affirmative action to employ and advance in
employment "qualified handicapped individuals" to carry out the
contract. A similar provision must be included in any subcontract in
excess of $2,500 entered into by the contractor in furtherance of its
federal contract. 21 Thus, the federal contractor and subcontractor
become obligated under the government contract to engage in
affirmative action to benefit the handicapped in employment.
Section 503 also provides that a handicapped individual who
believes a federal contractor or subcontractor has violated the
affirmative action clause of its contract may file a complaint with
the Department of Labor, which is authorized to investigate such
complaints and "take such action thereon as the facts and
circumstances warrant, consistent with the terms of such contract
and the laws and regulations applicable thereto."22
The Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) has promulgated regulations to implement Section 503 (the OFCCP regulations).23 These regulations
prohibit discrimination against the handicapped in all employment
decisions made by federal contractors. Included within the nondiscrimination obligation is a duty to "accommodate" the needs of

Department shall promptly investigate such complaint and shall take
such action thereon as the facts and circumstances warrant, consistent
with the terms of such contract and the laws and regulations applicable
thereto.
(c) The requirements of this section may be waived, in whole or in
part, by the President with respect to a particular contract or
subcontract, in accordance with guidelines set forth in regulations which
he shall prescribe, when he determines that special circumstances in the
national interest so require and states in writing his reasons for such
determination.
21. Id. § 793(a). It is questionable, however, whether a subcontract for supplies
essential to every aspect of the prime contractor's business, such as paper clips,
is "entered into . . . in carrying out" a federal contract. Both prime and
subcontractors will be referred to hereinafter as "contractors."
22. Id. § 793(b).
.
23. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.1 to .54 (1977). Executive Order No. 11,758,39 Fed. Reg. 2075
(1974), delegates to the Secretary of Labor the Presidential authority set forth in
§ 503(b) of the Rehabilitation Act to promulgate implementing regulations.
OFCCP also administers the affirmative action programs mandated under
Executive Order No. 11,246, which requires federal contractors and subcontractors with contracts for $10,000 or more to engage in affirmative action to
eliminate discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. See id. pts. 60-1 to 60. Under a recent Presidential
reorganization of the federal civil rights agencies, the OFCCP will continue to
enforce § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act and § 402 of the Veteran's Readjustment
Act, discussed at notes 36-40 and accompanying text infra, as well as Executive
Order 11,246 for at least two more years. During the interim, consideration will
be given to the transfer of its enforcement responsibility to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
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qualified handicapped employees and job applicants.24 The regulations reiterate the statutory requirement for the incorporation of an
affirmative action clause regarding the handicapped into all federal
contracts that exceed $2,500,25 with certain minor exceptions. 26 In
addition, the regulations impose an obligation upon all contractors
or subcontractors who hold federal contracts of $50,000 and employ

24. One federal court has held, however (in the process of finding no private cause of
action under § 503), that the section does not forbid discrimination against the
handicapped but merely "encourages" their employment. Moon v. Roadway
Exp., Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
The "accommodation" duty imposed by the regulations is discussed in detail
at notes 304-345 and accompanying text infra.
25. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.3 to .4 (1977). The affirmative action clause requires the
contractor to take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment
qualified handicapped individuals and prohibits discrimination on the basis of
physical or mental handicap in regard to any position for which the
handicapped individual is qualified. In addition, the clause binds the contractor
to post notices stating its obligation and the rights of handicapped employees
and job applicants under the law, and to notify unions or other employee
representatives of its legal obligation under the Rehabilitation Act. [d.
§ 60-741.4.
The affirmative action clause may be incorporated by reference into the
government contract. [d. § 60-741.22. The mere omission of the affirmative
action clause from a contract does not relieve the contractor or subcontractor of
the obligation imposed by the clause, however, since by operation of law, the
affirmative action clause is considered to be a part of every contract and
subcontract required by the Rehabilitation Act and the OFCCP regulations to
include such a clause, whether or not it is physically incorporated into the
contract and whether or not there is a written contract between the agency and
contractor. [d. § 60-741.23.
The federal contractor should be aware that the financial amount involved
in contracts covered by the Rehabilitation Act, $2,500, is much less than the
amount involved in contracts covered under other legislative and executive
affirmative action mandates. For example, both Executive Order No. 11,246 and
the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Act, 38 U.S.C. § 2012 (Supp. V 1975),
apply only to federal contracts exceeding $10,000.
The OFCCP regulations specifically require that the affirmative action
clause be included in contracts and subcontracts for indefinite quantities, unless
the contracting agency has reason to believe that the amount to be ordered in
any year under the contract will be less than $2,500. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.3(a)(2)
(1977). Finally, the regulations specify that no agency, contractor, or subcontrac·
tor may procure supplies or services in less than usual quantities to avoid the
applicability of the affirmative action clause. [d. § 60-741.3(a)(1).
26. Pursuant to subsection c of § 503, the President has the authority to waive the
requirements of the Section when the national interest warrants. The OFCCP
regulations provide that the requirements of the affirmative action clause are
waived with regard to work performed outside the United States 'by the
contractor's employees who were not recruited within the United States. The
Director of the OFCCP also may waive the application to any contract or
subcontract of any part or all of the affirmative action clause, if he deems thltt
the waiver is in the national interest. Moreover, an agency head, with the
concurrence of the Director, may grant waivers to groups or categories of
subcontracts or contracts of the same type where it is in the national interest,
where it is found impracticable to act upon each request for a waiver
individually, and where the waiver will substantially contribute to convenience
in administration of § 503 of the Act. Such waivers can be withdrawn at the
Director's discretion. In addition, the head of a subcontracting agency may
decline to apply any requirement in the regulations to a contract or subcontract
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50 or more persons to prepare and maintain at each establishment27
a written program of affirmative action (an affirmative action plan)
to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped
individuals. 28 These affirmative action and non-discrimination
when its award without compliance with the regulatory requirements is
necessary to the national security. 41 C.F.R. § 6D-741.3(b) (1977).
It should be noted that § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act requires federal
contractors to engage in affirmative action only "in employing persons to carry
out the [federal] contract." The OFCCP regulations contain a conclusive
presumption that all of the contractor's employees at the plant or facility where
work is being done on the federal contract are in fact engaged in work to carry
out the contract. Nevertheless, the fact that an individual complainant was not
employed to work on the federal contract, or is involved in a very tangential
manner, is a possible defense that should not be ignored by the employer. In this
regard, the regulations permit the Director of OFCCP to waive the requirements
of the affirmative action clause with respect to any of a prime contractor's or
subcontractor's facilities that he finds to be in all respects separate and distinct
from activity of the contractor related to the performance of the federal contract,
if such a waiver would not interfere with or impede the effectuation of the Act.
The waiver, however, must be specifically requested by the contractor or
subcontractor. Id. § 6D-741.3(a)(5). With respect to state or local governments
that enter into contracts with the federal government, on the other hand, the
regulations state that the affirmative action clause does not apply to those local
or state governmental agencies, instrumentalities, or subdivisions that do not
participate in work on or under the federal contract or subcontract. No request
for a waiver of their coverage therefore need be made. Id. § 6D-741.3(a)(4).
The private sector federal contractor may be able to exclude subsidiaries not
involved with the federal contract or subcontract from the affirmative action
obligations, if the tests for joint employer status under the National Labor
Relations Act are not met. See Ernst·Theodore Arndt, 52 COMPo GEN. 145 (1972);
Nash, Affirmative Action Under Executive Order 11,246, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 225,
251 (1971).
27. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.5(a) (1977). But see note 26 supra.
28. The elements of the affirmative action plan also constitute the agency's criteria
for determining whether a contractor with less than $50,000 in government
contracts has complied with its obligations under the law. Thus, the only
difference the regulations establish between large and small contractors is that
the large contractor must set forth its affil1TIative action policies, practices and
procedures in a written plan. Compare 41 C.F.R. §6D-741.5(a) (1977) with id.
§60-741.6.
The discussion herein of the affirmative action program obligations imposed
upon government contractors by Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act is limited
to a general overview and to an analysis of the distinctions between affirmative
action and nondiscrimination. This article, therefore, will not set forth a detailed
discussion of the elements of affirmative action plans. The various items that
must be included within affirmative action plans are set forth at 41 C.F.R.
§ 60-741.6 (1977). In brief, the plan must contain a statement of the contractor's
affirmative action policy, must set forth plans for the internal and external
dissemination of the policy, must assign responsibilities for the implementation
of the policy to corporate officials, must show that the contractor has issued an
invitation to handicapped employees and job applicants to identify themselves in
order to take advantage of the affirmative action program, must provide for a
review of personnel processes to determine whether present procedures provide
for the systematic consideration of known handicapped individuals for vacancies
and promotions, must provide for a review of all physical and mental
qualifications for the purpose of ensuring that they do ~not factor out
handicapped individuals for reasons that are not job related or consistent with
business necessity and the safe performance of the job, must specify accommodations for the handicapped that are being made or planned, and must set forth
other affirmative action programs to benefit the handicapped that the employer
is developing or executing. The affirmative action plan required under this
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obligations are imposed upon state and local governments and their
agencies, as well as private companies, that contract with or do
subcontract work for the federal government. 29
The OFCCP regulations also establish complaint procedures and
provide for investigation and conciliation of such complaints. 30 If the
OFCCP investigation of a complaint reveals contractor noncompliance that cannot be resolved during conciliation,31 and the
opportunity for a hearing is provided, the Director of OFCCP is
section is very similar to that required under Executive Order 11,246 and the
OFCCP regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, with the exception that the
federal contractor is not required to establish goals and timetables with respect
to employment of the handicapped. Compare 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6 with id. pt.
60-2, especially § 2.12.
Contrary to its approach under Executive Order No. 11,246, OFCCP has been
concentrating its enforcement efforts with respect to § 503 on investigation of
discrimination complaints rather than on compliance reviews of affirmative
action programs. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS
ADMINiSTRATION, OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS TASK
FORCE, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE REVITALIZATION OF THE FEDERAL
CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 100 (1977) (hereinafter cited as OFCCP TASK
FORCE REPORT). The Task Force, however, has recommended that the Agency
establish a system for the targeting and conduct of compliance reviews in
addition to the complaint system, and that the compliance review program be
merged with the one currently in operation to enforce Executive Order No.
11,246. Id. at xvii·iii. The Secretary of Labor recently stated that the Department
will begin compliance reviews on randomly selected contractors and subcontractors, to be conducted by OFCCP's regional offices. See [1977] 6 DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) A-5 to A-6.
A more detailed analysis of the components of an affirmative action plan
can be found in Note, Lowering Barriers to Employment of the Handicapped:
Affirmative Action Obligations Imposed on Federal Contractors, 81 DICK. L.
REV. 174 (1976); Note, Affirmative Action Toward Hiring Qualified Handicapped
Individuals, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 785 (1976). An excellent review of many of the
issues pertinent to Rehabilitation Act discrimination cases is set forth in Wright,
Equal Treatment of the Handicapped by Federal Contractors, 26 EMORY L.J. 65,
65-106 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Equal Treatment). For a discussion of the
wisdom of utilizing government contracts as a means for achieving societal
goals through affirmative action, see Morgan, Achieving National Goals
Through Federal Contracts: Giving Form to an Unconstrained Administrative
Process, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 301.
29. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1977) defines a "government contract" as:
Any agreement or modification thereof between any contracting agency
and any person for the furnishing of supplies or services or for the use of
real or personal property including lease arrangements. The term
"services," as used in this section includes, but is not limited to the
following services: utility, construction, transportation, research, insurance and fund depository, irrespective of whether the government is the
purchaser or the seller. The term "government contract" does not include
(1) agreements in which the parties stand in a relationship of employer
and employee, and (2) federally-assisted contracts.
Section 60-741.2 defines a "person" as:
[A]ny natural person, corporation, partnership or joint venture, unincorporated association, state or local government, and any agency,
instrumentality, or subdivision of such a government. (emphasis added).
30. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.26 (1977).
31. Before a contractor will be deemed in compliance after an investigation reveals a
violation, it must make a specific written commitment to take corrective action.
See, id. § 60-741.26(g)(2). But see OFCCP Policy Clarification Memorandum
78-12/60-2, reprinted in 1978 DAILY LAB. REP. No. 50 (BNA) (written
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authorized by the regulations
to debar contractors found in
violation of the affirmative action clause from receiving further
federal contracts, to withhold their contract progress payments, and
to suspend, cancel, or terminate their current contracts. 32 The
Director also is empowered to seek judicial action to enforce the
affirmative action clause, including injunctive relief, without first
providing a hearing on the alleged noncompliance. 33 In attempting

conciliation agreement not normally required under Executive Order 11,246
regulations in certain circumstances, such as when no show cause order issued
against contractor and there are only minor deficiencies in the affirmative action
program).
32. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.28 to .30 (1977). The regulations state that hearings on
violations of the Rehabilitation Act must be conducted in accordance with
OFCCP's rules of practice applicable to hearings on violations of Executive
Order 11,246 which are set forth in 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-30. Id. § 60-741.29(b) (revised
in 42 Fed. Reg. 19146 (1977)).
Employers who rely heavily on government contracts as a source of business
should recognize the risk they take by refusing to conciliate a complaint found
meritorious during an OFCCP investigation. If, after a hearing, the Assistant
Secretary of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, concludes that a
violation of the affirmative action clause occurred, he is authorized by the
regulations not only to enjoin the violation and require the contractor to provide
remedial relief, but also to impose any of the sanctions discussed in the text
supra - i.e., debarment from future contracts, suspension, termination, or
cancellation of current contracts, and withholding of progress payments on
current contracts. 41 C.F.R. § 60-30.30(a) (1977). The Assistant Secretary's choice
of which sanctions to impose is virtually unlimited, with the exception that the
regulations require that the OFCCP's "complaint" against the contractor, which
is issued prior to the hearing, must include a statement of the sanctions that the
government expects to impose. Id. § 60-30.5(b). OFCCP can, in practice, enforce
the debarment, suspension, termination, cancellation or withholding of contract
progress payments without a court order. Finally, failure to comply with the
Assistant Secretary's order "shall result in the immediate cancellation,
termination, and suspension of the respondent's contract and/or debarment of
the respondent from future contracts." Id. § 60-30.30(a). Under this provision,
OFCCP also is enabled to compel compliance with the injunctive and remedial
aspects of its orders, which typically would require judicial enforcement, by the
threat of withdrawal of government contracts if the orders are not complied with.
The final administrative order of the Director of OFCCP is subject to judicial
review under the standards set forth in the federal Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. §§551-576, 701-703 (1970). See Pan American World Airways v.
Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Timken Co. v. Vaughan, 413 F. Supp.
1183 (N.D. Ohio 1976). A stay of administrative action pending judicial review
would be available in some cases. See generally 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw TREATISE § 23.19 (1958). A preliminary injunction against debarment or
other sanctions imposed without compliance with the hearing procedure set forth
in the regulations would also be available. See Pan American World Airways v.
Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). For a general discussion of the due
process rights of government contractors, see Steadman, Banned in Boston and Birmingham and Boise and . . . . ": Due Process in the Debarment and
Suspension of Government Contractors, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 793 (1976).
33. Compare 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.28(b) (1977) with id. § 60-741.29(a).
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to remedy discriminatory acts through conciliation, OFCCP has
regularly pursued both reinstatement and back pay relief for
handicapped complainants, even though the regulations do not
expressly empower the agency to seek such relief. 34 In part because
of these administrative enforcement mechanisms, the existence of a

34. The regulations do not specifically provide for back pay awards in conciliation
agreements. See id. §§ 60-741.26(g), .28(a). Nevertheless, OFCCP has supervised
conciliations wherein the complainant was awarded back pay and reinstate·
ment. See News Release of Employment Standards Administration, Department
of Labor (Jan. 10, 1977) (more than $115,000 has been paid to handicapped
workers in settlements of charges brought under § 503, with settlements ranging
from $231 to $12,000); OFCCP VETERANS AND HANDICAPPED WORKERS PROGRAM
OPERATIONS DIVISION, SUMMARY OF BACK PAY CASES (available from United
States Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Office of
Federal Contract Compliance Programs, Veterans and Handicapped Workers
Program Operations Division, Room No. N-3402, New Department Labor
Building, Washington, D. C. 20210) (hereinafter cited as OFCCP BACK PAY
CASES SUMMARY). See also OFCCP VETERANS AND HANDICAPPED WORKERS
PROGRAM OPERATIONS DIVISION, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL
40-43 (available from same source) (hereinafter cited as OFCCP STANDARD
OPERATING MANUAL).
OFCCP relies upon U. S. v. Duquesne Light Co., 423 F. Supp. 507 (W.D. Pa.
1976), as authority for its assertion of the power to require back pay and
reinstatement. In that case, OFCCP sought injunctive relief, including back pay,
against Duquesne Light Co. for violations of Executive Order 11,246. The court
pointed out that § 209(a)(2) of the Executive Order empowered the Secretary of
Labor to recommend to the Department of Justice that "appropriate proceedings" be brought to enforce the contractual provisions set forth in the order, and
held that this reference to "appropriate proceedings" conferred discretion to
invoke the equitable powers of the court.
While § 503(b) of the Rehabilitation Act does not specifically authorize
judicial proceedings against violators of the Rehabilitation Act, or make any
mention of the type of relief available to discrimination victims, it does empower
the Department of Labor to "promptly investigate [complaints of violations of
the affirmative action clause] and ... take such action thereon as the facts and
circumstances warrant, consistent with the terms of such contract and the laws
and regulations applicable thereto." This provision does not appear to permit
back pay relief for complainants, particularly in light of the fact that when
Congress has intended that such back pay relief be made available to
discrimination complainants, it specifically has so provided. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975) (remedial provision of Title VII). McNutt v. Hills, 426
F. Supp. 990, 1002 (D.D.C. 1977), compared Title VII with § 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (Supp. V 1975), which requires federal
agencies to adopt plans of affirmative action to employ the handicapped, and
reached the conclusion that § 501 did not constitute a waiver of sovereign
immunity since, like § 503, it did not mention a back pay remedy. Compare
Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271, 1278 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
934 (1970) with Pettit v. United States, 488 F.2d 1026, 1031-32 (Ct. Cl. 1973),
which differ on the issue of whether a federal employee may obtain back pay for
violations of executive Order 11 ,246.
In any event, it can be argued that victims of discrimination violative of an
employer's contract with the federal government are limited to the type of relief
generally available in suits by a third party beneficiary to a contract - i.e.,
specific enforcement rather than damages. The Duquesne court rejected this
argument, however, holding that the action was actually one to enforce a
statutorily authorized administrative program, and "the remedies available to
enforce such a measure should not be limited to those discernible by references to
ordinary principles of contract law." 423 F. Supp. at 510, n.5.
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private cause of action against an employer under Section 503 is
doubtfu1. 35
b.

Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment
Assistance Act of 1974
Section 402 of the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment
Assistance Act of 197436 (hereinafter referred to as the Veterans'
Readjustment Act) imposes an obligation upon persons that have
federal contracts of $10,000 or more to take affirmative action to
employ and advance in employment qualified disabled veterans and
veterans of the Vietnam era. In addition, the Veterans' Readjustment Act requires government contractors and subcontractors to list
job opportunities and to file reports with state employment service
agencies. 37
35. The statutory prOVISIOn for administrative enforcement of the law is an
indication that Congress did not intend for § 503 to be enforced through private
suits. Cf. Nat'l RR Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of RR Passengers, 414 U.S.
453 (1974) (Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 does not imply a private cause of
action); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'g 406
F. Supp. 1257 (D.C. Ill. 1976), aff'd on rehearing, 559 F.2d 1077 (7th Cit: 1976)
(Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 does not imply a private cause of
action). Congress' repeated rejection of attempts to amend Title VII, which does
provide a private remedy, to include the handicapped, see note 16 supra, is a
further indication that it intended to provide no private remedy for handicap
discrimination under § 503.
At the very least, it would appear that a private cause of action to enforce
§ 503 would be available only when the suit challenges "wholesale .. .
discrimination against a large number of [individuals] by a particular .. .
institution." Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 559 F.2d at 1074. The cases that have
considered the issue of whether § 503 provides a private cause of action put the
weight of authority on the negative side. Wood v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 440 F.
Supp. 1002 (D. Del. 1977); Moon v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D.
Ga. 1977); Coleman v. Darden, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6788 (D. Colo. 1977) and
Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1977), held that § 503 did
not establish a private cause of action, while Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen.
Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977), concluded that § 503 established a
private cause of action, but that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior
to suit. It should be noted that the Drennon court relied in part upon decisions
holding that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act establishes a private cause of action.
Section 504 is distinguishable in that it does not specifically establish a means
for administrative enforcement of the nondiscrimination obligation imposed
upon programs receiving federal financial assistance. See Wood v. Diamond
State Tel. Co., 440 F. Supp. at 1008 (legislative history of § 504 not helpful in
interpreting whether § 503 establishes private cause of action). In any event, the
implication of a private cause of action under § 504 is also qu·estionabie. See note
70 and accompanying text infra. For an exhaustive analysis of this issue, see
Equal Treatment, note 28 supra, at 89-97.
.
Section 503's provision for an administrative complaint procedure is more
similar to Executive Order 11,246 than to § 504. Several federal courts have held
that no private cause of action exists under Executive Order 11,246 or its
predecessors. See Farkas v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Traylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., F.E.P. Cas. 1762
(N.D. Cal. 1975); cf. Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964)
(no private right of action exists under Executive Order 11,246 when administrative remedies have not been exhausted). Contra, Lewis v. Western Air Lines, 379
F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
36. 38 U.S.C. § 2012 (Supp. V 1975).
:37. Id.
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The OFCCP has promulgated regulations (the OFCCP Veterans'
regulations), which correspond closely with those issued pursuant to
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, discussed above. 38 Besides
imposing general affirmative action obligations upon federal
contractors and subcontractors, the OFCCP Veterans' regulations
require contractors and subcontractors with federal contracts of
$50,000 and with 50 or more employees to prepare and maintain at
each establishment a written program of affirmative action to
employ and advance in employment disabled veterans and veterans
of the Vietnam era. 39 The OFCCP Veterans' regulations will be
separately discussed in this text only insofar as the obligations they
impose upon federal contractors with respect to disabled veterans
differ from the contractor's obligations to other handicapped
individuals, as set forth in the OFCCP regulations issued under
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act. 40
2.

Laws Regulating Programs Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance

a.

Section l11(b) of the Rehabilitation Act.

Under Section 111(b) of the 1974 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act,41 the affirmative action obligations imposed by Section 503
38. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-250.1 to .54 (1977).
39. 41 C.F.R. § 60-250.5(a) (1977). Both the OFCCP § 503 regulations and the OFCCP
Veterans' regulations provide that the affirmative action plan required may be
integrated into other affirmative action plans of the contractor. Compare id. with
id. § 60-741.5(a).
The government contractor who is covered by the Veterans' Readjustment
Act is also covered by § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act in most cases, so that a
combined affirmative action plan for the purposes of these two laws may be
advisable. There is a strong argument, however, against combining these two
plans with that required under Executive Order 11,246, since both the former
plans must be made available for employee inspection, 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-250.5(c),
741.5(d), while the latter need not be. See id. pts. 60-1 through 60-2. If the
Rehabilitation Act and Veterans' Readjustment Act affirmative action plans
were combined with the Executive Order 11,246 plan, the detailed goals and
timetables that must be set forth in Executive Order 11,246 affirmative action
plans would then become available to employees.
40. The major substantive difference between the two sets of regulations is in the
definition of the individuals covered. The OFCCP Veterans' regulations define a
"disabled veteran" as:
[A] person entitled to disability compensation under laws adminis·
tered by the Veterans Administration for disability rated at 30 per
centum or more, or a person whose discharge or release from active duty
was for a disability incurred or aggrevated [sic] in the line of duty.
41 C.F.R. § 60-250.2 (1977).
The Department of Labor has suggested that a disabled veteran could be
protected under the Veterans' Readjustment Act, but not.under the Rehabilitation Act, and vice versa. 41 Fed. Reg. 26386 (1976). But see note 172 infra
(suggesting that the OFCCP's definition of a handicap under the Rehabilitation
Act is so broad as to subsume the Veterans' Act definition).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 721(a) (Supp. V 1975). The amendment stated:
Section 101(a)(6) of [the Rehabilitation] Act [which sets forth some of the
components of the state plan required under Title I] is amended by
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of the Act upon federal contractors are also incumbent upon state
agencies and facilities for the handicapped that are funded under
Title I of the Rehabilitation Act. The legislative history of the 1974
amendments indicates Congress intended that this affirmative
action duty also be imposed upon privately owned rehabilitation
facilities and programs for the handicapped to which the states
funnel Rehabilitation Act funds available under Title 1. 42
b.

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

In contradistinction to Section 111(b)'s limited applicability to
federally funded rehabilitation programs for the handicapped and
its mandate for affirmative action, Section 50443 of the Rehabilitation Act affects all public and private sector programs that receive
federal financial assistance for any purpose, but merely imposes a
non-discrimination duty. Section 504 provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
States, as defined in Section 706(6) of this title, shall, solely
by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance. 44
adding at the end thereof before the semi-colon "(including a requirement that the StaJe Agency and the facilities in receipt of assistance
under this Title shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in
employment qualified handicapped individuals covered under, and on
the same terms and conditions set forth in, section 793 of this title)."
(emphasis added).
42. The Senate report on the amendment stated:
The new provision requires that each State agency and every other
facility in receipt of assistance under title I of the Act must take
affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified
handicapped individuals who are covered under Section 503 (thereby
applying the new defmition of "handicapped individual" which would be
added by Section 111(a) in H.R. 14225 and this identical original bill)
and on the same terms and conditions as set forth in Section 503
(relating to the affirmative action requirement under Federal contracts
and subcontracts) .
. . . [T]hose State agencies which administer a program for handicapped
individuals, along with facilities and other public and nonprofit private
agencies which provide services through funds under the Act, are
expected to adopt strong affirmative action programs which are at least
equivalent to those now being developed for Federal agencies. Moreover,
these State agencies and facilities should be held to the same exemplary
standard for affirmative action required of the Federal agencies with
particular responsibilities for programs affecting handicapped individuals, in order to serve as a model for compliance with the affirmative
action that is required of all Federal contractors and all Federal
subcontractors under Section 503 of the Act.
S. REP. No. 93-1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 6373, 6391-92 (emphasis added).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975).
44. [d. There is no explanation in the legislative history for Congress' use of the
phrase "qualified handicapped individuals" in § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act

198

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 7

The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare has promulgated regulations implementing Section 504 of the Act with regard to
federal financial assistance administered by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare,45 (the HEW regulations). Pursuant to
Executive Order 11,914, the Secretary has also promulgated
regulations (the Executive Order 11,914 regulations)46 to coordinate
the consistent enforcement of Section 504 by all federal agencies that

while using the phrase "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" in § 504 of
the Act. The regulations promulgated to implement § 504 by the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare, see note 45 infra, use the term "qualified
handicapped person." With respect to this usage, the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare has explained:
The Department believes that the omission of the word "otherwise" is
necessary in order to comport with the intent of the statute because, read
literally, "otherwise" qualified handicapped persons include persons who
are qualified except for their handicap, rather than in spite of their
handicap. Under such a literal reading, a blind person possessing all the
qualifications for driving a bus except sight could be said to be
"otherwise qualified" for the job of driving. Clearly, such a result was
not intended by Congress. In all other respects, the terms "qualified"
and "otherwise qualified" are intended to be interchangeable.
42 Fed. Reg. 22676, 22686 (1977) (Appendix to final HEW regulations on
"Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities
Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance," Subpart A general provisions, ~ 5) (emphasis added).
45. 42 Fed. Reg. 22676-22685 (1977) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (hereinafter
cited by C.F.R. title and section number). Section 5 of Executive Order 11,914,3
C.F.R. 117-18 (1977), authorizes the Secretary of HEW to adopt rules and
regulations and issue orders necessary to implement § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.
46. 42 Fed. Reg. 2132 (1977) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 85) (hereinafter
cited by C.F.R. title and section number). Section 1 of Executive Order 11,914, 3
C.F.R. 117 (1977), authorizes the Secretary of HEW to coordinate the implementation of § 504 by all federal departments and agencies empowered to extend
federal financial assistance to any program or activity. Specifically, the
Secretary is authorized to establish standards for determining who are
handicapped individuals and to adopt guidelines for determining what are
discriminatory practices, which standards and guidelines are set forth in the
proposed Executive Order 11,914 regulations.
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extend financial assistance,47 each of which is expected to issue its
own regulations effectuating Section 504.48
All of the Section 504 regulations issued to date purport to
govern employment practices,49 but their authority to do so is fat
from clear. Although Section 111(b) of the 1974 amendments,
discussed above, clearly applies to the employment practices of
programs receiving federal funds under Title I of the Rehabilitation
Act, Section 504 makes no reference to employment practices of the
other federally funded programs to which it applies.
47. Both the HEW and the proposed Executive Order 11,914 regulations define a
"recipient" of federal financial assistance governed by the regulations as
[a]ny state or its political subdivision[s], any instrumentality of a state
or its political subdivision, any public or private agency, institution,
organization, or other entity, or any person to which federal financial
assistance is extended directly or through another recipient, including
any successor, assignee, or transfere of a recipient, but excluding the
ultimate beneficiary of the assistance.
Compare 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(0 with id. § 85.3(d). In Simon v. St. Louis County Police
Dept., 14 F.E.P. Cas. 1363 (E.D. Mo. 1977), the court held that a plaintiff
charging a violation of § 504 must allege that the particular job category in
which he was allegedly discriminated against was part of a program or activity
receiving federal funds, unless he asserts that he was discriminated against with
respect to all employment in a federally funded program. The case therefore
implies that the § 504 obligation applies only to the specific program of a state or
local government that is federally funded, and that, for example, the fact that a
university's science program is federally funded would not subject its athletic
program to the § 504 obligation, unless that program also was federally funded.
"Federal financial assistance" is defined by both the HEW and Executive
Order 11,914 regulations as
any grant, loan, contract (other than a procurement contract or a
contract of insurance or guaranty), or any other arrangement by which
the Department [agency] provides or otherwise makes available
assistance in the form of:
(1)
Funds;
(2)
Services of Federal personnel; or
(3)
Real and personal property or any interest in or use of such property,
including:
transfers or leases of such property for less than fair market
(i)
value or for reduced consideration; and
(ii)
proceeds from a subsequent transfer or lease of such property if
the federal share of its fair market value is not returned to the
Federal Government.
Compare 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(h) with id. § 85.3(e).
48. The Small Business Administration (SBA) has issued proposed regulations for
the implementation of §504. 43 Fed. Reg. 9488-9493 (1978) (proposed for
codification in 13 C.F.R. pt. 113) (hereinafter cited by C.F.R. title and section
number). In addition, the Treasury Department has promulgated interim
regulations pursuant to § 122 of the State and Local Assistance Act of 1972, as
amended, 31 U.S.C.A. § 1242(a)(I) (West Supp. 1977), which makes the provisions
of § 504 applicable to state or local governments receiving revenue·sharing funds.
Section 51.50 of the Treasury regulations states that a purpose of the regulations
is to prohibit discrimination with respect to an otherwise qualified handicapped
individual, as provided in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 42 Fed. Reg.
18362-18372 (1977) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. pt. 51) (hereinafter cited by C.F.R.
title and section number); 31 C.F.R. §~ 51.52 to .53 (1976).
49. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.11 to .14, 85.52 to .55; 31 C.F.R. §§ 51.52 to .53 (1976). 13 C.F.R.
§§ 113.3 to .3-3.
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The wording of Section 504 is similar to that of Section 901 of
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, as amended/>O which
prohibits sex discrimination in educational programs receiving
federal financial assistance. In Romeo Community Schools u.
H.E. W.,51 a federal district court in Michigan held that HEW
regulations 52 promulgated to implement Title IX were invalid to the
extent that they purported to govern the employment practices of
educational programs receiving federal financial assistance. The
court reasoned that:
Though cast in broad terms, § 1681 [Section 901 of Title IX]
nevertheless addresses itself only to sex discrimination
against the participants in and the beneficiaries of federally
assisted education programs. Section 1681 must therefore be
read to protect from sex discrimination only those persons
for whom the federally assisted education programs are
established, and this can only mean the school children in
those programs. As a reference to faculty employees, the
language of § 1681 is indirect, if not obscure . . . . Teachers,
in short, are hard pressed to fit themselves within the plain
meaning of § 1681's prohibitory language, general as it may
appear on its face. When Congress means to statutorily
regulate employment discrimination, it uniformly does so in
more explicit terms than this. 53
50.
51.
52.
53.

20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. V 1975).
438 F. Supp. 1021, (E.D. Mich. 1977).
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.51 to .71 (1976).
438 F. Supp. at 1031-1032. See also Seattle Univ. v. H.E.W., 16 FEP Cas. 719 at
720 (1978). But see McCarthy v. Burkholder, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 7926 (D. Kan.
1977).
Both Title IX and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act track the language of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970 & Supp. V 1975), which
prohibits federally assisted programs from discriminating on the basis of race,
color or national origin. The Romeo court rejected an argument that the absence
of an explicit provision in Title IX, similar to § 604 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(d)(2), which specifically excludes employment discrimination from
coverage of Title VI, showed a congressional intent to make Title IX broader
than Title VI in this respect. The court noted that Title IX was· enacted as part of
a legislative program which also included an amendment to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, enlarging the scope of that provision to include sex
discrimination in employment, and an amendment to the Equal Pay Act
authorizing the Secretary of Labor to regulate sex discrimination in educational
employee compensation. Thus, the court held, the addition to Title IX of a
provision similar to § 604 in Title VI would have created some inherent
contradiction between Title IX, Title VII, and the Equal Pay Act. Romeo
Community Schools v. H.E.W., 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1030 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
Like Title IX, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not specifically exclude
employment practices from coverage. Although a construction of § 504 that
would render it applicable to employment practices would not conflict with Title
VII, which does not cover handicapped status discrimination, the defeat of
amendments that would have expanded Title VII to provide such coverage
buttresses the conclusion that Congress did not mean to cover employment
discrimination on the basis of a handicap, except where it specifically so
provides. See note 16 supra.
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The Romeo court's rationale in invalidating employment
regulations derived from a statute unrelated to employment is
pertinent to the legality of the Section 504 regulations insofar as
they attempt to govern employment practices of federally assisted
programs. Congress used explicit terms in certain sections of the
Rehabilitation Act, such as Section 503 and Section 111(b) of the
1974 amendments discussed above, that were directed towards
employment practices, and there are additional specific references to
employment practices in the Act. For example, Section 501, entitled
"Employment of Handicapped Individuals," specifically requires
federal agencies and departments to prepare affirmative action
programs for the employment of the handicapped; requires the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to "encourage" the
appropriate state agencies to adopt and implement policies and
procedures to facilitate the hiring, placement, and advancement in
employment of individuals who have received rehabilitation services; and requires that special consideration be given to qualified
handicapped individuals in filling vacancies on the President's
Committee on Employment of the Handicapped. 54 The specificity of
these provisions strengthens the argument that Congress, which did
not include employment language in Section 504, did not intend to
regulate the employment practices of programs receiving federal
financial assistance. 55
Notwithstanding the arguments against the application of
Section 504 to the employment practices of programs receiving
federal financial aid (other than those funded directly under Title I
of the Rehabilitation Act), the HEW, Executive Order 11,914, and
Treasury regulations all cover employment. For example, the HEW
regulations specifically prohibit discrimination against qualified
handicapped individuals in all employment practices, including the
development and application of employment criteria and preemployment inquiries. 56 In addition, the recipient of federal financial
assistance is required to provide HEW with an "assurance" that its
program will be conducted in full compliance with the regulations.57

54.
55.
56.
57.

29 U.S.C. § 791 (Supp.V 1975).
See also discussion at note 79 and accompanying text infra.
45 C.F.R. §§84.11 to .14.
ld. § 84.5. The "assurance" must be set forth on a form provided by the Secretary
of HEW. Breach of the "assurance" can give rise to a judicial action for
enforcement. See id. § 80.8(a). It therefore is conceivable that federally funded
programs could be bound by their assurance to comply with regulations that, in
and of themselves, would be unenforceable. Accordingly, some recipients of
federal financial assistance have questioned whether they should limit their
"assurance" to a promise to comply with all valid regulations. HEW has stated,
however, that the assurance does not preclude a recipient from raising the
invalidity of a regulation as a defense in an enforcement action. See Letter from
Peter Libassi, General Counsel, HEW, to Jay Hedgepth, General Counsel,
American Hospital Association (July 8, 1977).
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Moreover, the recipient must conduct a "self-evaluation," enlisting
the aid of "interested persons," such as handicapped persons or
organizations representing handicapped persons, to ascertain
whether any modifications are necessary to bring the federally
financed program into compliance with the regulations, and whether
"remedial steps" should be taken to eliminate the effects of past
discrimination. 58 Any recipient with fifteen or more employees is
required to establish grievance procedures for handling complaints
under the Act, and to appoint an employee to coordinate its efforts to
comply with the regulations. 59 The recipient with fifteen or more
employees also is required to notify job applicants, employees, and
unions or professional organizations with which it has collective
bargaining agreements that the recipient does not discriminate on
the basis of handicap.60
In some respects, the HEW regulations more closely control
employment practices than do the OFCCP regulations addressed to

58. 45 C.F.R. § 84.6. The "self·evaluation" must be completed within one year after
the effective date of the regulations - by June 3, 1978. Recipients with fifteen or
more employees must maintain a list of the persons consulted, areas examined,
problems identified, modifications made, and remedial steps taken on file for
three years. The file must be made available for public inspection and provided
to the Director on request.
Needless to say, the self·evaluation should be approached very carefully.
There is a possibility of conflict with the concept of exclusive representation of
employees by collective bargaining representatives, if management confers with
the representatives of handicapped employees without first notifying their
union, or if management makes personnel policy changes that conflict with the
collective bargaining agreement. C{. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970); The Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975)
(employees who sought to bargain separately with employer as to the elimination
of racially discriminatory practices are not free from the exclusivity principle of
the National Labor Relations Act); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
678 (1944) (employer violates National Labor Relations Act by disregarding the
bargaining representative to negotiate with individual employees over working
conditions).
Moreover, few employers would want to reveal to third parties detailed
information about business practices and problems when those third parties may
not be subject to a duty of confidentiality. Further, there is always the possibility
that the suggestions of such participants- during the evaluation might later be
admitted into evidence in litigation. Finally, depending upon the extent to which
HEW relies upon third party input, the agency may be accused of improperly
delegating to unidentified third parties, not subject to any standards, its own
duty to regulate compliance with the law. For a general discussion of the
subdelegation problem, see 1A K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE
§§ 9.05- .06 (1958).
59. 45 C.F.R. § 84.7. When employees are represented by a union, the employer
should permit union involvement in the grievance procedure if requested, and
obtain union approval before resolving a grievance by making any changes in
personnel policies that would conflict with the collective bargaining agreement.
See discussion at note 58 supra.
60. 45 C.F.R. § 84.8. The notification requirement was to be complied with by sixty
days after the effective date of the regulations, or by August 2, 1977.
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affirmative action in employment under Section 503,61 even though
the affirmative action duty of Section 503 connotes, conceptually at
least, a more onerous burden than the duty of nondiscrimination
imposed by Section 504. The term "nondiscrimination" merely
demands neutrality, while "affirmative action" requires a disposition in favor of the protected minority.62 Moreover, the HEW
regulations and the Executive Order 11,914 regulations, like the
OFCCP regulations, require recipients to make "reasonable accommodations" to the known physical or mental limitations of qualified
handicapped job applicants, unless the accommodations would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the federally financed
program. 63 Whether Section 504 authorizes the implementing
regulations to impose an "accommodation" burden in employment
also is unclear, since accommodation is conceptually an affirmative
method of alleviating discrimination that generally is imposed only
by a specific legislative or executive mandate for either accommodation or broad affirmative action. 64 No such mandate appears in
Section 504.
The HEW regulations incorporate by reference the procedural
regulations issued pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,65 which set forth a complaint procedure for discrimination
victims 66 and authorize informal conciliation of complaints. 6? The
procedural regulations also permit HEW to suspend or terminate
federal financial assistance after a hearing, to refer complaints to
the Department of Justice for judicial enforcement of the rights of
the United States under "any law of the United States, or any
assurance or other contractual undertaking," and to engage in other
applicable proceedings under state or local law. 68 The Executive
Order 11,914 regulations instruct other federal agencies to adopt the
Title VI procedures. 69 The weight of judicial authority presently

61. For a comparison of the rules on pre-employment inquiries and physicals under
the HEW and OFCCP regulations, see notes 283-295 and accompanying text
infra.
62. See, e.g., Note, Affirmative Action Toward Hiring Handicapped Individuals, 49
S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 800 n.77 (1976).
63. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.12(a), 84.55; 41 C.F.R. § 6D--741.6(d) (1977).
64. See discussion at notes 305-308 and accompanying text infra.
65. 45 C.F.R. § 84.61. The Title VI complaint and hearing procedures are set forth at
id. §§ 80.6-80.10, 81.1 to .131.
66. 45 C.F.R. § 80.6.
67. Id. § 80.7(d).
68. Id. § 80.8.
69. Id. § 85.5.
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supports the existence of a private cause of action under Section 504,
at least when the plaintiff exhausts existing administrative remedies. 70
70. A private right of action under § 504 has been recognized in several cases. See
Davis v. Southeastern Community College, No. 77-1237 (4th Cir., filed March 28,
1978), rev'g 424 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D.N.C. 1976); Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d
296 (2d Cir. 1977) (motion for preliminary injunction denied on other grounds to
individual plaintiffs attacking school policy forbidding visually handicapped
students to participate in public school contact sports); United Handicapped
Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977) (defendant's motion for summary
judgment denied in class action attacking inequality of access by mobility
handicapped persons to urban transportation system); Lloyd v. Regional Transp.
Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977) (defendant's motion to dismiss denied in
class action attacking inequality of access by mobility handicapped persons to
public transportation system); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635
(D.S.C. 1977) (preliminary injunction granted in private action challenging
denial of interpreters to deaf students enrolled in private college that received
federal funds); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (defendant's motion to dismiss denied in private action alleging that the
city-owned hospital's employment policy of denying jobs to persons who had
epileptic seizures less than two years before application violated §§ 503 and 504,
but action stayed pending administrative proceedings); Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F.
Supp. 1190 (N.D. W. Va. 1976) (plaintiffs motion for summary judgment in
private action seeking declaratory judgment that, inter alia, denial of access by
prisoner to federally funded prison vocational rehabilitation program violated
§ 504 granted in relevant part); Bartels v. Biernat, 405 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Wis.
1975) (permanent injunction granted in class action seeking to restrain
transportation board from owning public mass transit system that did not assure
availability of mass transportation to handicapped persons). Ct. Crawford v.
University of North Carolina, 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.S.C. 1977) (preliminary
injunction granted, noting probable jurisdiction under § 504); Duran v. City of
Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (preliminary injunction denied on other
grounds in private action challenging denial of public employment due to history
of epilepsy); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. W. Va. 1976) (violation of
§ 504 found in private action requesting injunction against exclusion of child
with spina bifida from public school classroom); Snowden v. BirminghamJefferson County Transit Auth., 407 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ala. 1975), atf'd, 551 F.2d
862 (5th Cir. 1977) (no violation of § 504 found in class action challenging denial
to mobility handicapped persons of access to public transportation facilities);
Simon v. St. Louis County Police Dept, 14 F.E.P. Cas. 1363 (E.D. Mo. 1977)
(individual action challenging employment discrimination in violation of § 504
dismissed with leave to amend, due to failure to allege that plaintiff was denied
all employment or that the particular job category in which he was the victim of
discrimination was a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance).
The case most often cited for the proposition that a private cause of action
exists under § 504 is Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir.
1977), which applied the four standards set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78
(1975) for determining whether a federal statute provides a private cause of
action. The Third Circuit concluded that § 504 was enacted for the special benefit \
of the handicapped, that the legislative history of the 1974 Amendments to the
Rehabilitation Act indicate the Congressional intent to permit private enforcement of § 504 of the Act, at least after any administrative remedies are exhausted
(see S. REP. No. 93-1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 6373, 6390-91), that it is consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy, and that a private
suit to enforce § 504 is not the kind of suit traditionally relegated to state law in
an area basically the concern of the states. 548 F.2d at 1284-87. Lloyd left open
the question, however, of whether administrative remedies under the HEW
regulations, which were not in existence when the case was decided, must be
exhausted prior to a private suit, id. at 1286 n.29. But see Drennon V.
Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Lloyd also left
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Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975

Section 6(a) of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975,71 which provides for federal assistance to fund public
education for handicapped children, requires that each recipient of
such assistance take "positive efforts" to employ and advance in
employment qualified handicapped individuals in programs funded
by the Act. The HEW regulations discussed above cite this Act, in
addition to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, as one of the
promulgating authorities.72 Thus, to the extent that the attempt of
the HEW regulations to govern the employment practices of
federally assisted programs pertains to educational programs for the
handicapped, Section 6(a) of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975 provides legislative support. Moreover, the
mandate to take "positive efforts" to employ the handicapped may
justify the imposition of such programs of more than a duty to avoid
discrimination. 73
unanswered the question of whether the private cause of action is available only
to a large class of plaintiffs and not to individual complainants. 548 F.2d at 1287.
On the latter question, see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, (7th
Cir. 1976); Crawford v. University of North Carolina, 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.S.C.
1977). Cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(approving court's holding that failure of school system to provide English
language instruction to students of Chinese ancestry violates § 601 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, in view of the large number of children affected by the lack of
such a program of instruction). It would appear that private actions alleging a
single instance of employment discrimination therefore might be distinguishable
from Lloyd. Duran u. City of Tampa, Drennon u. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., and
Simon u. St. Louis County Police Dep't, all of which involved single plaintiffs
challenging allegedly discriminatory employment practices, do not speak to this
issue, however. Employment discrimination cases are also distinguishable from
Lloyd in that the great majority of plaintiffs would have a remedy under state
law. See note 137 infra.
It should be noted that § 124 of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance
Amendments of 1976, 31 U.S.C.A. § 1244 (West. Supp. 1977) explicitly established
a private cause of action for violations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by
recipients of revenue sha'ring funds. See note 35 supra, for cases discussing a
private cause of action under § 503. For a detailed analysis of the private cause of
action issue under both sections of the Rehabilitation Act. See Equal Treatment,
supra note 28, at 89-97.
71. 20 U.S.C. § 1405 (Supp. V 1975).
72. See 42 Fed. Reg. 22676, 22678 (1977). In addition to the Education For All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as
amended, the HEW regulations also cite as among the promulgating authorities
§ 321 of the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention,
Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4581 (Supp. V 1975), and
§ 407 of the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, as amended, 21 U.S.C.
§ 1174 (Supp. V 1975). The latter two provisions deal with the responsibility of
federal agencies to provide equal access to treatment facilities to drug addicts
and alcoholics.
73. The HEW regulations so assume. 45 C.F.R. § 84.1l(a)(2). But cf. United
Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413, 415-16 (8th Cir. 1977) (reversing
lower court decision that nondiscrimination duties under § 504 and "special
efforts" duties under Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as amended, 49
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1613 (Supp. V 1975), were met, in light of regulations issued
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Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act

The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act7 4 provides for federal assistance to states and universities, and
for special grants to public and non-profit private entities to fund
programs and services for developmentally disabled individuals. 75
Section 106 conditions federal assistance provided pursuant to the
Act upon the requirement that
each recipient of such assistance take affirmative action to
employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped
individuals on the same terms and conditions required with
respect to the employment of such individuals by the
provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 which govern
employment (1) by State rehabilitation agencies and
rehabilitation facilities, and (2) under Federal contracts and
subcontracts. 76
Although there is scanty legislative history to aid in the
interpretation of Section 106,77 it apparently is intended to add
programs receiving federal aid under the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act to the list of employers required to
engage in affirmative action to employ the handicapped. As has
been discussed above, and as indicated in Section 106, the list
already included federal contractors (Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973), and state agencies and facilities receiving funds
under Title I of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 111(b) of the

74.
75.

76.
77.

pursuant to both statutes imposing "affIrmative duties"). Contra, Snowden v.
Birmingham-Jefferson County Transit Auth., 407 F. Supp. 394, 396-97 (N.D. Ala.
1975), aff'd, 551 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1977) (case decided before promulgation of
regulations but affirmed afterwards).
42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (Supp. V 1975).
The Act defines a "developmental disability" as
[A] disability of a person which(A) (i) is attributable to mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, or
autism;
(ii) is attributable to any other condition of a person found to be
closely related to mental retardation because such condition res~lts in
similar impairment of general intellectual functioning or adaptive
behavior to that of mentally retarded' persons or requires treatment and
services similar to those required for such persons; or
(iii) is attributable to dyslexia resulting from a disability described
in clause (i) or (ii) of this subparagraph;
(B) originates before such person attains age 18;
(C) has continued or can be expected to continue indefInitely; and
(D) constitutes a substantial handicap to such person's ability to
function normally in society.
42 U.S.C. § 6001(7) (Supp. V 1975).
Id. § 6005.
See H.R. REP. No. 94-58, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 919; CONF. COMM. REP. No. 940473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 40,
reprinted in U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 960.

1978]

Handicapped Employment Opportunity

207

1974 Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).78 Moreover, the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act, also discussed above,
which was enacted shortly after the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, adds federally assisted education
programs for the handicapped to the list of programs having
employment obligations with respect to the handicapped, although it
requires only "positive efforts," rather than affirmative action.
A comparison of these enactments with Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act is helpful in analyzing the coverage of Section
504. Since both the Education for All Handicapped Children Act and
the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act
were enacted subsequent to the Rehabilitation Act, and since, unlike
Section 504 of the' Rehabilitation Act, both specifically govern employment practices, these laws buttress the argument that Congress did not intend that Section 504 apply to employment practices
of programs receiving federal financial assistance. 79 In fact, these
enactments and Sections 111(b), 503, and 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, taken together, indicate a congressional scheme to regulate
employment practices as they affect the handicapped only with
respect to federal contractors and certain federally funded programs
specifically designed to benefit the handicapped. HEW has generated confusion in this area by issuing one set of regulations to
govern the treatment of the handicapped by all the federally funded
programs for which it is responsible, regardless of whether the
appropriations statute under which the program is funded imposes
any obligation to employ the handicapped and regardless of the
nature of any such obligation imposed. 80 To the extent that the
78. The reference to "affirmative action ... on the same terms and conditions
required by the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 which govern
employment by ... state rehabilitation agencies and rehabilitation facilities"
relates to § 111(B) of the Rehabilitation Act, which, as discussed previously,
imposes an affirmative action obligation upon state rehabilitation agencies and
facilities funded under Title I of the Act. Similarly, the reference to federal
contracts and subcontracts apparently relates to § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Thus, it can be inferred that Congress intended to make these affirmative action
obligations incumbent upon federal programs funded under the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act.
79. See also notes 53-57 and accompanying text supra.
The argument can be made, however, that Congress simply intended to
impose a more onerous obligation on employers administering those programs an affirmative action or positive efforts obligation, as opposed to a mere
prohibition on discrimination in employment - which arguably had already
been imposed by § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. This appears to be HEW's
understanding. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(a) with id. § 84.11(b). The surface logic
of this argument is nevertheless undermined by the specificity of the provisions
in the Rehabilitation Act, other than § 504, that explicitly apply to employment
practices, discussed previously.
80. As stated at p. 205 supra, the HEW regulations cite both the Education For All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, which applies to employment practices of
education programs for the handicapped, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
which does not apply to employment practices, among its promulgating
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regulations purport to govern the employment practices of employers
not specifically covered by the statutes cited as promulgating
authorities, they therefore are subject to challenge.
As currently interpreted by the implementing regulations, all
of the recently enacted statutes discussed above have significant import for both private and public sector ~mployment practices. At least
275,000 businesses and institutions, employing more than one third
of the country's work force, are federal contractors affected by
Section 503 of the Act and the implementing regulations. 81 In
addition, numerous private industries, private and state or municipal hospitals, and educational institutions receive federal financial
aid in the form of grants, loans, contracts, or other arrangements
with the government under which assistance is made available in
the form of funds, services of federal personnel, or governmentallyowned real and personal property. As HEW has interpreted Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, all of these federally financed
programs are prohibited from discriminating against, and are
required to accommodate, qualified handicapped employees and job
applicants. Some employers or institutions may be subject to the
provisions of both Sections 503 and 504. A notable example is a
hospital that receives federal financial assistance in the form of
research grants or construction funds, and that also has a
contractual arrangement with the government to provide services
or to perform research. 82 Because a vast number of public and
private entities do business with the federal government, and are
affected by the Rehabilitation Act, this legislation greatly increases
employment opportunities available to the handicapped and imposes
heavy burdens on many employers.
3. Application of Constitutional Provisions and
the Civil Right Acts to Handicap Discrimination
In addition to the new statutory remedies discussed above, the
handicapped are beginning to use some of the older civil rights
authorities. The regulations do not indicate that the sections pertaining to
employment practices are applicable only to educational programs for the
handicapped. They do, however, indicate that these programs are subject to a
"positive efforts," rather than a "nondiscrimination," obligation with respect to
employment of the handicapped. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(a) with id. § 84.11(b).
But ct. note 73 supra.
81. The Wall Street Journal, January 27, 1976, at 1, col. l.
82. Whether health care facilities that receive reimbursement for services to
Medicare or Medicaid recipients are government contractors is an open question
at the moment. In fact, the types of arrangements that will be deemed
government contracts is not at all clear. See Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp.,
428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (staying action pending exhaustion of
administrative remedies, and questioning whether research arrangement
between hospital and federal government was contractual in nature). One court
has also rejected a contention that a rehabilitation center receiving Medicaid and
Medicare reimbursements was a recipient covered by § 504. Trageser v. Libbie
Rehabilitation Center, Inc., No. 77-0191-R (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 1977) (app.
pending).
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statutes and constitutional provisions as means of securing
recompense for employment discrimination. An analysis of the
applicability of these laws to the handicapped thus is appropriate.
a.

Constitutional Provisions

Handicap discrimination by public employers and private
employers involved in state action 83 may violate the due process
clauses of the fourteenth 84 and fifth amendments. 85 Plaintiffs
who have asserted that their due process rights were offended by
employment practices discriminatory against the handicapped have
found support in the "irrebuttable presumption" analysis developed
by the Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur. 86
In Gurmankin v. Costanzo,87 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit invalidated as constituting an "irrebuttable
presumption" a school board rule that prohibited blind teachers, who
were otherwise eligible, from taking an exam to qualify them to
teach sighted students. 88 As defined by Gurmankin, an "irrebuttable
83. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving persons
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. When the state is
enmeshed in the affairs of a private employer, however, the private employer's
actions may be held to constitute state action sufficient to subject it to
constitutional standards. E.g., Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 408 (2d Cir.
1975) (employment actions of private university may constitute state action if
there is sufficient state financial support and regulation of hiring and the claims
to private status do not "by themselves outweigh the peculiar offensiveness of
the alleged misconduct"); Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n., 496
F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974) (hospital's receipt of Hill·Burton Act funds involved state
in its affairs sufficiently to warrant imposition of fourteenth amendment
procedural due process standards on hospital's dismissal of physician). But see
Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
943 (1976) (no state action when state support or control did not contribute to the
alleged discrimination) ..
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l.
85. Id. amend. V.
86. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). In LaFleur, the Court ruled that a mandatory maternity
leave policy under which· a pregnant teacher was required to take maternity
leave without pay beginning five months before the expected birth of her child,
even though many teachers would be physically able to continue working beyond
the arbitrary cutoff date, established an irrebuttable presumption of physical
incompetency. Such an irrebuttable presumption, the Court held, was a violation
of due process of law, /!.lthough it represented a "good faith effort to achieve a
laudable goal," because it unduly penalized a female teacher in the exercise of a
basic liberty - the right to bear a child. [d. at 648. "Irrebuttable presumptions"
infringing upon a protected right have not been allowed to stand where the fact
presumed was not "necessarily or universally true in fact," Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441, 452 (1973), where the presumption was permanent, Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972), and where the state had other reasonable alternative means
of making the determination presumed to be true. In this connection, it is not
sufficient for the state to show merely that the presumption results in greater
administrative convenience, speed, and efficiency, id. at 656-57.
87. 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977), aff'g 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
88. A condition precedent to due process analysis, of course, is the existence of a
protected right. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that Ms. Gurmankin
had a reasonable expectation of being admitted to the qualifying exam, since she
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presumption" arises when public sector employment policies
eliminate handicapped individuals from consideration for certain
jobs without providing an opportunity for the individuals to
demonstrate that, despite their handicap, they can perform the jobs.
The attack is not on the rationality of underlying competency
requirements for the job or upon the classifications they set forth,
but on the denial of an opportunity to prove that the requirements
can be met. 89 Thus, the judicial inquiry involves procedural rather
than substantive due process or equal protection analysis. 90
Several other federal courts have refused to dismiss suits by
handicapped individuals against public sector employers predicated
on the "irrebuttable presumption" theory.91 On the other hand, in
Coleman v. Darden,92 a federal district court in Colorado refused to
apply the theory to a requirement that legal research assistants have
the ability to read typewritten characters with the help of corrective
lenses. In effect, the court applied a substantive due process test,
stating that it was not "arbitrary or capricious" for an agency to set
had previously been issued a professional certificate by the Pennsylvania
Department of Education. Under the rules of the defendant school district, this
certificate was the only requirement for entrance to the examination. Thus, the
court held that the right to take the examination was a right arising under state
law, and its deprivation in an arbitrary manner violated due process. 556 F.2d at
188. In most cases of hiring discrimination, however, the establishment of the
protected right might be more difficult since there is no fundamental right to
public employment, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976). But
Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977)
(preliminary injunction denied on other grounds to plaintiff alleging denial of
due process in failure to hire due to City Civil Service Board medical standard
precluding employment of applicants with a history of epilepsy; court found a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the fourteenth amendment
claim). The establishment of a "reasonable expectation" of continued employ·
ment sufficient to warrant due process analysis has proved difficult for some
plaintiffs. Compare Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) with Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
The court awarded Ms. Gurmankin "rightful place seniority," ordering her
employment with seniority rights and all other rights that would have accrued
had she been permitted to take the examination. The lower court had found that
Ms. Gurmankin would have been offered suitable employment by September,
1970, if she had been permitted to take the examination when requested. 556 F.2d
at 188.
The Gurmankin court distinguished Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975)
(rejecting an "irrebuttable presumption" attack on the duration of relationship
requirements of the Social Security Act), on the ground, inter alia, that it
involved an attack on the rationality of the law rather than on the denial of an
opportunity to rebut a legislative presumption. 556 F.2d at 188 n.5; see 422 U.S.
at 772.
This approach has been roundly criticized, see, e.g., Note, Irrebuttable
Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1974).
Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977); Drennon v.
Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (W.O. Pa. 1977);
Hoffman v. Ohio
Youth Comm'n., 13 F.E.P. Cas. 30 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (dictum indicating that, if
case had not been moot, a violation of due process would have been found on the
grounds that the refusal to hire a blind plaintiff as a youth counselor because of
his blindness constituted an unconstitutional "irrebuttable presumption").
13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6788 (D. Colo. 1977).

cr.

89.

90.
91.

92.

cr.
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job-related physical requirements, and that the sight requirement
was in fact job-related. 93
The vitality of the "irrebuttable presumption" theory in
handicap discrimination cases may well depend upon whether the
court views the plaintiff's attack as directed towards an employer's
failure to provide a hearing, thus requiring procedural due process
analysis, as did the Gurmankin court; as an attack on the rationality
of the underlying employment criteria, requiring substantive due
process analysis, as was apparently the case in Coleman; or as an
attack on a legislative classification, thus requiring equal protection
analysis. Under substantive due process or equal protection
analysis, the plaintiff is less likely to prevail. 94 The trial court
opinion in Gurmankin indicates, however, that when the court is of
the view that procedural due process has been offended, it may
engage in a searching comparison of job duties and the corresponding competency requirements in its attempt to define the extent to
which the defendant must provide handicapped job applicants with
an opportunity to prove their ability.95
93. Id. at 6789.
94. See note 97 infra.
95. The Gurmankin trial court took extensive testimony on the methods blind
teachers can use to overcome problems that might be encountered as a result of
their handicaps. The court concluded:
The School District can reasonably and legitimately consider an
applicant's blindness in evaluating his or her qualifications for a
teaching position. [T]he testimony indicated that blind persons could be
successful teachers, but that special arrangements were necessary in
some areas. For example, blind teachers usually were not assigned to
lunchroom or playground supervision, and special arrangements
sometimes had to be made for administering tests or keeping records.
The special problems encountered by blind teachers and the kinds of
adjustments in normal school procedures that may be necessary are
relevant to a school district's evaluation of a blind applicant for a
teaching position.
In Ms. Gurmankin's case, however, the interviewers frequently did not
give her an opportunity to explain how she might overcome her
handicap, nor did the interviewers have sufficient background information to properly evaluate the prospects of a blind applicant for a teaching
position.
411 F. Supp. at 988.
In Hoffman v. Ohio Youth Com'n, 13 F.E.P. Cas. 30 (N.D. Ohio 1975), the
trial court .engaged in a similar analysis inquiring into minute aspects of the job
of a youth counselor, the areas in which a blind person might have difficulty,
and the accommodations that could be made by the employer to eliminate the
difficulties. The court concluded:
[T]his Court is of the view that the Ohio Youth Commission could have
accommodated Dr. Hoffman and explored the ways in which he could
have implemented such alternatives as utilized by Mr. Hallford and the
San Diego Department of Social Welfare without infringing upon the
rights of the State and its agencies to set National requirements for the
position of Youth Counselor ... and that the irrebuttable presumption
indulged in by the Commission in 1969 that a blind person could not
perform the duties of a Youth Counselor was unreasonable.
Id. at 35-36. The Hoffman court declined to determine whether the denial of
employment to Dr. Hoffman reached the constitutional magnitude of a violation
of the due process clause because the claims for relief were moot.
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Another potential area of constitutional applicability with
respect to the handicapped is the equal protection clause. 96 Several
substantive difficulties are associated with suits alleging a violation
of equal protection. Judicial inquiry into most such claims is limited
to an analysis of whether there is any "rational basis" for the
classification attacked, unless a fundamental right or a suspect
classification is involved, in which case the courts will apply "strict
scrutiny" to the classification and require the state to justify it with
a compelling state interest. 97 To date, public sector employment in
itself has not been recognized as a "fundamental" right sufficient to
invoke the "strict scrutiny" test unless an inherently "suspect"
classification was involved,98 and the handicapped have not been
These opinions indicate that courts inquiring into employment practices
alleged to constitute irrebuttable presumptions resulting in handicap discrimination will proceed to a large degree along the same lines of inquiry mandated by
the Rehabilitation Act and state fair employment statutes, discussed infra at
notes 229-263 and accompanying text. That is, the courts will review physical
standards for employment to ascertain whether they are in fact job-related, and
also will seek to determine whether reasonable accommodations could have been
made for the handicapped individual. To some extent, perhaps, this inquiry is
necessary to ascertain whether the irrebuttable presumption is in fact
universally true. Actually, however, the courts in irrebuttable presumption cases
are requiring that the standards for employment meet a test higher than the
rational basis test, see note 97 infra, a requirement that would not be imposed
had the attack been made upon the rationality of the employment standards
themselves under the equal protection clause.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. V; amend. XIV, § l.
97. Under this traditional approach to equal protection, most statutory classifications that do not involve a suspect class are upheld, since judicial scrutiny under
the rational basis test is extremely limited. Compare Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484 (1974) (state disability insurance program that excluded from coverage
certain disabilities resulting from pregnancy upheld as a non-gender based
classification, rationally related to the state's interest in maintaining the selfsupporting nature of the insurance program) with Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (plurality opinion) (applying compelling state interest test, on
grounds that sex is a "suspect" classification, to a statute that prohibited
servicewomen from claiming their husbands as dependents unless they showed
that the husband was in fact dependent on the wife for more than one-half of his
support).
Recently, the Court has begun to apply what appears to be an intermediate
test to classifications that, while not inherently "suspect," are deemed to require
close scrutiny. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying close scrutiny,
the Court struck down a statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males under
the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
(rejecting the "compelling state interest" test but applying close scrutiny to strike
down an Idaho statute giving preference to men over women as administrators
of a decedant's estate). For a discussion of this phenomenon in the development
of equal protection analysis, see Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine of a Changing Court: a Model of a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
98. See Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)
(upholding a Massachusetts statute requiring mandatory retirement of uniformed state police officers at age 50 against a challenge that a classification
based on age alone lacked a rational basis in furtherance of any substantial
state interest). The Court in Murgia stated that "equal protection analysis
requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to
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recognized as a "suspect" classification. 99 In fact, Justice Brennan's
plurality opinion in Frontiero u. Richardson,100 holding that sex is a
suspect classification, specifically excluded physical disability from
the category. Justice Brennan stated:
[W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as
intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the
recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society.101
At least for the present, then, it appears that cases brought by
handicapped individuals alleging fourteenth or fifth amendment
violations are more apt to be successful if predicated upon
irrebuttable presumption theories.
The Civil Rights Acts

b.

Several federal civil rights statutes also may have relevance in
cases involving allegations of handicap discrimination. Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,102 although not applicable to
handicapped status discrimination as SUCh,103 may be helpful to
plaintiffs who allege employment discrimination on the basis of
handicaps that are particularly prevalent among persons of a
particular race, ethnic ancestry, or sex. For example, discrimination
because of physical problems associated with sickle cell anemia,
which is an inherited disease occurring most frequently in blacks,

99.

.

100.
101.
102.
103.

the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class," Id. at 312 (footnotes omitted),
rejecting the contention that the right to public sector employment is a
fundamental right.
The plaintiffs argument in Gurmankin u. Costanzo that the blind constitute a
"suspect classification" was rejected by the lower court in dictum:
Even admitting that the blind are a small, politically weak minority that
has been subjected to varying forms of prejudice and discrimination, the
limitations placed on a person's ability by a handicap such as blindness
cannot be ignored. Unlike distinctions based on race or religion,
classifications based on blindness often can be justified by the different
abilities of the blind and the sighted.
411 F. Supp. at 992 n.8.
To date, race, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499 (1954), national ancestry,
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and alienage, In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717 (1973), are the only classifications other than sex, see note 97 supra,
to be regarded as inherently "suspect" and subjected to "strict scrutiny." For
arguments on whether the handicapped should be considered a suspect
classification, Compare Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The
Qualifications' of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal
Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855 (1975) with Employment and the
Disabled, note 2 supra, at 457-58.
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
Id. at 682.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (Supp. V 1975).
Coleman v. Darden, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6788 (D. Colo. 1977); McNutt v. Hills,
426 F. Supp. 990, 1002 n.27 (D.D.C. 1977).
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might have such a disproportionate impact upon blacks as to give
rise to a cause of action for racial discrimination under Title VII.l04
Recourse to Title VII may be limited, however, by judicial
decisions holding that Title VII prohibits discrimination only on the
basis of those characteristics that are inherently related to one's
status as a member of one of the classifications covered by the
law. l05 Thus, the mere fact that, for example, a statistically
significant percentage of drug addicts are blacks,106 or that heart
disease is more prevalent in males than females, would not warrant
a holding that employment criteria which deny jobs to individuals
with these impairments are prima facie violative of Title VII, absent
proof that the impairments are inherently race or sex related.
The same rationale should limit the use of Section 1981 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866107 as a remedy for handicapped status
discrimination. Although Section 1981 has been held to afford a
cause of action for employment discrimination in the private as well
as the public sectors,108 the statute was enacted pursuant to the
thirteenth amendment and its application generally has been limited
to discrimination on the basis ofrace. l09 It has specifically been held
104. Cf. Smith v. Olin Chemical Corp., 555 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1977) (summary
judgment for defendant on grounds that business necessity could be presumed
for a job requirement of a "good back" in a manual labor position, even though
plaintiff claimed that the job criteria impacted adversely upon blacks who
suffered from sickle cell anemia); Woods v. Safeway Stores, 420 F. Supp. 35 (E.D.
Va. 1976) (discharge of black plaintiff for failure to meet grooming code because
of a beard grown on advice of a dermatologist as treatment for a skin condition
that affects blacks almost exclusively, upheld on ground that there was a
legitimate business purpose for the rule).
105. See, e.g., Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir.
1976); Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Both
cases refused to strike down a sex differentiated grooming regulation, holding
that the regulation did not constitute discrimination based on either immutable
sex characteristics or constitutionally protected activities. For a more detailed
discussion of the cases on this point, see D. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAw, 337-60 (1976). See also Ogden,
Justice and the Problem of the Volitional Victim, 1977 LAB. L.J. 417, 419.
106. See Note, Employment Discrimination Against Rehabilitated Drug Addicts, 49
N.Y.U.L. REV. 67, 70 (1974).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
108. See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975):
[1]t is well settled among the Federal Courts of Appeals - and we now
join them - that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination
in private employment on the basis of race. An individual who
establishes a cause of action under § 1981 is entitled to both equitable
and legal relief, including compensatory and, under certain circumstances, punitive damages. (citations omitted).
109. The statute also has been held applicable to discrimination on the basis.of
alienage, Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974), and
national origin, Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded for reconsideration on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951 (1977)
(Mexican-Americans); Puerto Rican Council v. Metromedia, Inc., 10 F.E.P. Cas.
1009 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). Contra, Gradillas v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 407 F. Supp. 865,
867 (D. Ariz. 1975). Korylas v. United States Dep't of Agric., 373 F. Supp. 1072,
1075-76 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 514 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Section 1981 is
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inapplicable to "pure" handicapped status discrimination,l1O and
therefore should have relevance only where a handicap is inherently
related to race. 11I
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 112 presents another
alternative for the redress of discrimination based upon handicapped status - an alternative that already has been recognized in
a few federal courts,113 Section 1983 was enacted pursuant to the
fourteenth amendment,114 and establishes a private cause of action
against
every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage of any state or territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States, or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution or the laws. 1l5
Section 1983 thus provides to the handicapped a statutory remedy
for violations of any constitutional or federal statutory right ..
Inasmuch as Section 1983 by its terms applies only to
discriminatory action engaged in by persons acting under color of
state law, relief is generally unavailable against private sector
employers not so involved with the state that state action can be
found to be present,11s Although state and local agencies and
municipalities recently have been deemed "persons" subject to suit
under Section 1983,117 the plaintiff is limited to recovery for official

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

not applicable to discrimination based on sex. See, e.g., Agnew v. City of
Compton, 239 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.s. 959 (1957); Terry v.
Bridgeport Brass Co., 11 F.E.P. Cas. 625 (S.D. Ind. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 806 (7th
Cir. 1975).
Simon v. St. Louis City Police Dep't, 14 F.E.P. Cas. 1363, 1364 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
In some circuits, if the handicap relates to the complainant's national origin, a
§ 1981 action would also be possible. See note 109 supra.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
See United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); King-Smith
v. Aaron, 455 F.2d 378 (3d Cir. 1972); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F.
Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D.W. Va. 1976).
The title of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 states that it is "An Act to Enforce the
Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and for other Purposes," Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22 § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
See Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.s. 943 (1976); Martin v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 441 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971). See also note 83 supra.
Monell v. Dep't of Social Serv., 46 U.S.L.W. 4569 (1978). Monell overruled a
substantial body of precedent which had effectively precluded injunctive and
monetary relief under § 1983 against state and local agencies and municipalities.
See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Singleton v. Vance City Bd. of
Educ., 501 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1974); Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir.
1973) (city is not a person suable under § 1983).
Relying on pre-Monell precedent, however, the courts have permitted
plaintiffs to sue local agencies or municipalities directly under the fourteenth

216

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 7

policies or customs that deprive him of civil rights. The local or state
government, thus, cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for the
"constitutional torts" of its employees under the doctrine of
respondent superior. 118
Sections 1985(3)119 and 1986120 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
also may have utility in employment discrimination cases based on
handicapped status. Section 1985(3) was enacted pursuant to the
fourteenth amendment and provides a cause of action against
persons who
cons~ire

or go in disguise on the highways or on the
premIses of another, for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing
or hindering the constituted authorities of any state or
territory from giving or securing to all persons within such
state or territory the equal protection of the laws.
Section 1986 authorizes suits against persons who have knowledge
that a violation of Section 1985 is about to be committed, but who
neglect or refuse to exercise their power to prevent or aid in
preventing the violation.
To date, there have been no definitive rulings on whether
Section 1985(3) provides a cause of action for conspiratorial
handicap discrimination, although claims under the section have
been raised in a few public sector cases. l21 Regardless of its

118.

119.
120.
121.

amendment and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1977), holding that the "person" requirement
of § 1983 is not a jurisdictional bar to a suit against a municipality. See, e.g., Cox
v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975); Hostrop v. Bd. of Junior College Dist.
No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 577 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976); Gray v.
Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1975);
Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809, 811 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Some
courts have limited the relief available in such cases to equitable relief, holding
that a claim for damages against a political subdivision is not cognizable under
the fourteenth amendment and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Raffety v. Prince George's Cty.,
423 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Md. 1976); Scott v. Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. N-76-1513 (D.
Md. Sept. 2, 1977); Clipper v. Takoma Park, Civ. No. B-73-295 (D. Md. March 25,
1975). See Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional
Violations, 89 HARv. L. REV. 922 (1976).
Most courts, however, have permited a recovery of money damages against
government officials sued in their individual capacities, although equitable relief
has been denied on the grounds that it is inappropriate relief against one sued in
his individual capacity. See, e.g., Burt v. Bd. of Educ., 521 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir.
1975); O'Brien v. Galloway, 362 F. Supp. 901 (D. Del. 1973).
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970).
Id. § 1986.
See Simon v. St. Louis City Police Dep't, 14 F.E.P. Cas. 1363 (E.D. Miss. 1977)
(holding that plaintiff failed to raise factual allegation sufficient to establish a
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applicability, there would appear to be few situations In which
Section 1985(3) would provide a better basis for a handicap
discrimination suit against a public sector employer than that
existing under Section 1983, which involves fewer elements of
proof. 122 The same limitations on relief and on suable defendants
that exist with respect to an action under Section 1983 are applicable
in suits against public sector defendants brought under Section
1985(3).123
In the private sector, however, Section 1985(3) could provide
some plaintiffs with what might be the only means of obtaining
federal judicial relief. Even if a private cause of action for
employment discrimination exists under the Rehabilitation Act,124
only those employers who are government contractors or recipients
of federal aid would be subject to suit. As mentioned above, Section
1981 would provide a cause of action against private employers only
where the basis for discrimination is a race-related handicap,125
Similarly, Title VII suits would be feasible only where the handicap
discrimination has a disparate impact upon the classes protected by
that statute. 126 Thus, Section 1985(3) could be valuable to handicapped individuals alleging conspiratorial employment discrimination in the private sector who have no cause of action under the
above-mentioned statutes.

122.

123.
124.
125.
126.

conspiracy to deprive him of civil rights under § 1985(3»; United Handicap Fed'n
v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977) (reversing grant of defendant's motion for
summary judgment, but with no discussion of the § 1985(3) claim); King-Smith v.
Aaron, 455 F.2d 378,381-86 (3d Cir. 1972) (reversing lower court's dismissal of
action on the basis of abstention doctrine but expressing no opinion on the
merits of plaintiff's claims brought under the 14th Amendment and §§ 1983 and
1985).
Quaere, however, whether § 1985(3) applies to actions against public sector
defendants alleging a conspiratorial violation of due process through, for
example, an "irrebuttable presumption," see notes 87-96 and accompanying text
supra, as opposed to actions challenging a denial of equal protection. See, e.g.,
Coltharp v. Cutler, 419 F. Supp. 924 (C.D. Utah 1976). For a discussion of this
issue, see C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS, CIVIL PRACTICE §§96, 99
(1971).
The plaintiff in a § 1983 action need show only that he has been deprived of a
right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, that the defendant caused the deprivation, and, that in so doing, the •
defendant acted. under color of state law. See, e.g., Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d
436 (2d Cir. 1969); Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 991 (1970). Some district courts have begun to apply the Supreme
Court's decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), requiring proof of
purposeful discrimination in equal protection cases, to § 1983 suits alleging a
violation of equal protection. See League v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873
(C.D. Calif. 1976). But see Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970).
See notes 117:'18 supra.
See notes 35 & 70 supra.
See notes 107-111 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 104-105 and accompanying text supra.
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State action is not a prerequisite to Section 1985(3) suits,127 but
in order to obtain relief against private sector defendants the
plaintiff must prove a conspiracy based upon "some racial or
perhaps otherwise class-based invidiously discriminatory animus"128
intended to deprive him of equal protection of the laws or of equal
privileges and immunities under the law. In addition, the plaintiff
must prove an act in furtherance of the conspiracy that either
injured him in person or property or deprived him of having and
exercising a right or privilege of citizens of the United States.129 To
date, the only private conspiracy that the Supreme Court has
recognized as actionable under Section 1983(5) is one intended to
deprive Negro citizens of the right to travel or of thirteenth
amendment rights. 130 If this limitation is adhered to, the plaintiff
would have no cause of action against private sector defendants
under Section 1985(3) unless the conspiratorial handicap discrimination also impinged upon one of these rights, so that only race-related
handicap discrimination in employment would be actionable.
Nevertheless, some lower federal court opinions raise the possibility
that "invidiously discriminatory" private conspiracies directed
towards classes based on characteristics other than race may be
actionable under Section 1985(3).131

4.

Summary of Federal Laws

The above overview has illustrated that private sector employees
and job applicants alleging handicapped status discrimination have
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971).
Id. at 102.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 105.
See Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206, opmwn withdrawn and
vacated as moot, 507 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1975) (reversing dismissal of § 1985(3) suit
against private defendants who allegedly conspired to deprive environmentalist
of his job); Marlowe V. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057, 1065 (6th Cir. 1973) (action
alleging conspiratorial deprivation of equal employment opportunities because of
religious beliefs and national origin remanded inter alia on § 1985(3) claim);
Action V. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (affirming denial of motion to
dismiss § 1985(3) action by white plaintiffs to enjoin organizations of blacks from
conspiring to interrupt church services and interfering with first amendment.
rights); Richardson V. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971) (reversing order
dismissing § 1985(3) claim of white persons who advocated racial equality in
employment opportunities); cf. Weise V. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 408-09
n.16 (2d Cir. 1975) (remanding, inter alia, on issue of whether conspiratorial sex
discrimination is a "class-based inviduously discriminatory" violation of equal
protection actionable under § 1985(3». Contra, Cohen V. Illinois Inst. of Tedi.,
524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976) (conspiratorial sex
discrimination held not actionable under § 1985(3), absent state action); Bellamy
V. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974) (private conspiracy to deprive
Ku Klux Klan members of first amendment rights held not actionable under
§ 1985(3»; Dombroski V. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972) (private conspiracy
to deprive criminal lawyers of rental office space held not actionable under
§ 1985(3».
The argument can also be made that private conspiracies to deprive
individuals of rights established by federal statutes, as well as constitutional
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several possible sources of relief under federal law. 132 The Rehabilitation Act provides for relief through the Department of Labor for the
failure to meet affirmative action obligations if the employer is a
government contractor or subcontractor. If the employer is a
federally funded educational program for the handicapped or
receives federal fmancial assistance under Title I of the Rehabilitation Act, relief from discriminatory employment practices is
available under the HEW regulations. Although their applicability
to the employment practices of other federally funded programs is
subject to challenge, the HEW and Executive Order 11,914 regulations purport to provide this alternative with respect to all public
and private sector programs receiving federal financial assistance,
and the Treasury regulations reiterate this alternative with respect
to programs receiving revenue sharing funds. In addition, although
it is unlikely that a private cause of action would be implied under
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act,133 there is substantial judicial
authority that a private suit may be brought under Section 504 of the

rights, may be challenged under § 1985(3). But see Doski v. Goldseker, 539 F.2d
1326 (4th Cir. 1976) (no action under § 1985(3) for conspiratorial sex discrimina·
tion where Title VII was available as a remedy and plaintiff had failed to perfect
her rights thereunder); Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1329 (E.D. Ga.
1976) (no claim exists under § 1985(3) for conspiratorial age discrimination since
the Age Discrimination In Employment Act provides the exclusive federal
remedy).
132. Another possible mechanism for alleviating certain types of handicap discrimination in employment is found in 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1970). Section 1994 was
enacted pursuant to the thirteenth amendment, and prohibits "the holding of
any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage" in any
territory or state. The section also invalidates
all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of any Territory
or State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or
by virtue of which any attempt shall' hereafter be made to establish,
maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary
service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or
obligation, or otherwise.
It has been suggested that § 1994 and other sections of the Civil Rights Acts
of 1866 and 1871 could provide a means of achieving redress for handicapped
individuals who are forced to perform work at the institutions where they are
receiving treatment, sometimes for subminimum wages or no wages at all. See
Friedman, The Mentally Handicapped Citizen and Institutional Labor, 87 HARv.
L. REV. 567 (1974). While the practice of requiring patients to perform labor for
no compensation or for unequal compensation may violate the ban against
discrimination in compensation on the basis of a handicap set forth in the
OFCCP and HEW regulations, any private cause of action that may exist under
the Act would lie only against government contractors and federally-funded
institutions. Although patient workers in private institutions are protected by the
minimum wage provisions of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Ach see Souder
v. Brennan, 267 F. Supp. 808 (D.D.C. 1973) and 29 C.F.R. pt. 529 (1976), these
provisions are not applicable to most public sector employees. See Nat'l League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
Section 1994 thus could provide patient workers with a cause of action to fill
the gaps, but the elements of the case may be difficult to establisp. See Friedman,
supra.
133. See note 35 supra.
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Act, at least where the plaintiff has exhausted administrative
remedies. 134
Moreover, discrimination on the basis of a handicap that is
inherently race or sex-related may be challenged under Title VII,
and race-related handicap discrimination claims might be raised
under Section 1981 as well. A Section 1985(3) conspiracy action could
be brought for discrimination on the basis of a race-related
handicap, but whether the action is available when the suit is
predicated on a private conspiracy directed towards a handicapped
class as such is open to question for the present. Legal and equitable
relief from private sector defendants is available in suits brought
under anyone of these latter four statutes.
All of the above alternatives are also available to public sector
employees. In addition, the public sector victim of handicap
discrimination may be entitled to relief under Section 1983 from
officials acting under color of state law, as well as state and local
agencies and municipalities, and, under the due process clauses of
the fourteenth and fifth amendments, from both persons and entities
involved in state action. The public sector employee's relief from
governmental entities, however, may be limited to instances in
which an official policy or custom is directly involved. Although
state and local government officials may be sued in their
individual capacities, equitable relief has been available only when
the public official is sued in his official capacity.135 In addition, the
defense of "qualified immunity" may preclude monetary awards
against state or local governments or individuals acting in an
official capacity unless they have acted in bad faith. 136
While these federal statutes and constitutional provisions
establish several possible sources of relief for handicap discrimination in employment, the above discussion also has revealed that
each of the remedies is subject to certain limitations. Moreover, there
are many unsettled questions of law as to the applicability of some
remedies to the handicapped class, the scope of those remedies that
may exist, the nature of the relief available, and the defendants who
may be called upon to provide such relief. Ample grounds exist, then,
for defending employers against administrative action or judicial
complaints predicated on an alleged deprivation of federally
protected employment rights of the handicapped.

134. See note 70 supra.
135. See note 118 supra.
136. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975), reh. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975)
(compensatory awards against individual government officials are appropriate
only if they "acted with such disregard of clearly established constitutional
rights that [the] action cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good
faith"). C{. Monell v. Dep't of Social Serv., 46 U.S.L.W. 4569 (1978).
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At the present time, thirty-seven states and the District of
Columbia have enacted laws prohibiting discrimination against the
handicapped in employment. 137 There are differences among these
137. ALASKA STAT. § 18:80:220(a)(I), (4) (Supp. 1976) (physical handicap); CAL. LAB.
CODE § 1420 (West Supp. 1977) (physical handicap or mental condition); Anti·
Discrimination Act of 1957, as amended by H.B. No. 1454,1977 Colo. Sess. Laws
(to be codified as COL. REV. STAT. § 24-34-306) (physical handicap); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 31-126 (West Supp. 1977) (physical disability); D.C. CODE ENCYCL.
§ 6-1504 (West Supp. 1977·1978) (physical handicap); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 413.08(3)
(West 1973 & Supp. 1977); Fair Employment Practice Law, amended by chs. 30 &
109, 1975 Haw. Sess. Laws (to be codified as HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2) (physical
handicap); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 65-22, -23, ch. 48, § 853 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1977); IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3(l), -13 (Bums Supp. 1977) (certified handicaps only);
IOWA CODE § 601A.6 (1975) (physical or mental disability); Act Against
Discrimination as last amended S.B. 369, 1977 Kan. Sess. Laws (to be codified at
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009) (physical handicap only); 1976 Equal Opportunities
Act, H.B. 407, ch. 280, Ky. Acts 1976 (to be codified as Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 207.130(2), (3)(a), 150(1) (prohibits discrimination by public sector employers on
the basis of physical handicaps only); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, §§ 4572,4573(4) (West
Supp. 1976-1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 19 (Supp. 1977); MASS. ANN. LAws
ch. 149, § 24K (Michie/Law Co-op 1976) (establishes a misdemeanor offense,
punishable by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $200, for the dismissal
from employment of or refusal to hire, solely because of handicap, any qualified
rehabilitated handicapped person); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 37.1202 (West
Supp. 1977-1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(1) (West Supp. 1977); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 43-6-15 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (prohibits discrimination on the basis of
blindness or other physical handicaps in public sector employment); MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 64-304 to -306(1), (2), (6)(c), (9) (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 48-1104 (1974) (physical or visual handicap); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.330 (1975);
Law Against Discrimination, H.B. 857, 1975 N.H. Laws (to be codified at N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.1 (West Supp. 1976)
(physical handicap only); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-7 (1974); N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 296
(McKinney Supp. 1976-77); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 128-15.3 (Supp. 1975) (prohibits
discrimination in hiring policies of state's personnel system on the basis of
physical defect or impairment); id. § 168-6 (sets forth a right of handicapped
persons to public sector employment on the same terms and conditions as the
able-bodied); id. § 143-416.2 (establishes state public policy against employment
discrimination on the basis of inter alia handicap); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§4112.02 (Page Supp. 1976); OR. REV. STAT. §659.425 (1975); 43 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 955 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78); R.I. GEN. LAw § 28-5-7 (Supp. 1976)
(physical handicap); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. §3-6A-15 (1974) (prohibits
discrimination on the basis of physical disability in state employment); Pub. ch.
457, § 1, 1976 Tenn. Pub. Laws (makes discrimination in hiring practices on the
basis of physical, mental or visual handicap a misdemeanor); TEX. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 441ge, § 3(f) (Vernon 1976) (makes discrimination against the
handicapped a misdemeanor offense and establishes a cause of action for
damages against employers who violate the law); see also Mentally Retarded
Persons Act of 1977, § 9, S.B. 700, 1977 TEX. GEN. LAWS (forbidding the denial of
equal opportunities in employment because of mental retardation); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 498 (Supp. 1976) (prohibits discrimination in employment on the
basis of physical handicap and establishes civil action for damages or other
equitable relief); VA. CODE § 40.1-28.7 (1976) (prohibits discrimination on the
basis of physical handicap in employment by all employers not covered by the
Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and establishes private cause of action to
enjoin such discrimination); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180 (Supp. 1976)
(prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sensory, mental, or
physical handicap); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(a) (Supp. 1977) (prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of blindness); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(5)(a), (f) (West
1974 & Supp. 1977-78).
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laws as to the type of administrative enforcement and relief
authorized, and as to whether they provide for a private cause of
action. 13B Many city and county governments also have adopted
ordinances prohibiting employment discrimination against the
handicapped. 139
For the most part, the state and local employment practice laws
do not mandate affirmative action in the absence of a finding of past
discrimination.l 40 As will be discussed in more detail below,l4l
however, judicial decisions and regulations promulgated by the
agencies authorized to enforce these laws often render this a
distinction without a difference, so that many of the same
accommodation and affirmative action duties set forth in the
OFCCP and HEW regulations have been made incumbent upon
employers covered only by state fair employment practice statutes. 142

138. Most state laws establish a human relations commISSIon to investigate
complaints of noncompliance, issue determinations of whether a violation
occurred, conduct hearings, and issue orders enforceable by the judiciary. The
remedies that the commissions may order vary, however. For example, the
Maryland statute did not authorize the Maryland Commission on Human
Relations to award back pay to victims of unfair employment practices until July
1, 1977. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 14(e) (Supp. 1977), as amended by H.B.
No. 458, Act of March 22, 1977, ch. 937, 1977 Md. Laws.
A private cause of action to enforce handicap discrimination statutes exists
in the minority of states, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.10.020(c), 18.80.145 (Supp.
1976); 1976 Equal Opportunities Act, H.B. 407, Ch. 280, 1976 Ky. Acts (to be
codified as Ky. REV. STAT. § 207.230); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, §§ 4621-4623 (West
Supp. 1976-77); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.14 (West. Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODE
ANN. § 64-329 (Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613-420 (1975); N.Y. EXEC. LAw
§ 297 (9) (McKinney Supp. 1976-77); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 962(c) (Purdon
Supp. 1977-78); TEX. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 441ge, § 6(b) (Vernon 1976); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, §498(b) (Supp. 1976); VA. CODE §40.1-28.7 (1976); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ l11.36(3)(c) (West 1974 & Supp. 1977-78).
139. See, e.g., BALTIMORE CITY CODE art. 4 (1966), amended by Ordinance # 908 (1975).
140. But see CAL. LAB. CODE § 1431(a), (b) (West Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48,
§ 854 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977) (state contractors); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 784 .
(West Supp. 1976-1977) (state contractors); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 16.765 (West 1974 &
Supp. 1977-78) (state contractors).
141. See notes 303-314 and accompanying text infra.
142. Some state laws, however, prohibit the imposition on employers of the duty to
make certain types of accommodations. See Fair Employment Practice Law, as
amended by ch. 30, 1975 Haw. Sess. Laws' (to be codified as HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 378-9(7» (unreasonable structural changes or expensive alterations are not
required); 1976 Equal Opportunities Act, H.B. 407 ch. 280, Ky. Acts 1976 (to be
codified as Ky. REV. STAT. § 207.150) (employer not required to modify facilities
or grounds or exercise a higher degree of caution for the handicapped); IND.
CODE § 22-9-1-13(c) (Supp. 1977) (employer not required to modify physical
accommodations or administrative procedures for the handicapped).
On the other hand, some states require accommodations for the handicaI1ped
as an element of the nondiscrimination duty. See Colorado Anti-Discrimination
Act of 1957, amended by H.B. No. 1454, 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws (to be codified as
COL. REV. STAT. § 24-34-306(1)(a» (not unlawful for employer to discriminate
against the handicapped if no reasonable accommodation can be made); D.C.
CODE ENCYCL. § 34-3.1 (West Supp. 1977-78) (defines handicap as a disability
for which reasonable accommodation can be made); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN.
§§ 37.1202(f), (g), .1207 (Supp. 1977-78) (accord).
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In addition, many states also have "White Cane Laws" designed
primarily to define the rights and responsibilities of blind persons,
particularly in relation to the use of white canes and guide dogs.!4 3
In some states, White Cane Laws have been broadened to include
other types of handicaps as well. 144 Most White Cane Laws merely
set forth a public policy statement or make discrimination on the
basis of handicapped status a misdemeanor.145 White Cane Laws
generally impact only upon employment rights in the public sector,
if they apply to employment at all. 146
Maryland's range of laws impacting upon employment rights of
the handicapped is fairly typical. The Maryland fair employment
practice laws are set forth in Article 49B of the Maryland Annotated
CodeY7 Section 19(a) of Article 49B makes it an unlawful
employment practice for employers covered by the law to refuse to
hire or to discriminate in terms or conditions of employment against
any individual "because of such individual's ... physical or mental
handicap lUlrelated in nature and extent so as to reasonably
preclude the performance of the employment," or to classify such
individuals in ways that would tend to deprive them of employment
opportunities or adversely affect their status. as employees.
Complaints of handicap discrimination may be filed with the
Maryland Commission on Human Relations (the Commission),
which is empowered to investigate, render findings on, and
conciliate such complaints. 14s If conciliation cannot be achieved, the
Commission is authorized to hold public hearings, issue enforcement
orders, and award relief, including injunctive relief, equitable relief,
and back pay.149 The Commission is empowered to seek enforcement
of its orders in the appropriate equity court of the county where the
alleged discrimination took place. l50 Article 49B does not provide for
a private cause of action by discrimination victims.
Section 19(a) of Article 49B applies to all private sector
employers with fifteen or more employees,151 and the Maryland
Court of Appeals recently held in Maryland Commission on Human
Relations v. Mayor of Baltimore,152 that employees of the state's

143. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. §46-1951 (West 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 30, §33
(1976).
144. See LA. REV. STAT. § 46-1951 (West 1977) (applies to blind, visually handicapped,
and "otherwise physically disabled").
145. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 3364,3365 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 30, § 33(g) (1976).
146. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 3365 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
147. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 17-20 (Supp. 1977).
148. Id. §§ 12-15.
149. Id. § 14(e) as amended by H.B. No. 458, Act of March 22, 1977, ch. 937, 1977 Md.
Laws.
150. Id. § 15(a).
151. Id. § 18(b).
152. 280 Md. 35, 371 A.2d 645 (1977).
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political subdivisions also are covered. In addition, Section l1(b) of
Article 49B prohibits discriminatory employment practices by state
agency employees. The authority of the Commission with respect to
complaints of viola:tions of Section l1(b) is limited, however, to
investigation, conciliation, mediation, and reporting to the governor.
Maryland also has a White Cane Law, which provides in part:
It is the policy of this State that the blind or visually
handicapped shall be employed in the State service, the
service of the political subdivisions of the State, in the public
schools, and in all other employment supported in whole or
in part by public funds on the same terms and conditions as
the persons not so handicapped, unless it is shown that the
particular handicap prevents the performances of the work
involved. 153

Although Maryland's White Cane Law contains no provisions for
administrative enforcement, it makes interference with rights of a
blind or visually handicapped person under the law a misdemeanor
offense. 154
III.

ISSUES ARISING UNDER LAWS GOVERNING EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY FOR THE HANDICAPPED

The above overview of the laws pertaining to employment
discrimination against the handicapped has been limited to an
outline of. their basic provisions and coverage. The judicial
application of these laws to date has not been extensive. Nevertheless, regulations issued by the state and federal agencies and a few
isolated lower court cases suggest the types of issues that will likely
predominate in handicap discrimination litigation, and some trends
as to their probable resolution. It is already clear that three problems
will pose difficult issues for the courts. These three problems are: (1)
identifying those employees and job applicants who are handicapped within the meaning ofthe law, (2) determining whether these
individuals nevertheless are qualified for a job, and (3) determining
whether or to what extent accommodations must be made for their
handicaps.

A.

IDENTIFYING HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUALS

1.

Federal Standards

The identification of individuals who are considered handicapped and thus entitled to benefit from affirmative action or to
receive protection from discrimination is the. first and most crucial
problem for the employer. The difficulty associated with this task is
153. MD. ANN.
154. Id. § 33(g).

CODE

art. 30, § 33(b) (1976).

1978]

Handicapped Employment Opportunity

225

evidenced by the fact that Congress failed in its first attempt to
define adequately the diverse class of "handicapped individuals"
entitled to protection under the Rehabilitation Act. In the 1973 Act,
the term "handicapped individual" was defined as
any individual who (A) has a physical or mental disability
which for such individual constitutes or results in a
substantial handicap to employment and (B) can reasonably
be expected to benefit in terms of employability from
vocational rehabilitation services provided pursuant to
[Titles I and III] of this Act. I55
In less than a year, Congress recognized that this definition was
too narrow. First, the definition permitted government contractors to
condition the affirmative action required under Section 503 of the
Act upon a handicapped individual's having benefited or having a
reasonable expectation of benefit from vocational rehabilitation
programs. Second, the definition made the protection from discrimination in federally assisted programs accorded by Section 504 of the
Act available only to those individuals whose disability was a
handicap to employment. The section thus effectively failed to
prohibit discrimination in federally assisted housing, medical, or
other programs against handicapped individuals who were employed. I56
Accordingly, in the 1974 Amendment to the Rehabilitation Act,
Congress added a new definition of "handicapped individual," for
the purposes of Section 503's affirmative action mandate for federal
contractors and Section 504's non-discrimination mandate for
programs receiving federal financial assistance. This new definition
describes a "handicapped individual" as "any person who (A) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities, (B) has a record of such
impairment, or (C) is regarded as having such impairment."157 This
statutory definition is incorporated into the various regulations
issued to implement the Act.
The regulations provide further illumination as to certain
aspects of the statutory definition. Although the OFCCP regulations
do not explain what "physical or mental impairments" are included
under the statutory definition, both the HEW and Executive Order
11,914 regulations provide that:
"Physical or mental impairment" means (A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatom155. 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (Supp. IV 1974).
156. See S. REP. No. 93-1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 6373, 6388-89.
157. 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (Supp. V 1975).
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ical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive;
digestive; genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and
endocrine or (B) any mental or psychological disorder such
as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. 15s
It should be noted that HEW has not defined the term
"impairment" in reference to the degree of severity or duration of the
impairing condition. Thus, a minimal and temporary physiological
condition affecting any body system, or, in the case of mental
disorders, minimal retardation or temporary emotional illness,
theoretically is covered. 159 The impairment must "substantially
limit" an individual in a "major life activity," however, before the
individual can be deemed "handicapped" under the statutory
criteria.
The HEW and Executive Order 11,914 regulations refrain from
defining the phrase "substantially limits ... major life activities,"
but the OFCCP regulations state that "a handicapped individual is
'substantially limited' if he or she is likely to experience difficulty
in securing, retaining or advancing in employment because of a
handicap."l60
Both OFCCP and HEW have attempted to delineate the types of
"major life activities" the "substantial limitation" of which results
in an impaired person's being deemed "handicapped." Appendix A
to the OFCCP regulations interprets the phrase "life activities" to
158. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(j)(2)(i), 85.31(b)(i). The Secretary of HEW has noted that
although this definition does not list specific diseases or conditions deemed to be
handicaps, it covers "such diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech
and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple
sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness,
and ... drug addiction and alcoholism." 42 Fed. Reg. 22685 (1977).
159. The Secretary's analysis of the final regulations states, however:
It should be emphasized that a physical or mental impairment does not
constitute a handicap for purposes of section 504 unless its severity is
such that it results in a substantial limitation of one or more major life
activities. Several comments observed .the lack of any definition in the
proposed regulations of the phrase "substantially limits." The Department does not believe that a definition of this term is possible at this
time.
A related issue raised by several comments is whether the definition
of handicapped individuals is unreasonably broad .... The Department
continues to believe, however, that it has no flexibility within the
statutory definition to limit the term to persons who have those severe,
permanent, or progressive conditions that are most commonly regarded
as handicaps. The Department intends, however, to give particular
attention in its enforcement of section 504 to eliminating discrimination
against persons with the severe handicaps that were the focus of concern
in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
42 Fed. Reg. 22685-86 (1977).
160. 41 C.F.R. 60-741.2 (1977) (emphasis added).
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include "communication, ambulation, selfcare, socialization, education, vocational training, employment, transportation, adapting to
housing, etc.,"16I but provides that for the purpose of Section 503,
primary attention is given to those life activities affecting employability. Similarly, the HEW regulations define "major life activities"
to include "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working."162
In addition to providing an amplification of the components of
clause (A) of the statutory definition of "handicapped individual"
(an "impairment" which "substantially limits" one or more "major
life activities"), the agency regulations explicate what is meant by
clause (B) of that delmition ("has a record of such an impairment"),
·~md clause (C) ("is regarded as having such an impairment"). With
respect to clause (B), the OFCCP's Appendix A guidelines I63 and the
HEW and Executive Order 11,914 regulations 164 indicate that this
aspect of the statutory definition of a "handicapped individual"
extends the coverage of the Rehabilitation Act to individuals who
previously were erroneously classified as handicapped - for
example, as mentally ill or retarded - and those who may be
recovered in whole or in part, from a previous physical or mental
impairment - such as the mentally restored and those who have
had and recovered from heart attacks or cancer. An implication of
this aspect of the definition is that an employer may have
obligations with respect to individuals who, because of their previous
handicaps, have had poor work attendance or productivity records.
In other words, such records may not totally justify an adverse
employment decision if the record resulted from a past handicap that
does not presently exist.
With respect to clause (C) of the statutory definition - "is
regarded as having such an [mental or physical] impairment" - the
HEW regulations state:
"Is regarded as having an impairment" means (A) has a
physical or mental impairment that does not substantially
limit major life activities but that is treated by a recipient as
constituting such a limitation; (B) has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits major life activities
only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such
impairment; or (C) has none of the impairments defined in
paragraph (j)(2)(i) of this section but is treated as having
such an impairment. 165
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
45
41
45
Id.

pt. 60-741, app. A (1977).
C.F.R. 84.3G)(2)(ii); see id. § 85.31(b)(2).
C.F.R. pt. 60-741, app. A (1977).
C.F.R. § 84.3G)(2)(iii); id. § 85.31(3).
§ 84.3G)(2)(iv); see id. § 85.31(b)(4).
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According to the Secretary of HEW's commentary on the regulations, this part is intended to include those persons who are
"ordinarily considered" to be handicapped but who do not technically fall within the first two parts of the statutory definition, "such
as persons with a limp;" those who might not ordinarily be
considered handicapped, "such as persons with disfiguring scars;"
and those who actually have no physical or mental impairment but
who "are treated by a recipient as if they were handicapped."166
The OFCCP regulations do not define "is regarded as having
such an impairment," but the Appendix A definitional guidelines of
the OFCCP regulations state that this phrase
refers to those individuals who are perceived as having a
handicap, whether an impairment exists or not, but who,
because of attitudes or for any other reason, are regarded as
handiCapped by employers, or supervisors who have an
effect on the individual securing, retaining or advancing in
employment. 167
No one agency has issued regulations that explicate all aspects
of the statutory definition of a "handicapped individual." It is
possible, however, to read the regulations together, with one set
filling in the gaps left by the others, so as to obtain a more complete
picture of the agencies' collective interpretation of the elements of
the definition. There is some support for this approach, even though,
as indicated above, employers are covered by the provisions of
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (and the HEW and Executive
Order 11,914 regulations) only if they are recipients of federal
financial assistance, and by Section 503 (and the OFCCP regulations) only if they are federal contractors. The 1974 Amendment's
definition of a "handicapped individual" applies to both Sections 503
and 504 of the Act, and the legislative history of the Amendment
indicates that Sections 503 and 504 are to be administered in a
consistent and uniform manner by the federal agencies involved. 168
Accordingly, those aspects of the statutory definition of a handicapped individual that are amplified in the OFCCP regulations, but

166. 42 Fed. Reg. 22686 (1977) (emphasis added).
167. 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-741, app. A (1977).
168. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 6373, 6391. See also Exec. Order 11,914, § 5,3 C.F.R. 117,118 (1977), which
provides in part:
The Secretary shall ensure that such rules, regulations, and orders
[adopted to carry out his responsibilities under the Order] are not
inconsistent with, or duplicative of, other Federal Government policies
relating to the handicapped, including these policies adopted in
accordance with sections 501, 502, and 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, as amended, or the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C.
§§ 4151-4157 (Supp. V 1975)).
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not in the HEW or Executive Order 11,914 regulations, and vice
versa, must be considered by both federal contractors and recipients
of federal financial assistance.
Taken together, the definitional aspects of these regulations
purport to create a vast class of persons who may be deemed
"handicapped," and thus entitled to the protection of Sections 503
and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. First, as pointed out above,
HEW's interpretation of the types of impairments included within
the statutory definition of a handicap does not refer to the severity of
the impairment, so that handicap discrimination complaints
presumably can be asserted by individuals who are impaired only
minimally. Second, OFCCP has liberally construed the term
"substantially limits" by defining it as "likely to experience
difficulty ... in employment" - a phrase that conceivably could
apply to anyone who is denied a job and a phrase that presumes that
employment in and of itself, is the type of "major life activity" to
which Congress was referring. Thus, an individual with a minimal
impairment that has resulted in the loss of a single job opportunity
theoretically may be entitled to the protection of Sections 503 and
504 under the combined effect of these regulations, even if his
lifestyle has not been affected otherwise by his impairment.
Both OFCCP and HEW appear to have correctly interpreted
clause (B), "has a record of such an impairment," and clause (C), "is
regarded as having such an impairment." Congress clearly intended
to accord protection (1) to individuals who in fact have no
impairment, but who are perceived as or have a record of being
impaired, and (2) to individuals who have, have a record of, or are
perceived as having impairments that actually impose no substantial limitation on their ability to engage in major life activities, but
which are treated as imposing such a limitation. A problem with
clause (C) of the definition, however, results from HEW's interpretation of "impairment" and OFCCP's construction of "substantially
limits." Virtually anyone who has been denied a job because of a
failure to meet a physical or mental, as opposed to educational, job
requirement could argue that he has been "perceived" as "impaired"
and "substantially limited" as a result thereof. The "perceived"
impairment apparently need not be an obvious one, and could be so
innocuous as the "emotional illness" of fear of height that precludes
the job applicant from working on the top floor of a skyscraper. The
employer accordingly could be required to establish that the fear of
height could not be accommodated by, for example, putting the
individual in a job on the first floor of the building.
Such a result admittedly would be possible only under a broad
reading of the defmitions and regulations. An OFCCP summary of
the facts of the cases in which the agency has obtained back pay
settlements for handicap discrimination complainants indicates
however, that OFCCP intends to apply the "handicapped individ-
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ual" definition as broadly as its regulations permit. The "handicaps"
involved in these cases included an intestinal infection, an injury to
the right elbow, an extra vertebra in the back, a bleeding ulcer,
hypertension, anemia, alcoholism, and what was vaguely described
as mental instability and emotional illness. 169 There was little
significant comment on the severity, duration, or curability of any of
these conditions, and there was nothing to indicate that any of the
complainants previously had been at all limited in major life
activities as a result of their condition, or that they were likely to
experience limitations in the future. Moreover, there was no
indication in many cases that the complainant had even experienced
previously difficulty in obtaining employment. In fact, many of the
complainants had obtained jobs with different employers by the time
a back pay settlement was made. Clearly, many of these "handicaps" would not substantially limit the individual in terms of general
employability, although the handicap may have caused the
individual's rejection for a particular job.
In essence therefore, OFCCP, at least, has made handicapped
status a result of one's treatment by the defendant employer in a
discrimination case, rather than a result of the relationship, or
generally perceived relationship, of an impairment to one's ability to
function normally. The legislative history of the 1974 Amendment
signifies that Congress had precisely the opposite intent. First, it
appears that Congress was attempting by the 1974 Amendment to .
change the emphasis of the statutory definition applied to Section
503 and 504 from a focus on isolated external factors, such as
difficulty in obtaining employment or prospects of benefiting from
rehabilitation programs, to a focus on the impact of the impairment
itself upon normal body functions. Thus, the section -by section
analysis of the 1974 Amendment, attached to the Conference
Committee's report, indicates that the mere fact that one's employability is impeded by an impairment is not sufficient to render one
handicapped - that employment, in and of itself, is not the type of
"major life activity" to which Congress meant to refer. The report
states: "In contrast [to the old definition], the definition proposed in
the Committee substitute focuses on substantial limitations of one or
more of an individual's major life activities, rather than focusing on
handicaps to employment, vocational goals, and prospective benefit
from vocational rehabilitation services."17o
Moreover, the Senate bill that first suggested an amended
definition for "handicapped individual" originally included the
phrase "a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
such person's functioning or one or more of such person's major life
169. See OFCCP BACK PAY CASES SUMMARY, note 34 supra.
170. S. REP. No. 39-1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S.
AD. NEWS 6373, 6414 (emphasis added).
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activities." The deletion of "such person's functioning" as "redundant" illustrates that Congress intended to use the phrase "major life
activities" in its basic sense to convey the notion that the
impairments covered by the definition must have a significant
impact upon operational ability.17l "Major life activities" therefore
must be those required to maintain the level of autonomy normally
expected of individuals of the same age. The term would include
locomotion, communication, perception, and other similar "activities," but not playing, learning, or working. While the extent to which
one's major life activities are limited or are perceived to be limited
may be manifested in a decreased access to playmates, an education,
or a job, these deprivations are the effect, rather than the cause, of
one's status as a "handicapped individual" as Congress has defined
the term. Under O'FCCP's contrary interpretation, the definition is a
tautological curiosity that is no help whatsoever to employers,
agencies, or the courts.
The available legislative history further indicates that by
adding clause (C) - "is regarded as having such an impairment"to the statutory definition, Congress was not trying to reach
individuals who are denied a particular job by a single employer
merely because they were erroneously believed to be physically or
mentally incapable of performing the job. Instead, Congress
intended to protect individuals who have or exhibit the obvious
characteristics of impairments that generally are perceived, albeit
erroneously, as resulting in a substantial limitation upon functioning. The Conference Committee's section-by-section analysis of the
1974 Amendment states, as an example of clause (C),s application,
that it pertains to "a person with some kind of visible physical
impairment which in fact does not substantially limit that person's
functioning." 1 72
171. Id. [1974] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 6389.
172. Id. [1974] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 6414 (emphasis added).
An additional argument against a broad application of the statutory
definition of a handicapped individual results when that definition is compared
with the definition of a "disabled veteran" under the Veterans' Readjustment
Act, i.e., one "entitled to disability compensation under laws administered by the
Veterans' Administration for disability rated at 30 per centum or more, or whose
discharge from active duty was for a disability incurred or aggravated in the line
of duty." 38 U.S.C. § 2011(1) (Supp. V 1975). See also 41 C.F.R. § 60-250.2 (1977).
It is difficult to conceive of a disabled veteran covered by this definition who
would not also be deemed "handicapped" under OFCCP's broad interpretation of
the Rehabilitation Act definition. But see note 40 supra. Yet, if Congress had
intended that the definition of a handicapped individual set forth in the
Rehabilitation Act be construed so broadly as to include disabled veterans,
there would have been no need to cover "disabled veterans," as well as veterans
of the Vietnam Era, under the affinnative action provisions of the Veterans'
Readjustment Act of 1974. The Veterans' Act was enacted subsequent to the
Rehabilitation Act and the 1974 Amendments to the Act, but before the first set
of proposed regulations to implement § 503 were issued. With the exception of the
requirement that the federal contractor list all employment vacancies with the
local employment service office, disabled veterans derive no employment benefits
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Notwithstanding these indications in the legislative history that
Congress anticipated a narrower construction of the statutory
definition of a "handicapped individual," OFCCP, at least, has
tended to assert jurisdiction over complaints filed by any individual
who alleged that he had been denied a single job opportunity
because of an existing, previous, or perceived mental or physical
condition of any type. 173 Employers, therefore, constantly must be
alert to the possibility that an employee or job applicant may
consider, himself "handicapped." Perhaps because of the latitude
given by OFCCP to the term "handicapped," however, the agency
regulations establish some procedural methods by which a government contractor can alleviate the risk of unexpected complaints of a
violation of Section 503. First, the OFCCP regulations require the
contractor to issue an "invitation" to all employees and job
applicants to identify themselves as "handicapped individuals" if
they wish 10 take advantage of the contractor's affirmative action
plan. If the contractor complies with this requirement, it is not
obligated to search the medical records of job applicants or
employees to ascertain those who are entitled to the benefit of
affirmative action. On the other hand, employees may take
advantage of the invitation at any time, and the issuance of the
invitation does not relieve the contractor of its obligations to
individuals of whose handicaps it has actual knowledge, nor does it
relieve the contractor of liability for discrimination against the
handicapped. 1 74
Second, the OFCCP regulations permit the government contractor to require a job applicant or employee to submit medical
documentation of an alleged "impairment," or, in the alternative, to
undergo a medical examination at the contractor's expense. The
medical documentation of a handicap required under this provision
must be based upon the American Medical Association Guides to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. 175 Employers might be well
from the Veterans' Readjustment Act of 1974 that were not already available to
them as "handicapped individuals" under OFCCP's interpretation of the
applicability of the Rehabilitation Act.
173. See OFCCP SUMMARY OF BACK PAY CASES, note 34 supra.
174. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.5(c) (1977).
The invitation must state that any information given by the employee is
voluntarily provided, that it will be kept confidential, that refusal to provide it
will not subject the applicant or employee to any adverse treatment, and that it
will be used only in accordance with the Act and the regulations. Id.
§ 60-741.5(c)(l) Appendix B to the OFCCP Guidelines sets forth an acceptable
form for such an invitation.
175. Id. § 60-741.7(b)(d).
The regulations provide that any determination of a handicap required by
the employer must meet the requirements of § 60-741.5(c), which sets forth the
safeguards applicable to "invitations" to identify oneself as handicapped. Thus,
the medical information obtained must be kept confidential. The provisions of
§ 60-741.5(c)(I) and § 60-741.7(c) conflict, however, in that the latter section
infers that the contractors may require medical documentation, while the former
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advised to absorb the expense of providing a medical examination
conducted by their company physicians in accordance with the
Guides to any employee or applicant who alleges that he is
"handicapped." Interestingly enough, the Guides would appear to
impose more stringent standards for the assessment of an impairment than those expressed in the definitional aspects of the OFCCP
and HEW regulations and guidelines. The Guides refer only to
permanent impairments, which are defmed as "an anatomic or
functional abnormality or loss after maximal medical rehabilitation
has been achieved, which abnormality or loss a physician considers
stable or nonprogressive at the time evaluation is made." The
"evaluation of permanent impairment" conducted by the physician,
according to the Guides, is "[a]n appraisal of the nature and extent
of the patient's illness or injury as it affects his personal efficiency
in one or more of the activities of daily living. These activities are
self-care, communication, normal living posture, ambulation, elevation, traveling, and non-specialized hand activities."176
The OFCCP regulations limit the applicability of the Guides to
the determination of the existence, rather than the degree, of
impairment, however.177 Under the Guides, an individual with a
20/25 measure of central visual acuity in one eye has a total visual
impairment of only one percent,178 but the OFCCP regulations
indicate that, nevertheless, such an individual would be considered
"handicapped" ifthe visual impairment resulted in the loss of a job.
For the present, therefore, employers should be made cognizant of
the potential for liability under Section 503 and 504 that inures in
large measure from the liberal view of the agencies responsible for
implementing these sections as to what constitutes a "handicap."

indicates that information must be obtained on a voluntary basis with the
assurance that refusal to provide it will not subject the applicant to adverse
treatment.
The Maryland proposed regulation similarly provides that H[w]henever
there is a question or dispute as to the handicap or as to limitations of the
handicapped person, medical vertification shall be obtained by the complainant." 5 Md. Reg. 532 (1978) (to be codified as XVI COMAR (Code of Maryland
Regulations) § 14.03.03(A) (hereinafter referred to by COMAR volume and section
number). It is not clear, however, whether this is a procedural prerequisite for the
Commission in the processing of charges filed by an individual who is claimed
by the defendant employer not to be handicapped, or whether any individual
who files a charge against his employer must first provide the employer with
medical proof of his handicap.
176. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, COMMITTEE ON RATING OF MENTAL AND
PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT, GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT
IMPAIRMENT preface, iii (1972) (hereinafter cited as AMA GUIDES TO
EVALUATION OF IMPAIRMENT).
177. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.7(d) (1977).
178. AMA GUIDES TO EVALUATION OF IMPAIRMENT, ch. VII, Tables 1 and 5.

234

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 7

2. Maryland Standards
Most of the state statutes prohibiting discrimination in employment against the handicapped also set forth a definition of the class
of individuals entitled to statutory protection. The variety of
definitions provided 179 and, in some states, the absence of any
definition for "handicap"l80 further illustrates the difficulty in
formulating a description of this diverse minority class. The state
definitions generally differ in several significant aspects from the
definition in the Rehabilitation Act. 18l The Maryland statute, which
is more specific than most, provides:
The term "physical or mental handicap" means any
physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement which is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness
including epilepsy, and which shall include, but not be
limited to, any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of
physical coordination, blindness or visual impairment,
deafness or hearing impairment, muteness or speech
impediment or physical reliance on a seeing eye dog,
wheelchair, or other remedial appliance or device; and any
mental impairment or deficiency as, but not limited to,
retardation or such other which may have necessitated
remedial or special education and related services. 182
179. Some state statutory deImitions of a handicap require that the condition be
verified. E.g., Fair Employment Practice Law, amended by chs. 30 and 109, 1975
Haw. Sess. Laws (to be codified as HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-1(7»; 1976 Equal
Opportunities Act, H.B. 407, ch. 280, 1976, Ky. Acts (to be codified as Ky. REV.
STAT. § 207.130(2»; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 291(20) (McKinney Supp. 1976-77); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4553(7-a) (West Supp. 1976-77); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN.
§37.1103(b)(i) (West Supp. 1977-78); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4112.01(M) (Page
Supp. 1976). Others specifically require some degree of permanence. HAW. REV.
STAT. supra; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. supra. Some statutory definitions build in
the concept that the condition must be unrelated to the individual's ability to
perform the job sought, see IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3(q) (Burns Supp. 1977); IOWA
CODE § 601A.2(11) (1975); Act Against Discrimination, as amended S.B. 369, 1977
Kan. Sess. Laws (to be codified as RAN. STAT. § 44-1002(j); ME. REV. STAT. supra;
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102(8) (1974); Law Against Discrimination, H.B. 857, 1975
N.H. Laws (to be codified as N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §354-A:3(13»; N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 4-33-2(K) (1974); N.Y. EXEC. LAw, supra; OR. REV. STAT. § 659.400(2)
(1975); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 954(p) (Purdon Supp. 1977-78), and others
include in the deImition the concept of "reasonable accommodation" for the
handicapped. See D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 34-3.1 (West Supp. 1977-78). Some
provide no guidance as to the specific types of impairments covered, while others
list certain types of impairments deemed to be handicaps under the law.
Compare Anti-Discrimination Act of 1957, as last amended by H.B. 1454, 1977
Colo. Sess. Laws (to be codified as COL. REV. STAT. § 24-34-302); D.C. CODE
ENCYCL. supra; HAW. REV. STAT. supra, with MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 18(s)
(Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. supra; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1O:5-5(q) (West Supp.
1976); R.I. GEN. LAw § 28-5-7(H) (Supp. 1976).
180. The Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Nevada, North Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin statutes
contain no definition of the handicapped or disabled individuals entitled to
protection under those states' non-discrimination laws. See note 138 supra.
181. But see Anti-Discrimination Act of 1957, as last amended by H.B. 1454, 1977
Colo. Sess. Laws (to be codified as COL. REV. STAT. § 24-34-302(7.5».
182. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 18(g) (Supp. 1977).
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It first should be noted that the Maryland definition does not
narrow the types of handicaps covered to those that substantially
limit major life activities, as does the Rehabilitation Act. On its face,
then, the definition would appear to cover an individual with any
one of the listed disabilities, no matter how minor its effect on his
lifestyle. The Maryland Commission on Human Relations at one
time limited the breadth of the definition by promulgating proposed
regulations 183 intended to serve as "guidlines" for employers, which
stated in a "working definition" that a handicapped person was "a
person with a physical or mental disability or impairment, or a
person with a record of this impairment, which results in a barrier to
empioyment. 184 The Commission has since revised its definition to
comport with that set forth in the statute. 185
It further should be noted that although the Maryland statute on
its face covers only existing impairments, the Commission's original
"working definition" purported to expand the coverage to include
persons with a record of an impairment. Although this aspect of the
regulatory def'mition also has been deleted since, and, even if finally
adopted, would not have had the force of law,18B the original draft
indicates that the Commission may attempt to assert jurisdiction
over, investigate, issue determinations, and hold hearings on
complaints filed by individuals who are not currently impaired but
who only have records of impairments. The doctrine requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies makes it difficult for
employers to challenge this practice until after the Commission has
issued an order against them. The Commission, however, never has
included individuals who are regarded as having handicaps within

183. 4 Md. Reg. 967-69 (1977) (to be codified as XVI COMAR - Code of Maryland
Regulations - §§ 14.03.01-.07).
. The Maryland Commission's Notice of Intended Action states that the
regulations "will establish guidelines for anti-discrimination as it relates to the
physically and mentally handicapped." 4 Md. Reg. 967 (1977). The Administrator
of State Documents originally declined to publish the proposed guidelines
because Article 49B does not delegate to the commission the power to promulgate
rules or regulations, and the administrator could find no implied power. The
Maryland Attorney General rendered an opinion, however, that the commission's proposed guidelines could be categorized as "interpretive rules without the
force of law for which the Commission needs no express statutory to
promulgate." 62 OP. ATIY. GEN. 77-20 (1977).
184. XVI COMAR § 14.03.02B (emphasis added).
185. 5 Md. Reg. 532 (1978) (to be codified as XVI COMAR § 14.03.02). The revised
regulations were originally intended to become effective on or about June 2, 1978.
The Commission is currently reevaluating the regulations, however, and as of
this date (June 20, 1978) has not issued a final rulemaking.
186. See notes 183 & 185 supra.
187. See Soley v. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations, 277 Md. 521, 356 A.2d 254
(1976). In Soley, the plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that the
Maryland Commission had issued complaints that were not in compliance with
§ 12(b) of Article 49B. The court specifically rejected the contention that
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its "working defmition." Thus, in Maryland, an individual who is
denied an employment opportunity because he is perceived as
suffering from an impairment that is included within the Maryland
definition of a handicap should not be that fact alone become
entitled to the protection of the statute.
It should be recognized that the Maryland statutory definition of
a "handicap" includes an enumeration of specific types of impairments deemed to be handicaps, which may result in the exclusion of
some physical or mental problems that might otherwise appear to be
covered by the general language in the definition. A recent decision
by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, construing a statutory
definition of "handicap" that tracks Maryland's in structure and
language,188 exemplifies this point. The court concluded in Providence Journal Co. v. Mason,189 that its state legislature could not
have intended the unreasonable and burdensome consequences that
would flow from interpreting a statutory definition of the term
"handicap'" so broadly as to encourage persons with any medical
problem whatsoever to seek relief from the state employment
practices commission.l 90 Thus, the court held, the more general
language in the statutory definition of a handicap, which would
appear to include any physical disability no matter how slight, was
limited by the enumeration of several specific injuries, infirmities,
and malformations that are deemed to be physical handicaps. The
court found that all the impairments listed were of a serious or
permanent nature, inferring therefrom a legislative intent to accord
protection only to those individuals suffering from either a serious
injury or an impairment of more than a temporary nature. The court
then concluded that the plaintiffs "Whiplash" injury, which had
caused only "some pain and discomfort," was not a handicap of such
a serious or permanent nature. 19l
The same analysis should be applied to the Maryland statute. 192
Carrying this analysis a bit further, a close inspection of the

188.
189.
190.
191.

192.

exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the act of the
administrative agency is alleged to be illegal. The plaintiffs could not attack the
Commission's action on this ground, said the court, until they had exhausted the
statutory remedy available to them. Id. at 528, 356 A.2d at 258.
See R.I. GEN. LAW § 28-5-6(H) (Supp. 1976). The Rhode Island statute describes
physical handicaps in precisely the same language used in the Maryland statute,
but does not cover mental handicaps.
116 R.I. 614, 359 A.2d 682 (1976).
Id. at 620, 359 A.2d at 686.
Id. at 620-21, 359 A.2d at 687.
Some state statutes specifically provide that "handicaps" or "disabilities"
covered by the law must be permanent. See Fair Employment Practice Law,
amended by chs. 30 and 109, 1975 Haw. Sess. Laws (to be codified as HAW. REV.
STAT. § 378-1(7); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(m) (Page Supp. 1976).
Maryland case law adopts the principle that general words in a statute, followed
by a specific enumeration, should be regarded as limited by the subsequent more
specific terms, Maguire v. State, 192 Md. 615, 623, 65 A.2d 299, 302 (1949); cf.
State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation v. Ellicott-Brandt, inc., 237 Md. 328, 335,

1978]

Handicapped Employment Opportunity

237

Maryland definition of a handicap reveals that it does not purport to
cover injuries, birth defects, or· illnesses as such. Instead, it covers
their results - i.e., a "physical disability, infirmity, malformation or
disfigurement ... caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness,
including epilepsy." Thus, a person is not handicapped under the
Maryland definition merely because he has a birth defect or suffers
from an illness or injury - even one that is serious or permanent.
The birth defect, illness, or injury must have resulted in a
"disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement." With respect
to mental handicaps, there must be a mental, not merely emotional,
impairment or deficiency. To the extent, then, that illnesses (such as
allergies, infectious diseases, or a bleeding ulcer), 'injuries (such as a
sprained back or a whiplash), and birth defects (such as a bad back,
flat feet, or an extra rib) have not resulted in severe or permanent
disabilities, infirmities, malformations, disfigurements, or mental
impairments or deficiencies, they should not be considered handicaps in Maryland.
Moreover, the physical and mental disabilities enumerated in
the law share characteristics other .than severity and permanence.
The physical disabilities specifically deemed to be handicaps include
"any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical coordination,
blindness or visual impairment, deafness or hearing impairment,
muteness or speech impediment or physical reliance on a seeing eye
dog, wheelchair, or other remedial appliance."193 With respect to
mental impairment~ or deficiencies, those specifically included are
"retardation or such other which may have necessitated remedial or
special education or related services."194 All of these impairments
affect the capacity of an individual to move freely about or control
his environment, impeding his functional ability, which in turn may
affect his general employability. It therefore reasonably can be
assumed that the Maryland General Assembly was attempting to
provide protection from job discrimination to those handicapped
individuals whose general opportunities for employment are so
206 A.2d 131, 135 (1965) (holding that the general language of one part of a
statute may be controlled by the more specific phraseology of another).
This is true even when the specific enumeration is preceded by language
such as "including, but not limited to," or other generally all-inclusive words.
Although this phrase is a phrase of enlargement, rather than a phrase of
limitation, the enlargement must be in kind, that is, any additions must share
the characteristics common to the specifica'l.,ly enumerated items, since if the
legislature had intended the general words to ~e used in an unrestricted sense, it
would not have enumerated the particular items. See, e.g., State v. Sinclair, 274
Md. 646, 337 A.2d 703, 711 (1975); cf. American Ice. Co. v. Fitzhugh, 128 Md. 382,
97 A. 999 (1916) (holding that when particular words of description are used in a
statute to indicate the scope of its application, and the specific words are
followed by general words, the latter are to be limited in their meaning so as to
embrace only a class of things indicated by the particular things).
193. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 18(g) (Supp. 1977).
194. Id.
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severely limited that it behooves the state to ensure that they are not
further limited for reasons that bear no relationship to their ability
to work. As was pointed out with respect to the Rehabilitation Act
definition of handicapped, however,195 the criterion for handicapped
status should not be the individual's difficulty in obtaining a
particular job, but rather the lack of functional ability that often
causes difficulty in obtaining any employment at all.
Finally, it should be observed that the Rhode Island court's
disjunctive characterization in Providence Journal v. Mason of the
impairments specifically enumerated in the Rhode Island and
Maryland statutory definition of "handicap" as "serious or nontemporary" is somewhat erroneous. In fact, each of the listed
impairments is serious. Not all non-temporary impairments, however, share this characteristic. For example, an individual may never
feel any functional effects from an extra rib. Such a "nontemporary" birth defect should not fairly be described as an
impairment of the type covered by the Maryland statute.
To date, there have been no judicial decisions in Maryland
analyzing the statutory def'mition of a handicap. With the exception
of the Rhode Island decision, mentioned above, however, the few
opinions rendered by other state courts have devoted almost no
analysis to the issue of whether the complainant was actually
handicapped within the meaning of the pertinent statutory language. If a judicial trend on this issue can be perceived, it is
evidenced best by the latitude given to the term "handicapped" by
the courts in states where the fair employment practices statutes do
not set forth a definition of the term. 196 These cases indicate that the
courts will tend to provide remedies to discrimination complainants
without consideration of the type or effect of the handicap involved.
In Milwaukee Road v. Wisconsin Department of Labor and Human
Relations,197 for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, lacking a
statutory definition for "handicap," defined the term as "a
disadvantage that makes achievement extremely difficult,"198 and
concluded that diseases such as asthma fall within this definition. 199
Circuit courts in Wisconsin subsequently have interpreted the state
employment practices law to provide protection to individuals
suffering from such "handicaps" as a deviated septum~ and
alcoholism. ~1
195.
196.
197.
198.

See notes 170-172 and accompanying text supra.
See note 180 supra.
62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443 (1974).
Ie!. at 398, 215 N.W.2d at 446; accord, Milwaukee Road v. Washington Human
Rights Comm'n, 87 Wash. 2d 802, 805, 557 P.2d 307, 310 (1976).
199. 62 Wis. 2d at 398, 215 N.W.2d at 446.
200. Journal Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 13 F.E.P.
Cas. 1655 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County, 1976).
.
201. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human
Relations, 13 F.E.P. Cas. 1811 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County, 1976). Other
disabilities found to constitute handicaps by Wisconsin circuit courts have
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Summary

Most of the judicial decisions and administrative regulations
that have read the term "handicapped" broadly seem to proceed on
the assumption that the purpose of statutes mandating equal
employment opportunities for the handicapped is to eliminate
discrimination based upon unnecessary physical or mental job
standards, and that such statutes should be liberaiIy construed to
permit any complainant to point out the irrelevancy of the standard
that resulted in his rejection for a job opportunity. After all, so the
argument goes, if the standard is in fact relevant, the employer will
have the opportunity to prove his case and the result will be a
finding of no discrimination.202
This rationale ignores some realities that may persuade the
courts and administrative agencies to adopt a more restricted
construction of the statutory definition of "handicapped." First, the
courts and agencies should be reminded of their experiences in
applying the 1964 Civil Rights Act and similar state statutes
prohibiting employment discrimination against other minorities,
and of the problems that have arisen in implementing equal
employment opportunity laws that have been given too broad a
sweep. Eager to assert their authority, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and state fair employment practice
agencies at first took jurisdiction over, investigated, and often found
probable cause to believe discrimination had occurred in complaints
that patently lacked legal suffiCiency. Eventually, however, implementation of the laws bogged down in the slough of petty complaints
that resulted from public awareness that every claim, no matter how
minor, would receive agency attention. Consequently, the agencies
soon found themselves lacking the time and resources to tackle the
larger task of eliminating more serious and widespread discriminatory practices without delay.203
Many of these agencies now have reconsidered their approach
and currently take the position that complaints over which the
agency patently lacks jurisdiction will be dismissed quickly, if
included rheumatoid arthritis, J. C. Penney Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus.,
Labor and Human Relations, 12 F.E.P. Cas. 1109 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County,
1976), diabetes, Fraser Shipyards, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and
Human Relations, 13 F.E.P. Cas. 1809 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County, 1976), a heart
murmur, City of Wisconsin Rapids v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and
Human Relations, [1977] 171 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-I (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane
County, 1977); and acute lymphocytic leukemia, Chrysler Outboard Corp. v.
Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 14 F.E.P. Cas. 344 (Wis.
Cir. Ct., Dane County, 1976).
202. See, e.g., Milwaukee Road v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human
Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443 (1974).
203. See Interview with Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chairman of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, [1977] 135 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) D-1. See also H.R.
REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1972): "[T]he burgeoning workload [of the
Commission], accompanied by insufficient funds and a shortage of staff has, in
many instances, forced a party to wait 2 to 3 years before final conciliation
procedures can be instituted."
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accepted at all, and that probable cause will be found only in
"litigable" complaints. 204 As the courts became overburdened with
discrimination complaints that obviously lacked merit, or failed to
conform to procedural prerequisites, they also began to appraise
with a more critical eye the limitations in the coverage of the civil
rights acts. 205 The hard-earned lesson that an inflationary construction of the coverage of discrimination laws results in their delayed
and diluted enforcement should not be lost on the courts and the
agencies as they encounter new laws to protect a newly recognized
minority.
A second consideration mandating a narrower approach to
construction of statutory definitions of "handicapped" is the scope of
the problem these statutes were intended to solve. The individuals
who have been relegated to dependent positions by societal attitudes
based upo~ erroneous notions about ability have not included those
temporarily hampered by injuries or illnesses, or those who suffered
from mild neuroses, allergies or unnoticeable birth defects.206
Although such physical or mental conditions may cause a few
isolated instances of difficulty in obtaining employment, they do not
generally eliminate one from equal consideration for the great
majority of jobs. Inasmuch as employment anti-discrimination and
affirmative action statutes traditionally are geared to remedy
deprivations resulting from broad-based and irrational classifications that significantly affect employment opportunity,207 it is
204. For example, the EEOC's recently amended procedural regulations provide that
the Commission will dismiss any charge which reveals on its face that it was not
timely filed or otherwise failed to make a claim under Title VII. 42 Fed. Reg.
55391 (1977) (to be codified as 29 C.F.R § 1601.19(a)). See also EEOC Draft
Memoranda on New Procedures for Processing Title VII Complaints, [1977] 141
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) E-l; Interview with Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chairman
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, [1977] 135 DAILY LAB. REP
(BNA) D-l, D-4 to D-5.
205. For example, three recent decisions by the Supreme Court have restricted the
applicability of Title VII. See, e.g., United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977)
(rehired employee may not attack policy that resulted in earlier separation from
employment and loss of seniority under neutral seniority system as a
"continuing violation" of Title VII); In1'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324 (1977) (neutral application of bona fide seniority system does not violate
Title VII even though it perpetuates effects of pre-Act discrimination); General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (disability income protection plan that
excludes disabilities arising from pregnancy does not constitute gender-based
discrimination in violation of Title VII, EEOC Guidelines to the contrary
notwithstanding).
206. Cf. Nagi, McBroom & Collette, Work, Employment And The Disabled, 31 AMER.
J. ECON. & SOCIa. 21 (1972) (survey of studies related to work, employment, and
disability dealing primarily with individuals who have severe impairments, such
as paraplegics, cardiacs, amputees, persons with spinal cord injuries, deafness,
and persons with severe mental or psychiatric disorders).
207. One reason, for example, that Title VII has not been held applicable to grooming
codes that treat males differently from females is that the courts have interpreted
Title VII to prohibit only discriminatory practices that impose a significant
economic detriment to members of one sex, by substantially depriving them of
opportunities for employment. See, e.g., Knott v. Missouri Pac. RR, 527 F.2d
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unreasonable to assume that in this instance the laws were intended
to pertain to individuals who have never been victimized previously
in any general way. It is questionable, for example, whether
Congress intended that tax dollars should be spent to process the
complaint of a flat-footed person who is denied a job as a foot
patrolman, a person allergic to chlorine who is denied a job as a
swimming pool lifeguard, or a person with a bad back who is denied
a job as a furniture mover .
.Third, it is questionable whether the same legislative bodies
whose previous equal employment enactments have been interpreted
as directed solely towards the protection of individuals who unfairly
had been denied jobs on the basis of characteristics that were not of
their own makingaJ8 have, in this instance, intended to protect
individuals who are discriminated against as a result of characteristics acquired by choice. Thus, the decisions of HEW, OFCCP, and at
least one lower level state court to include such conditions as
alcoholism and drug addiction under the term "handicapped"aJ9 can
be criticized severely. Alcoholics and drug addicts are not entirely
innocent victims of a handicap, as are the victims of race, sex,
national origin and religious discrimination. 210 Moreover, addictions
are not traditionally or popularly regarded as handicaps and it is
questionable whether many individuals who have these conditions
consider themselves "impaired."211 Certainly, such individuals

208.
209.

210.
211.

1249, 1251 (8th Cir. 1975); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084,
1091-92 (5th Cir. 1975); Dodge v. Giant Food, 488 F.2d 1333, 1335-37 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Boyce v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D.D.C. 1972). The
Supreme Court has also recognized the relevance of the traditional concept of
discrimination. In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), for
example, where the Court found no gender-based discrimination in a disability
insurance program that excluded pregnancy, the opinion stated:
The concept of "discrimination," of course, was well known at the
time of the enactment of Title VII, having been associated with the
Fourteenth Amendment for nearly a century, and carrying with it a long
history of judicial construction. When Congress makes it unlawful for an
employer to "discriminate. . . because of. . . sex. . .," without further
explanation of its meaning, we should not readily infer that it meant
something different from what the concept of discrimination has
traditionally meant. (citations omitted and emphasis added).
429 U.S. at 145.
See notes 14 and 105 supra.
The Secretary of HEW has specifically stated that the regulations cover drug
addiction and alcoholism as "handicaps." See 42 Fed. Reg. 22677 (1977). The
OFCCP's summary of back pay cases, supra note 34, includes a case where the
alleged "handicap" was alcoholism. In Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v.
Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 13 F.E.P. Cas. 1811
(Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County, 1976), the Dane County Circuit Court of Wisconsin
held that alcoholism or a "drinking problem" constitutes a handicap within the
meaning of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act.
For a discussion of the volitional nature of alcoholism and drug addiction, see
Ogden, Justice And The Problem Of The Volitional Victim, 1977 LAB. L.J. 417.
After the first set of proposed regulations for the implementation of § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act was issued by the Secretary of HEW, numerous comments
were received on the proposed inclusion of drug addicts and alcoholics under the
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would not be entitled to benefit under current equal protection
analysis, even if handicapped status were otherwise held to be a
suspect classification, since these handicaps are not "immutable
characteristic[s] determined solely by the accident of birth" or by a
constitutionally protected choice.212
Finally, a broad defmition of the handicapped class would be
incompatible with some of the standards of proof ap'plied in
discrimination litigation. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, for example, which was enacted to protect readily identifiable
members of minority groups that historically had been victimized by
individually motivated treatment, the plaintiff is not required to
establish the defendant's specific intent to discriminate when the
evidence reveals discriminatory effects, such as the "disproportionate impact" upon minorities of a facially neutral employment
criterion that is not justified by business necessity. Moreover, when
the complaint is predicated upon the "disparate treatment" of
minorities, intent is often inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment. 213 Unlike inequality of treatment because of
race, sex, religion or national origin, handicap discrimination often
stems from a sympathetic or benign intent, or at least from a lack of
definition of a "handicapped individual." The Secretary noted, in issuing a
second set of proposed regulations, that:
Commentators made a number of arguments against including alcohol
and drug addicts and homosexuals: That these conditions are selfinflicted; that section 504 is not the proper vehicle for eliminating
discriminations based on these characteristics; that the term "handicapped person" does not, from either an historical or popular viewpoint,
denote addicts or homosexuals; that such persons, and in particular
homosexual persons, would not agree with the notion that they are
handicapped; and that inclusion of these groups would detract from the
emphasis upon eliminating discrimination against those persons
traditionally thought of as being handicapped.
41 Fed. Reg. 29548-49 (1976). The Secretary decided, however, to include drug
addicts and alcoholics as "handicaps" but determined that homosexuals were
not "handicapped individuals."
212. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
213. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 n.15 (1977).
In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), however, the Supreme Court
recently held that the "disproportionate impact" theory of proof of employment
discrimination had been applied erroneously in a claim alleging state action in
violation of the equal protection clause and that proof of a racially discriminatory purpose must be established in such cases. In distinguishing Title VII from
the equal protection clause, the Court intimated that it is the language of Title
VII that eliminates the need for proof of discriminatory intent in disproportionate impact cases, stating: "Under Title VII, Congress provided that when
[employment] practices disqualifying substantially disproportionate number of
blacks are challenged, discriminatory purpose need not be proved." [d. at 247.
Section 703(b) of Title VII makes it unlawful to classify or limit employees or job
applicants in any way that "would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee because of ... race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(2) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added). The Rehabilitation Act
includes no such language and the courts therefore might apply to this statute
the rules for ascertaining intent set forth in Washington.
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knowledge about the effects of certain medical conditions. 214
Moreover, the characteristics that place an individual within the
protected ''handicapped'' class, as it is currently being construed,
will often be much less recognizable than the badges of race, age,
national origin, or sex, and many will not be recognized at all in the
absence of a physical examination. Further, because of the infinite
variety of ''handicaps,'' many of which only members of the medical
profession would recognize, it will be impossible, in many cases, for
the employer to foresee that a physical job standard might have a
disproportionate impact upon the handicapped. 215 Similarly, if the
term "handicap" includes minor physical conditions that ordinarily
are not thought of with that connotation, the employer may be
totally unaware that its actions constitute "disparate treatment" of
the handicapped as that term is used in the Title VII context. 216
214. Equal Treatment, supra note 28 at 101-102.
215. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), sets forth the elements of proof in
a disproportionate impact case. These elements were further refined in Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.s. 405 (1975).
[T]he employer [must meet] "the burden of showing that any given
requirement [has] ... a manifest relation to the employment in
question." This burden arises, of course, only after the complaining
party or class has made out a prima facie case of discrimination, i.e., has
shown that the tests in question select applicants for hire or promotion
in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of
applicants. If an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its
tests are "job related," it remains open to the complaining party to show
that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable
racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in
"efficient and trustworthy workmanship." (citations omitted).
Id. at 425.
216. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme Court
set forth the standards of proof in a case alleging disparate treatment:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under
the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.
This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii)
that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications ....
The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [complainant's] rejection.
Id. at 802. Thus as stated in the text supra, although proof of discriminatory
intent is required to make the prima facie showing in an' individual disparate
treatment case, proof of discriminatory intent can be inferred from the mere fact
that an individual was treated differently. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 n.15 (1977). The employer who denies a secretarial position
to an individual who suffers from migraine headaches, and hires instead an
individual who does not have such a condition, and who otherwise is not as
qualified or, in some circuits, is no better qualified than the rejected applicant,
therefore, may have met each of the elements of handicap discrimination under
the "disparate treatment" theory, even though the employer may not perceive
migraine headaches as a handicap. Cr. East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332 (5th
Cir. 1975) (defendant must articulate not only a legitimate r.on-discriminatory
reason for its choice, but also must show that other person hired subsequent to
the defendant's rejection of plaintiff were better qualified).
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A broad construction of the term "handicapped," especially if
applied in connection with standards of proof that obviate the need
for evidence of discriminatory intent, could therefore have harsh
consequences for employers. Moreover, when it is patently impossible for employers to identify the members of a class, or if individuals
become members of the class as a result of their treatment by the
defendant employer, rather than as a direct result of some inherent
characteristic, there is room to challenge laws protecting that class
on the grounds of vagueness. 217
Thus, although it can be argued that the precise intent of
legislative bodies that have enacted handicap discrimination laws
was to force employers to make demonstrably job-related employment decisions, there is a strong equitable, historical, and practical
argument to support the proposition that there was no intent to so
thoroughly police employment practices of businesses. A more
rational inference is that the legislative intent is to hold employers
liable only to individuals with handicaps that seriously impair their
functional ability and thus their general employability. Current
agency and judicial interpretations of the scope of handicap
discrimination and affirmative action laws arguably have exceeded
statutory authority and furthermore, may be counterproductive in
overreaching the intended beneficiaries of the law. Legal develop217. A statute so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application violates due process, and the rule is
applicable to regulations. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337,
340 (1952). In Boyce, the Court upheld a regulation, attacked as impermissibly
vague, in part because the statute pursuant to which it was promulgated
included culpable intent as a necessary element of the offense. The Court stated,
"this requirement ... does much to destroy any force in the argument that
application of the Regulation would be so unfair that it must be held invalid. [d.
at 342. The problem with the Rehabilitation Act's definition of a handicap, as
applied to impairments that are not readily ascertainable or commonly
recognizable as "handicaps," is that the defendant is subjected to liability for his
treatment of individuals whom he understandably would not consider "handicapped" and thus would have no intent to make a victim of discrimination on the
basis of handicap. OFCCP regulations providing for an invitation to the
handicapped to identify themselves and for medical documentation of handicaps, discussed at note 174 and accompanying text supra, may result from the
agency's recognition of the susceptibility of its regulations to a vagueness
challenge.
In any event, however, it is extremely difficult to obtain the invalidation of a
statute on the grounds that it is impermissibly vague. See Milwaukee Road v.
Washington Human Rights Comm'n, 87 Wash. 2d 802, 557 P.2d 307 (1976)
(statute forbidding discrimination on basis of handicaps is not void for
vagueness, even though statute does not contain definition of "handicap,"
because term has well understood, common meaning); accord, Milwaukee Road v.
Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.
2d 443 (1974); c{. Tietze v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 610 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (standard
for disability under the Social Security Act, - "unable to engage in substantial
gainful activity" - as applied by the Social Security Administration is precisely
defined in the Social Security Act, and thus must be upheld as against challenge
of vagueness). For a comprehensive discussion of the vagueness doctrine, see 1
A. C. SAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 21.16 (4th ed. 1972).

1978]

Handicapped Employment Opportunity

245

ments in this area are still at the sprout stage, however, and before
the dust settles from the "planting season," the courts may well be
persuaded by practical, equitable, and policy considerations, such as
those discussed above, to more stringently apply the rules of
statutory construction in ascertaining the intended coverage of the
laws.
B.

IDENTIFYING "QUALIFIED HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUALS"

Regardless of whether an individual is "handicapped," the equal
employment opportunity laws do not entitle him to the benefit of
affirmative action or to protection from discrimination unless he is
able to do the job he is seeking. The Rehabilitation Act covers only
"qualified handicapped individuals"218 and, while there is no
definition of the term "qualified" in the Rehabilitation Act itself, the
OFCCP regulations provide that a handicapped individual meets
this standard only if he is "capable of performing a particular job
with reasonable accommodation to his or her handicap."219 The
HEW and Executive Order 11,914 regulations make one variation on
this standard; under their definition of "qualified," the handicapped
individual need be capable of performing, with "reasonable accommodation," only the "essential functions" of the job. 220
218. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (Supp. V 1975). See Rogers v. Frito Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200
(N.D. Tex. 1977). Although §504 of the Rehabilitation Act uses the term
"otherwise qualified," 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975), the HEW regulations
interpret this phrase to mean merely "qualified." See note 44 supra. The
Veterans' Readjustment Act similarly protects only "qualified disabled veterans." 38 U.S.C. § 2012(a) (Supp. V 1975). One need be only a "handicapped
individual," however, in order to file a complaint under § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act or a "disabled veteran" to file a complaint under the Veterans'
Readjustment Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (Supp. V 1975); 38 U.S.C. § 2012(b)
(Supp. V 1975).
219.41 C.F.R. §60-741.2 (1977). The OFCCP Veterans' regulations track the OFCCP
handicapped regulations in this regard. Id. § 60-250.2. For a discussion of the
meaning of the word "qualified" as applied in other contexts, such as under the
Social Security laws, see Equal Treatment, supra note 28, at 72 n.24.
220. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(k)(I), 85.32(a). The HEW Secretary's analysis states that the
phrase "essential functions" is included to emphasize that handicapped
individuals should not be disqualified merely because of difficulty in performing
tasks that bear only a "marginal relationship" to a job, and that it is "not
inconsistent" with the Department of Labor's interpretation of "qualified." 42
Fed. Reg. 22676, 22687 (1977). See also 43 Fed. Reg. 2132, 2134 (1978).
The term "otherwise qualified" is interpreted somewhat differently by HEW
when applied in the context of federally financed educational programs. Section
84.3(k)(3) defines a "qualified handicapped person" with respect to post
secondary and ·vocational educational services as "[a] handicapped person who
meets the academic and technical standards requisite to admission or
participation in the recipient's educational program or activity."
In Davis v. Southeastern Community College, No. 77-1237 (4th Cir., filed
March 28, 1978), reu'g 424 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D.N.C. 1976), the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently relied on § 84.3(k)(3) as the basis for its reversal of a
district court holding that an applicant for a nursing educational program was
not "otherwise qualified" because her hearing deficiency would prevent her from
safely performing the· clinical training for a nursing degree and would, after her
graduation, restrict her in the pursuit of her proposed profession. The fourth
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The Maryland law similarly makes handicap discrimination in
employment unlawful only when it is based upon a physical or
mental handicap "unrelated in nature and extent so as to reasonably
preclude the performance of the employment,"221 and most other
state statutes include the same type of limitation. 222 In addition, the
laws of some states, including Maryland, provide that where
"physical or mental qualification is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of [a]
particular business or enterprise," it is not an unlawful practice for
the employer to base employment decisions upon physical or mental
qualifications. 223
Thus, although the drafters of state and federal laws affecting
the employment rights of the handicapped have phrased the caveat
in varying terms, none of the legislation forbids the rejeCtion of
applicants whose handicaps render them unqualified for a job. As
interpreted by the courts and administrative agencies, however,
these laws make the process of distinguishing between qualified and
unqualified handicapped individuals substantially more complicated
than it might appear to be. A two-tiered inquiry is required under
these interpretations. Initially, it must be determined whether the
handicap is "job-related," and there are restrictions upon the factors
that may be considered and the methods that may be used to
ascertain this fact.224 Second, if the handicap is "job-related," the
question becomes one of whether "reasonable accommodations" for
the handicap can be made in order to alleviate the impediment it
imposes to employment. 225 The duty to make "reasonable accommo-

221.
222.
223.

224.
225.

circuit held that, in view of the above quoted regulation, which was not in effect
at the time of the district court decision, the district court "erred by considering
the nature of the plaintiff's handicap in order to determine whether or not she
was 'otherwise qualified' for admittance to the nursing program, rather than by
focusing upon her academic and technical qualifications." [d., slip op. at 9. The
case was remanded and the college was ordered to reconsider the plaintiff's
application without regard to her hearing disability and to focus its inquiry on
other relevant subjective and objective factors utilized in the consideration of
non-handicapped applicants, such as past academic performance. [d. at 5-6.
Although the fourth circuit explicitly refrained from commenting upon the
reasonableness of the regulations, the import of its interpretation of the section
in question is that handicapped status must be irrelevant in a determination of
whether an applicant is qualified for a federally financed educational program.
The rule, based as it is on § 84.3(k)(3) of the § 504 regulations, would not be
applicable to employment programs, however, since as stated in the text above,
HEW has defined a "qualified handicapped person," for purposes of empioyment,
as "a handicapped person who, with reasonable accommodation can perform the
essential functions of the job in question." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (emphasis
added). Thus, the regulations do not preclude consideration of physical or mentlll
ability in employment decisions.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 19(a)(1) (Supp. 1977).
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18:80:220(1) (Supp. 1976).
Md. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 19(9)(1) (Supp. 1977) (emphasis added). See also CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-126(a) (1977).
See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(b), (c), -250.6(b), (c) (1977); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.13; 85.54.
The second line of inquiry is necessary because both the OFCCP and HEW
regulations build into the definition of "qualified" the concept that "reasonable
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dations" for the handicapped, which has ramifications beyond its
application to the question of whether an individual is qualified will
be discussed in more detaillater,226 while the instant discussion' will
deal with the more immediate problem of identifying job-related
handicaps.

1.

The Concept of Job-Relatedness

An individual's handicap can be deemed "job-related" only to
the extent that it prevents him from meeting "job-related" requirements for employment. In other words, a handicapped individual is
not "unqualified" because he fails to meet or pass job qualifications
that do not measure, and have no relevance to, his ability to perform
the specific job sought.
In irrebuttable presumption cases, the courts have applied this
standard to allegations of a deprivation of fourteenth amendment
rights, holding that public employers may not reject a job applicant
because of a handicap that would not necessarily impede his ability
to perform the employment. 227 The OFCCP regulations impose the
same restriction on government contractors, requiring them to
review all physical and mental job qualification requirements for the
purpose of ensuring that they do not tend to exclude qualified·
handicapped applicants from consideration for reasons that are not
"job-related and ... consistent with business necessity and the safe
performance of the job."228 The burden is placed on the contractor to
demonstrate that its job qualification requirements meet this
standard. 229 The HEW and Executive Order 11,914 regulations
similarly require federally financed enterprises to ensure that
employment selection criteria which tend to screen out the handicapped are "job-related."230 The Maryland proposed regulations on
the handicapped impose the same obligation by providing that
employers must adopt
[p]hysical standards for employment that are fair, reasonable, and adapted to the actual requirements of this
employment; these standards shall be based on complete

226.
227.

228.
229.
230.

accommodation" to an individual's handicap is a condition precedent to a
determination of whether the individual is in fact "qualified" for a particular job.
See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.2, -250.2 (1977); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(k)(I), 85.32(a). The
regulations of the Maryland Commission on Human Relations also purport to
impose an accommodation duty upon employers with respect to the determination of qualification for a job. XVI COMAR § 14.03.04(8).
See notes 303-304 and accompanying text infra.
See Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977); Duran v. City of Tampa,
430 F. Supp. 75, 77-78 (M.D. Fla. 1977); Hoffman v. Ohio Youth Com'n, 13 F.E.P.
Cas. 30 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (dictum); cf. Coleman v. Darden, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec.
6789 (D. Colo. 1977: "There can be no question but that sufficient visual acuity
to enable the employee to read has a direct relationship to the [paralegal] job."
41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c)(l) (1977); see id. § 60-250.6(c)(l).
Id. § 60-741.6(c)(2); see id. § 60-250.6(c)(2).
45 C.F.R. §§ 84.13(a), 85.54.
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factual information concerning working conditions, hazards, and essential physical requirements of each job;
physical standards may not be used to arbitrarily eliminate
the disabled person from consideration. 231
a.

Proof of Job-Relatedness

While the regulations make it clear that handicapped individuals may not be disqualified from employment on the basis of nonjobrelated criteria, they provide no guidance as to the types of physical
and mental employment criteria that will pass the "job-related" test.
Some guidance by analogy can be derived, however, from judicial
rulings that various types of employment selection criteria, such as
diploma, license, and financial requirements, and certain educational, skill, and aptitude tests, impacted disproportionately upon
racial minorities and females in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Ad of 1964. 232 In general, the courts have required employers
to prove the "business necessity" of job standards found to exclude a
significantly greater percentage of protected minority group
members than nonminorities from employment, and have accepted
proof of the "job-relatedness" of the standards as an adequate
showing of "business necessity."233 Since these Title VII cases are
the source of the "job-relatedness" concept, they may be helpful in
predicting the manner in which the concept will be applied with
respect to the newly-recognized handicapped minority.
A recent decision by the Supreme Court, Dothard v. Rawlinson,234 typifies the approach taken in Title VII attacks on standards
for employment. The Court found that height and weight requirements for guards in a prison for males, although facially neutral,
231. XVI Co MAR § 14.03.04B(2)(c). The Maryland proposed regulations include this
requirement among the suggestions for "reasonable accommodation" to the
handicapped, but the prevailing standards for ascertaining whether discrimination has occurred would impose this requirement in the absence of any duty to
accommodate. See note 233 infra.
232. For a discussion of the cases dealing with this issue under Title VII, see B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw chs. 4-6 (1976).
233. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Supreme Court forbade the
use of a high school diploma or a general intelligence test as a criteria for
promotion because significantly more blacks than whites failed to meet both
criteria, the criteria had been adopted "without meaningful study of their
relationship to job performance ability," and there was no proof of jobrelatedness or any other "genuine business need." Id. at 431-32.
The terms "job-relatedness" and "business necessity" are frequently used
interchangeably, and it has been suggested that
"job-relatedness" is merely one means of proving business necessity,
although it may be in some circumstances the only means of proving
business necessity if the purpose of the criteria is to predict the capacity
of a particular individual to successfully perform the job .... In other
areas ... [g]iven proper proof of a substantial disparate effect, the issue
of business necessity would turn not on predictive factors relating to the
employee's performance, but upon the burden to the business.
B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 133 (1976).
234. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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had a disproportionate impact on female applicants for the
position. 235 The defendant alleged that the height and weight
requirements were related to the physical strength essential to
effective performance of the guard's job, but failed to introduce
evidence to verify this contention. The requirements were struck
down, with the Court commenting that "[i]f the job-related quality
... is bona fide, [the defendant's] purpose could be achieved by
adopting and validating a test for applicants that measures strength
directly."236
The Dothard opinion illustrates that where a facially neutraP37
job criterion is found to impact adversely on a minority protected by
235. ld. at 331. In Dothard, a statistical showing of adverse impact triggered the
employer's burden to prove "business necessity." Under the HEW regulations, at
least as interpreted by the Secretary, no statistical proof of adverse impact is
required. The complainant need show only that an employment test "substantially limits" the job opportunities of handicapped persons in order to give rise to
the employer's burden to prove "job-relatedness." 42 Fed. Reg. 22676,
22688-22689 (1977).
236. 433 U.S. at 332 (emphasis added).
237. Some employment criteria are invalidated not because their facially neutral
character belies a disproportionate impact unjustified by business necessity, but
because they absolutely exclude members of a protected class from certain jobs.
The Dothard decision sets forth standards for upholding this type of employment
criterion as well. Even though the Court would not permit the virtual exclusion of
women from all guard positions in male prisons through the use of facially
neutral height and weight requirements not justified by their job-relatedness, the
defendant was allowed to absolutely exclude women from assignments to guard
positions that involved "contact" with male prisoners, via the Court's holding
that sex was a "bona fide occupational qualification" ("BFOQ") for such
positions. This result was justified, in the Court's opinion, because the evidence
demonstrated that women guards would be more susceptible than males to
assault by male sex offenders which could cause them to lose control over prjson
security. 433 U.S. at 336.
The Court articulated, without specifically adopting, several verbal formulations of the test for a BFOQ, including a standard that would permit the
employer to rely on the exception when it had "reasonable cause to believe, that
is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women would be
unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved." ld. at
2729, (quoting Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir.
1969)). The Court also quoted another standard: "[D]iscrimination based on sex
is valid only when the essence of the business operation would be undermined by
not hiring members of one sex exclusively." 433 U.S. at 333, (citing Diaz v. Pan
American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
950 (1971)).
The Court's discussion of the BFOQ issue might appear to have limited
application to handicap discrimination since, unlike Title VII, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e) (Supp. V 1975), the Rehabilitation Act does not contain a specific
BFOQ exception. Under handicap discrimination laws that specifically limit
applicability to "qualified" handicapped individuals, a strong argument can be
made that a BFOQ exception is necessarily implied, however. C[. 13 C.F.R.
§ 113.3-l(b) (1977) (providing that nothing in the SBA regulations issued
pursuant to § 504 prohibits "the restriction of certain jobs to qualified
handicapped persons or to members of one sex if a bona fide occupational
qualification can be demonstrated by the ... recipient.") Moreover, as discussed
at note 223 supra, some state handicap discrimination laws, including the
Maryland laws, specifically include a BFOQ exception. When an employer can
establish that the physical condition required for a particular job is a BFOQ, it
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Title VII, the courts ordinarily will not uphold the criterion in the
absence of specific evidence to substantiate its job-relatedness, at
least where a validated test could be used in lieu thereof.238 In most
cases the burden of proof requires the submission of detailed
evidence of job duties and conditions, and statistical demonstrations
of the validity of the criterion as a predictor of job performance. 239
A few Title VII cases have deviated somewhat from a rigid
application of this onerous proof burden, and have articulafed the
principle that there is a narrow class of job qualifications so
manifestly job-related that no evidentiary showing is required to
justify their imposition. 240 Recently, in Smith v. Olin Chemical
should logically be permitted to frame employment criteria or inquiries in
absolutely exclusionary terms, rather than be forced to struggle with the
difficulties often involved in drafting the facially neutral inquiries or criteria
that OFCCP and HEW apparently intend to require. See discussion at note
283-295 infra.
~_
~_
238. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975), the Court stated that
even though an employer proved a job criterion was job-related, the criterion
could still be struck down if the plaintiff showed that alternatives with a lesser
impact on minorities could be used to accomplish the same business purposes.
Dothard reiterated this view at the beginning of the opinion, 433 U.S. at 329, but
the statement quoted in the text at note 237 supra, implies that proof that no less
restrictive alternative exists - such as, in that case presumably, a validated test
- might be required from the defendant as part of its initial burden, rather than
from the plaintiff. Several federal circuit courts have adopted this approach. E.g.,
Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1974); Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 244 n.87 (5th Cir. 1974).
HEW has taken the position that the job-relatedness required under the § 504
regulations may be demonstrated by methods other than a validated test. 42 Fed.
Reg. 22676, 22688-89 (1977). Moreover, the regulations place the burden on the
Director to advance less restrictive alternatives. 45 C.F.R. § 84.13(a)(2). The
OFCCP regulations are silent on this point.
239. See, e.g., Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-36 (1975); United
States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 911-19 (5th Cir. 1973). There are some
recent indications of a relaxation in these standards. Cf, Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 248-52 (1976) (applying a lesser standard for validating jobrelatedness in a suit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981). Compare 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1607 (1976) (the EEOC's Employee Selection Guidelines) with 42 Fed. Reg.
65542-65552 (1977) (the Uniform Employee Selection Guidelines proposed for
adoption by the EEOC, the Civil Service Commission, the Department of Labor
and the Department of Justice) (proposed for codification in 5 C.F.R. pt. 300, 29
C.F.R. pt. 1607,28 C.F.R. pt. 50, and 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-3) (hereinafter cited to title 5
of C.F.R. and proposed section number). The proposed guidelines specifically
state that they do not apply to employees' subject to § 504 of the Rehabilitation·
Act. 5 C.F.R. § 30D-2D. While there is no specific exemption of employers subject
to § 503, that section is not included in the list of statutes and executive orders to
which the guidelines do apply. Id. § 300-2A.
240. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), for example, where
the company had refused to hire a black man who had participated in illeg~l
picketing at its premises, the Supreme Court held that although the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case of discrimination, see note 216 supra, the
defendant had met its burden of proof by articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason - the illegal picketing - for the rejection. The defendant
was not required to prove the business necessity for this standard and the case
merely was remanded to afford the plaintiff an opportunity to show that the
defendant's stated reason for the rejection was in fact a pretext for discrimination.
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Corporation,241 for example, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that the need for a manual laborer to have a
"good back" is such a manifestly job-related criterion. The plaintiff
in the case was discharged from a laborer's position due to a
company doctor's diagnosis of spinal degeneration, explained by the
plaintiffs history of sickle cell anemia. Since this disease is found
almost exclusively in Blacks, the plaintiff alleged that the "good
back" criterion impacted adversely upon members of his race. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendant, holding that, inasmuch as a "good
back" is "manifestly necessary" to work as a manual laborer,
an employer does not have to justify with evidentiary proof
of business necessity the exclusion from manual labor of
any person with "bone degeneration in his spinal region," a
bad back, even if such practice affects disproportionately
some class protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.242
Where "manifestly necessary" job criteria, such as a "good
back," can be identified,243 they logically should be upheld against
any claim of disproportionate impact, whether predicated on the
241. 555 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1977).
242. Id. at 1288. The court inferred from McDonnell Douglas, which involved
disparate treatment, a suggestion that, even in a disparate impact case, "a
facially neutral job criterion can be so manifestly job·related so [sic] as not to be
the kind of 'artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barrier' Title VII prohibits." Id.
at 1287. Thus, in essence, the fifth circuit held that where the peculiar
circumstances of a disproportionate impact case so require, the rules governing
the burden of proof in a disproportionate treatment case can be applied. Whereas
the traditional burden of proof rules for a disproportionate impact case applied in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), see note 215 supra, require the defendant to make a
strong showing of business necessity in order to counter the plaintiffs prima
facie case, the rule set forth in Smith requires only the articulation of some
legitimate non·discriminatory justification for the allegedly discriminatory act,
for which no evidentiary proof is required. The employer who meets this lesser
burden would prevail, in the absence of a claim by the plaintiff that the
employment criterion was used as a pretext for discrimination.
243. Industrial physicians have conducted a number of research studies that could be
helpful in proving the "manifest necessity" of a physical job standard. See, e.g.,
Bond, Low·Back X·Rays - Criteria for Use in Placement Examination in
Industry, 6 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 373 (1964). See also AMA GUIDES TO
EVALUATION OF IMPAIRMENT, note 176 supra. The GUIDES set forth methods for
calculating degrees of impairment, which could be correlated with specific job
functions. The OFCCP regulations currently authorize the use of the GUIDES, but
only with respect to an evaluation of the existence of an impairment, and not
with respect to an evaluation of the degree of impairment. See notes 175-178
supra and accompanying text supra.
If HEW adheres to its current position that a handicapped complainant need
show only that a job criterion "significantly limits" employment opportunities in
order to establish the invalidity of the criterion's application to determine
whether he is "qualified," instead of a statistically significant showing of
disproportionate impact, see note 236 supra, the employer's burden of proof to
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characteristic of race, sex, national origin, or handicapped status at least if the employer establishes that the handicap could not
reasonably be accommodated in the job. 244 In addition to the "good
back" criterion for applicants for laborer positions, the list of
"manifestly necessary" physical qualifications should include good
vision for a driver and good hearing for a telephone operator. Other
examples can be derived from cases where the courts have refused to
hold that an employer discriminated on the basis of race or sex when
its actions were predicated on physical or mental job requirements
which the plaintiff was unable to meet, and which were not found to
be mere pretexts to cover a discriminatory motive. 245
With the exception of the few cases where specific physical or
mental job requirements have been upheld as valid when interposed
as a defense to claims of race, sex, age, or national origin
discrimination, however, judicial authority under Title VII and other
equal employment opportunity statutes protecting other minorities is
helpful in the handicap discrimination context only insofar as it
establishes a methodology for proving job-relatedness. Some
variations in this methodology may be urged in handicap discrimination cases. First, physical condition - the very characteristic that
places an individual in the protected handicapped minority - is
generally more closely related to job performance than the characteristics peculiar to other minorities. 246 Second, as the Smith case
illustrates, the relationship will sometimes be so obvious as to
eliminate the necessity for statistical proof. Finally, because the
Rehabilitation Act and most state handicap discrimination laws

counter this contention also should be lightened. The approach taken by the fifth
circuit in Smith therefore is a reasonably equitable allocation of proof burdens
that should be considered seriously by agencies and courts confronted with a
plaintiffs claim that he cannot be deemed "unqualified" under a job standard
that disproportionately impacts upon individuals with his handicap.
244. The nature and extent of the employer's duty to "accommodate" the handicapped
is discussed at notes 303-344 and accompanying text infra. It is logical to
assume, however, that administrative agencies and courts will conclude that just
as some job criteria are "manifestly necessary," so also some accommodations
are manifestly inappropriate, since they clearly would impose an "undue
hardship" on the conduct of business. No evidentiary support should be required,
for example, of an employer's contention that it is impossible to accommodate
the blindness of an individual who seeks a job as a driver.
245. Several courts have denied claims alleging discrimination on the basis of race,
sex, and age, after concluding that the discriminatory act was justified by the
defendant's need for employees who met certain physical or mental standards.
See, e.g., Boyce v. Reynolds Metals Co., 532 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1976) (discharge of
black plaintiff justified by his asthmatic condition); Thompson v. Chrysler Corp.,
382 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (preliminary injunction denied to female who
claimed that discharge because of hypertension constituted discrimination on
the basis of race and age); Dorcus v. Westvaco Corp., 345 F. Supp. 1173 (W.D. Va.
1972) (failure to hire black complainant justified by knee condition); Johnson v.
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 2 F.E.P. Cas. 668 (N.D. Ala. 1970) (inability of
obese person to make rounds of job site justified discharge).
246. See, e.g., discussion at note 15 supra.
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apply only to qualified handicapped individuals,247 the complainant's prima facie case of discrimination should consist of more
evidence than that he is handicapped and that the job requirement
under which he was rejected falls more harshly upon individuals
with his handicap than upon normal individuals. Such facts do not
establish that the complainant is a "qualified handicapped individual" within the protected class, much less a prima facie case of
handicap discrimination. 248 Despite the assertions of administrative
agencies that the burden is on the employer to prove the jobrelatedness of its employment criteria, the complainant in a
handicap discrimination case therefore should be required to put
forth some evidence that his handicap is not job-related, and that he
falls within the protected class of "qualified handicapped individuals," before the defendant's burden to rebut this contention arises. 249
By their very nature, almost all physical job requirements will
have a disproportionate effect on individuals who can claim that
they are handicapped under the defmitions of "handicap," discussed
above. Thus, there is an explosive potential for litigation on jobrelatedness issues. To date, however, few handicap discrimination
cases attacking the predictive validity of physical job requirements
have reached the courts and it is difficult to foretell the extent to
which the methodology developed in Title VII cases will be varied to
meet the unique characteristics of the handicapped and of the laws
protecting them. 250
247. See Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 1977) (no evidence that
children sighted in only one eye are "otherwise qualified" under § 504 to play
contact sports); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Bureau of Labor, 28 Or. App. 747, 561
P.2d 637 (1977) (holding that employer's refusal to hire individual for position as
heavy appliance salesman on basis of physician's diagnosis that the individual's
heart condition precluded him from such work was not discriminatory under
state law).
248. Proof that one is a member of the "protected class" is usually the first element of
proof in a discrimination suit. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792,802 (1973). Unlike the Rehabilitation Act, the language of most other equal
employment opportunity statutes does not specifically limit the "protected class"
to "qualified" individuals, so that for example, in a disproportionate impact case
of race or sex discrimination, the plaintiffs job qualifications technically are not
required to be proved before the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the
"job relatedness" of the criterion under which the plaintiff was excluded from
employment. Under the McDonnell Douglas standards for proof in Title VII
cases predicated on disparate treatment, on the other hand, the plaintiff must
establish as part of his prima facie case that he was qualified for employment, in
addition to his status as a member of the "protected class."
249. The plaintiff might meet this burden with medical evidence, or with evidence
that he has previously done similar work elsewhere. See, e.g., Boynton Cab Co. v.
Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, No. 157-111 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane
Co., filed Jan. 24, 1978), where the defendant was required to hire as a taxicab
driver an individual with only one arm. The plaintiff established that he had
been successfully employed as a cab driver for nine months, and that he had a
driver's license. The court noted that the defendant failed to submit any medical
evidence, actual driving comparisons, or statistical evidence relative to the type
of handicap involved to overcome the plaintiffs showing that he was qualified.
250. Cases arising under -the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the "ADEA"),
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (Supp. V 1975), provide a closer analogy for the
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Does Job-Relatedness Include More Than Present
Ability To Do The Job?

The predictive validity of physical employment standards that
exclude handicapped individuals as unqualified is only one of the
issues that can be raised in the process of ascertaining whether a
handicap is "job-related". Even when there is no question as to a
handicapped individual's present ability to do a job, there may be
other grounds, properly characterized as "business necessity,"251 to
justify his rejection for employment. One question that has arisen in
this context is whether the possibility that exposure to certain job
conditions would aggravate a preexisting handicap is sufficient
"business necessity" to justify a refusal to hire the handicapped
individual.
Some state statutes deal directly with this issue, specifically
providing that it is not discriminatory to deny employment to a
handicapped individual because of the safety hazard that would
result to the employee and his co-workers, or the general public. 252
While the Maryland statute does not speak to this point, the
Maryland Commission's proposed regulations recommend that an
Rehabilitation Act than do Title VII cases. Although the language of the ADEA
tracks Title VII while the Rehabilitation Act does not, both age and handicapped
status bear a closer relationship to ability to work than do race, sex, or national
origin. In ruling on suits brought pursuant to the ADEA, some courts have
recognized that this difference, along with the fact that the ADEA is embodied in·
a different statute and has a different history from Title VII, mandates against a
rigid application of Title VII proof standards in ADEA cases. See, e.g., Laugesen
v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 311-13 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1045
(1976); Wilson v. Sealtest Foods Div. Kraftco Corp., 501 F.2d 84, 86-87 (5th Cir.
1974); Bishop v. Jelleff Assoc., Inc., 398 F. Supp. 579, 593 (D. D.C. 1974). In
Laugesen, for example, the court noted: "we do not believe that Congress
intended automatic presumptions to apply whenever a worker is replaced by
another of a different age." 510 F.2d at 312-313 n.4. Some of the same
differences, plus others discussed throughout this paper, distinguish the
Rehabilitation Act from Title VII and mandate some distinctions in the
treatment of these cases by the judiciary.
251. See note 233 supra.
252. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420(a)(I), (2) (West. Supp. 1976); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5
§ 4573(4) (West. Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.02, subd. 5 (West. Supp.
1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-304 (Supp. 1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 354-A:3(13) (Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(L) (Supp. 1976).
Such provisions have been criticized .roundly on the grounds that anyone
who undermines safety would be unqualified for a job in any event, and that the
incorporation of these provisions into laws dealing specifically with the disabled
infers that there is something peculiar about this classification that distinguishes it from other protected minorities. See Employment and the Disabled,
supra note 2, at 463. It further has been suggested that "allowing an employer to
discriminate against disabled applicants who might represent a single 'danger""to
themselves' exemplifies the very paternalism of which the disabled complain."
ld. This argument ignores the fact, however, that in most cases the employer
must compensate the handicapped individual for on-the-job injuries, and that an
employer who is precluded both from considering the likelihood that the
handicapped individual will suffer an on-the-job injury and from obtaining a
waiver of the right to compensation for such injury, see discussion notes at
269-71 infra, truly is caught between the proverbial rock and hard place.
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assessment of the applicant's qualifications should include a
determination of whether an applicant is physically and mentally
qualified to do the work "without adverse consequences, such as
creating a dangerous condition to life or health of self or others. ''253
The OFCCP regulations include "safe performance of the job"
among the factors to be considered in the development of job
criteria,254 and although the HEW regulations do not specifically
discuss safety considerations, the Secretary's comments indicate
that they are relevant. 255
All of these regulations appear to support employer concerns for
the safety of the handicapped individual's co-workers and the
general public, but only the Maryland proposed regulations clearly
permit the employer to consider the danger to the handicapped job
applicant that would result from his employment. There may be
some question as to whether even this permission can be read so
broadly as to allow the employer to consider the possible aggravation of an impairment that could result from job conditions. The
central issue concerns the extent to which the employer may make a
health decision for the handicapped job applicant.
There is some judicial support for the proposition that, despite
the absence of a statutory provision specifically permitting consideration of the danger to which a handicapped employee would be
subjected in a job, the employer may impose his judgment and deny
employment for this reason, even though the handicapped applicant
is unconcerned about the danger to his health. For example, in
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Bureau of Labor,256 in which the issue
was whether a pre-existing heart condition was related to the
complainant's ability to work as a heavy appliance salesman, the
Oregon Court of Appeals held:
[W]e interpret the Act as providing that an employer may
refuse to hire an applicant with such a "handicap" where
there is a reasonable medical possibility that the applicant
might, because of the extent of disability and the nature of
the work, be unable to perform the work or could experience
injury as a result of attempting to perform it.257

253. XVI COMAR § 14.03.04A(2) (emphasis added).
254. 41 C.F.R. § 60-74l.6(c)(2). See also id. § 60-250.6(c)(2).
255. For example, in discussing pre-employment inquiries in his analysis of the HEW
regulations, the Secretary stated:
[EJmployers may make inquiries about an applicant's ability to perform
a job safely. Thus, an employer may not ask if an applicant is an
epileptic but may ask whether the person can perform a particular job
without endangering other employees. 42 Fed. Reg. 22676, 22689 (1977)
(emphasis added).
256. 28 Or. App. 747, 561 P.2d 637 (1977).
257. Id. at 750, 561 P.2d at 639 (emphasis added).
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Other judicial opinions concerned with this issue have been
rendered in appeals from administrative agencies heard at the state
circuit court level. In Washington,258 the circuit courts have taken
the position that safety hazards to the job applicant and his coworkers and the possibility of aggravation of a pre-existing
handicap may be considered in determining whether an individual is
qualified for the job. In Rhode Island 259 and Wisconsin,260 on the
other hand, the circuit courts generally have refused to consider
anything other than present ability to do the job. Specifically, the
Wisconsin circuit courts have held that an employer may not
consider in employment decisions such factors as the high risk of
frequent illness and absenteeism typical of a leukemia patient, and
the resulting probability of higher rates for employer-supplied

258. In Milwaukee Road v. Washington Human Rights Comm'n, 11 F.E.P. Cas. 854
(Wash. Super. Ct., King County, 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 87 Wash. 2d 802,
557 P.2d 307 (1976), a Washington county court held that a railroad was not
required to hire as a brakeman an individual who had undergone surgery on his
knees, since there was a significant likelihood of further future degenerative
cllanges in the knees. See Clark v. Milwaukee Road, 12 F.E.P. Cas. 1102, 1104
(Wash. Super. Ct., Spokane County, 1975) (connected case):
In determining whether the denial of employment to an allegedly
handicapped person is discriminatory under the laws of the State of
Washington, one must look at more than present ability to do the job.
One must also examine the safety hazard to the applicant and to his coworkers and any physical deterioration the body of the applicant may
experience in the future as a result of this job, as compared to a person
without the alleged handicap.
259. In Providence Journal Co. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 13 F.E.P.
Cas. 168 (R.I. Super Ct., Providence County, 1975), aff'd sub. nom. on other
grounds, Providence Journal Co. v. Mason, 116 R.I. 614, 359 A.2d 682
(1976), a Rhode Island county court held that the fact that a whiplash injury
might be aggravated by a desk job was not a defense to a charge of a
discriminatory refusal to hire an individual with such an injury.
260. See notes 261-263 infra. But see Milwaukee Road v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus.,
Labor & Human Relations, 8 F.E.P. Cas. 937 (Wisconsin Cir. Ct., Dane County,
1971), aff'd 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443 (1974), where the employer's rules
prohibited individuals with asthma from working in a diesel roundhouse because
of the fact that the fumes would aggravate the asthmatic condition. The court
commented:
Common sense should make an employee hesitate to take or continue in
work which may cause him injury even if he exercises due care. And if
the law makes it discrimination to refuse to employ on that ground, even
if the possibility of injury is not to a reasonable certainty but presents a
known hazard, it would seem that the law is doing the employee, as well
as the employer, a great disservice and probably exposing him to harm.
Id. at 938. The court rejected the employer's defense, however, holding that the
Wisconsin law permitted the consideration only of present ability to perform the
job sought and did not permit the consideration of possible hazard to health. Id.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on the basis of the lack of
evidence that the plaintiff was able to efficiently perform the duties of his job. It
commented, however, that "in fact, there was no medical testimony that, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, that [sic] the working conditions were or
would be in the future hazardous to his health." This statement leaves open the
question of whether the presence of such evidence would have changed the
results. 62 Wis. 2d at 399, 215 N.W.2d at 446.
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insurance,261 or the safety hazard resulting from the possible
blackout of a diabetic, absent proof that the plaintiff actually created
such a hazard. 262
To date, there have been no decisions on this issue under Section
503 of the Rehabilitation Act. The OFCCP summary of backpay
cases and the facts involved in the administrative complaints issued
by the agency indicate that OFCCP does not give significant weight
to employer defenses grounded on the possibility that a handicapped
individual's condition would be aggravated by a particular job, the
possibility of increased absenteeism, or the possibility of increased
insurance costS. 263 As Smith v. Olin Chemical Corporation,264
discussed above, illustrates, however, the federal courts frequently
have found such defenses sufficient to justify discharges or refusals
to hire that were alleged to constitute race or sex discrimination. 265
In age discrimination cases, some courts have based holdings that
age is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for a particular
job on evidence establishing the probability that individuals older
than the cut-off age, while able to perform the job at the time oftheir
rejection, would experience future physical degeneration, not readily
detectable, that would have a detrimental impact on job performance. 266 The same types of defenses should be accepted in
handicap discrimination cases. Although employers may not be
entitled in all cases to paternalistically prevent job applicants and
employees from taking the risks associated with a particular job,
substantial proof that there is a probability of increased danger to
employee health, and a resulting probability of a substantial
detrimental impact on the business through excessive absenteeism
261. Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human
Relations, 14 F.E.P. Cas. 344 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County, 1976).
262. Fraser Shipyards, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human
Relations, 13 F.E.P. Cas. 1809 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County, 1976).
263. See OFCCP BACK PAY CASES SUMMARY, supra note 34.
264. 555 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1977) (increased risk of back pain or injury to black with
"bad back" in laborer position justifies discharge).
265. E.g., Boyce v. Reynolds Metals Co., 532 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1976) (danger to black
asthmatic employee held sufficient to justify discharge); Thompson v. Chrysler
Corp., 382 F. Supp. 1317, 1319-20 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (preliminary injunction
denied to hypertensive employee claiming race and age discrimination because
"[t]he objective standards which the law establishes in commercial settings must
yield at times to the frailties of human life. This court cannot approach the
plaintiffs motion without considering the possible harm to her own health a
decision in her favor may entail"); Johnson v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 2
F.E.P. Cas. 668 (N.D. Ala. 1970) (inability of obese female to safely make rounds
of job site justified discharge). But cf. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334
n.20 (1977) (noting that "[i]n the usual case, the argument that a particular job is
too dangerous for women may appropriately be met by the rejoinder that it is the
purpose of Title VII to allow the individual woman to make that choice for
herself," but finding a BFOQ where danger to woman guard in male prison
resulted in danger to co-workers and inmates).
266. See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976); Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines,. Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom.,
Brennan v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
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or higher insurance rates, should constitute sufficient business
necessity to justify the exclusion of handicapped individuals from
jobs involving dangers to which they are peculiarly susceptible.
A somewhat related question is whether an employer may
legally decline to hire or retain an individual who refuses to sign a
waiver of his right to workmen's compensation for on-the-job injuries
caused or contributed to by a pre-existing disability or injury. Many
state workmen's compensation statutes permit such waivers for
"second-injuries."267 If equal employment opportunity laws for the
handicapped are interpreted to preclude the consideration in
employment decisions of the probability that an existing disability
would be aggravated, or would increase the risk of subsequent
injury, employers may attempt to use "second injury waivers" to
limit their liability for workmen's compensation. A direct conflict is
predictable between the workmen's compensation statutes that
explicitly condone such waivers as an approved means of encouraging the employment of the handicapped,268 and anti-discrimination
and affirmative action statutes that might be interpreted to prohibit
such waivers as constituting a discriminatory treatment of the
handicapped. 269
There may be a similar conflict with various state and federal
laws and regulations governing employment in certain jobs. For
example, Maryland health regulations preclude the employment of
individuals with certain types of infections or communicable
diseases in some positions in hospitals, or in jobs in industries where
contact with food or food containers is involved. 270 Similarly,
regulations promulgated pursuant to the federal Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Control and Enforcement Act of 1970 271 by the Drug
Enforcement Administration 272 place a voluntary obligation on
267. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, §§ 36(1)(b), 51 (1964 & Supp. 1977).
268. For a discussion of the relationship between second injury funds and employer
receptiveness to handicapped workers, see Larson, The Role of Subsequent
Injury Funds in Encouraging Employment of Handicapped Workers, reprinted in
II SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAWS 403 (U.S. Gov't Printing Off. Doc. No. 0-521-667, 1973).
269. For a more detailed discussion of the issue whether differentiation in treatment
of handicapped individuals under insurance programs constitutes illegal
discrimination, see Equal Treatment, supra note 28, at 77-89; Hanks, Medical
Standards for Employment in Relation to Nondiscrimination Laws, 19 J.
OCCUPATIONAL MED. 181 (1977).
270. See, e.g., X COMAR § 10.02.04.203 (obstetrical service personnel in general
hospitals must be free of communicable disease, respiratory infections, diarrhea,
and skin lesions), § 10.03.15.30 (employees in contact with food in eating or
drinking establishments must be free of communicable disease, boils, infected
wounds and acute respiratory infections) § 10.03.18.582 (employees in contact
with milk or milk products in milk processing or distribution plants may not
have or be suspected of having communicable disease).
271. 21 U.S.C. § 801(b) (Supp. V 1975).
272. See 21 C.F.R. § 1301.90 to .93 (1977). The regulations include among the
suggested inquiries the following: "In the past three years, have you knowingly
used narcotics, amphetamines or barbituates, other than those prescribed to you
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employers who manufacture or distribute "controlled substances" to
implement a standard screening procedure for employees who will
have access to controlled substances. 273 In addition, standards
promulgated pursuant to the federal Occupational Safety and Health
Act274 by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 275
mandate that certain types of protective apparatus be used or worn
in dangerous job situations. In some cases, however, the protective
apparatus may pose an even greater danger than the existing job
situation to handicapped employees. 276
It would seem that compliance with such laws and regulations
would constitute sufficient "business necessity" to justify a determination that a handicap is "job-related."277 When the law or
regulation is designed to ensure public safety or the safety of coworkers, there is little room for argument. When the law is one that
originally was designed merely to encourage employment of the
handicapped, however, such as the "second-injury" waiver provision
discussed above, the question is much closer. In their relationship to
the Rehabilitation Act, such laws may be analogized to state
protective legislation for women that, in some cases, was struck
down because of conflict with Title VII.278 The continued validity of

273.
274.
275.
276.

277.

278.

by a physician? If the answer is yes, furnish details." Some of the inquiries,
which would otherwise have appeared to violate the pre-employment selection
guidelines then in effect at the EEOC were accepted by that agency as necessary
for business if limited to individuals applying for positions that clearly had
access to controlled substance. See 40 Fed. Reg. 17142, 17143 (1975). Although the
regulations are not mandatory, while the HEW regulations regarding preemployment inquiries are, it would appear that the Drug Enforcement
Administration's statement that the need to know the information requested is a
matter of "business necessity, essential to overall controlled substances
security," see 21 C.F.R. at § 1301.90, should be acceptable to HEW.
The "controlled substances" restricted by the Act are defined at 21 U.S.C. § 812
(Supp. V 1975).
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970).
29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.132-140 (1976).
The OSHA standards provide, for example, that persons should not be assigned
to tasks requiring use of respirators unless they are physically able to work and
use the equipment. 29 C.F.R. § 191O.134(b)(1O) (1976). Thus, persons with asthma,
who sometimes find it difficult to use respirators, would effectively be precluded
from many production jobs in certain industries, e.g., pesticide production, coal
mining, and coke-producing. It is often difficult, moreover, for persons wearing
glasses to obtain a proper fit with a respirator, and contact lenses may not be
worn. Id. § 1910.134(e)(5)(ii).
.
But cf. 45 C.F.R. § 84.1O(a), which provides:
The obligation to comply with this part is not obviated or alleviated by
the existence of any state or local law or other requirement that, on the
basis of handicap, imposes prohibitions or limits upon the eligibility of
qualified handicapped persons to .. . practice any occupation or
profession.
For a discussion of the cases on this point, see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 299-305 (1976). Although not necessarily
protective of the handicapped, second injury laws were designed to encourage
their employment, at a time when there were few laws prohibiting employment
discrimination, by alleviating the employers' fears of increased liability under
Workmen's Compensation laws. Some recent studies have cast doubt on the
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second injury provisions therefore likewise may be called into
question, or the application of such provisions narrowed. 279
Another difficult· problem will probably arise in attempts to
distinguish between those "unqualified". handicapped employees to
whom subminimum wages may be paid in certain circumstances
permitted by the federal Fair Labor Standards Act,280 and those
"qualified" handicapped individuals for whom such differentiation
in compensation is prohibited under the more recent equal employment opportunity laws for the handicapped. 281 The onus will be on
the Department of Labor to resolve this issue, however, since
subminimum wages may be paid to the handicapped only upon
issuance of a certificate of approval from the Department. 282

2.

Methods For Ascertaining Whether A Handicapped
Is ((Qualified"

Indiui~ual

Even if job criteria comport with the "job-relatedness" and
"business necessity" tests, the methods used to ascertain whether
applicants for employment meet these criteria may violate handicap
discrimination and affirmative action laws. These laws and the
implementing regulations curtail the extent to which preemployment inquiries as to existing mental or physical condition
and pre-employment physical examinations and other tests may be
used to ensure that employees are qualified.
OFCCP permits government contractors to conduct comprehensive pre-employment physical examinations, but the results of such
examinations must be used in accordance with the regulations
requiring that all standards for employment be job-related, and must

279.

280.

281.

282.

validity of such fears. See, e.g., VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, BALTIMORE
REGIONAL OFFICE, COUNSELING AND REHABILITATION SECTION, A GUIDE TO THE
HANDICAPPED WORKER - FACTS, MYTHS AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 5 (1977).
In some cases, however, the individual who is requested to waive the right to
workmen's compensation for a "second injury" in fact may not be handicapped
and entitled to the protection of anti-discrimination laws. For example, the preexisting disability may not limit the individual's "major life activities."
Section 14(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 214(c) (Supp. V 1975),
authorizes the Secretary of Labor to issue special certificates to employees
permitting the payment of subminimum wages to workers whose earning or
productive capacity is impaired by physical or mental deficiency. The regulations implementing this provision are set forth at 29 C.F.R. pts. 524, 525 (1976).
Inasmuch as the subminimum wage provisions are applicable only to those
individuals who cannot perform at normal productivity standards, see 29 C.F.R.
§ 524.2(a), .2(b), .5 (1976), such individuals would appear to fall outside the
definition of a "qualified handicapped individual" to whom the Rehabilitation
Act pertains. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1977); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(K)(1). The OFCCP
regulations permit the government contractor to contract with "sheltered
workshops" (which may be established under the Fair Labor Standards Act in
order to facilitate the training and employment of the handicapped at less than
the minimum wage) to obtain handicapped employees, but stipulate that the use
of employees from "sheltered workshops" does not relieve the government
contractor from his other obligations to the handicapped. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(j)
(1977).
See 29 U.S.C. 214(c) (Supp. V 1975).
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be kept confidentiaJ.283 OFCCP also permits the employer who needs
a determination of whether an applicant or employee is handicapped to require the individual to undergo a special medical
examination at the employer's expense, or, alternatively, to require
the individual to provide medical documentation of his impairment. 284
While OFCCP does not directly prohibit government contractors
from making inquiries concerning a job applicant's or an employee's
physical or mental condition,285 some restrictions on these inquiries
are implied in the regulation requiring the contractor to invite all
handicapped job applicants and employees to identify themselves
and take advantage of the contractor's affirmative action program. 286 The invitation must state that information as to handicapped status is requested only on a voluntary basis, that refusal to
provide it will not subject the employee to any adverse treatment,
and that the information will be used only in accordance with the
contractor's obligations under the Rehabilitation Act. Information
obtained in any inquiry into handicapped status, like physical
examination results, must be kept confidential.
The HEW regulations issued to implement Section 504 of the Act
are somewhat at variance and are more specific in some respects
than the OFCCP regulations. Although the recipient of federal
financial assistance, like the federal contractor, is prohibited from
using any employment tests or other selection criterion that tend to
screen out handicapped persons unless such tests are job-related, the
federal aid recipient also is prohibited from using even job-related
tests, if alternative job-related criteria that screen out fewer
283. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.6(c)(3), 250.6(c)(3) (1977). The confidentiality requirements are
as follows:
[I]nformation obtained in response to such ... examination[s] shall be
kept confidential except that:
(i) Supervisors and managers may be informed regarding
restrictions on the work or duties of handicapped individuals
and regarding accommodations; and
(ii) First aid and safety personnel may be informed, where and
to the extent appropriate, if the condition might require
emergency treatment; and
(iii) Government officials investigating compliance with the Act
shall be informed.
284. Id. § 60-741.7(b), (c), (d). See id. § 60-250.7.
The distinction between 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c) and § 60-741.7 appears to be
that the former section deals with pre-employment physicals required of all
employees. while the latter deals with an employer's need for physical
information relating to a particular individual who may not have been subjected
to a pre-employment physical but who the employer suspects may be unqualified
for a job because of a disability. In the former case there is no express
requirement in the regulations that the employer pay for the examination, while
in the latter case the employer is specifically required to undertake the cost.
285. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.6(c)(2), 250.6(c)(2) (1977).
286. Id. §§ 60-741.5(c), 250.5(c). See discussion at note 174 and accompanying text
supra.
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handicapped persons are shown by the Director of the Office of the
Civil Rights of HEW to be available. 287 Moreover, the HEW
regulations provide that any tests used must accurately measure job
skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor the tests purport to
measure, rather than merely reflect the handicapped applicant or
employee's impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills, except
where these skills are what the test purports to measure. 288 The
analysis of the HEW regulations notes that, for example:
[A] person with a speech impediment may be perfectly
qualified for jobs that do not or need not, with reasonable
accommodation, require ability to speak clearly. Yet, if given
an oral test, the person will be unable to perform in a
satisfactory manner. The test results will not, therefore,
predict job performance but instead will reflect impaired
speech.289
Second, unlike OFCCP, HEW generally prohibits preemployment inquiries into whether an applicant is handicapped, or
the nature and severity of a handicap.290 The employer may,
however, inquire as to an applicant's ability to perform job-related
tasks. The distinction is narrow indeed. As an example, the analysis
states that while an employer may not ask if an applicant is
epileptic, it may ask whether the applicant can perform a particular
job without endangering other employees. 291
The only exception to HEW's prohibition on pre-employment
inquiries into handicapped status occurs when the employer makes
the inquiries in conjunction with (1) voluntary action to overcome
past conditions that may have limited the employment of the
handicapped, (2) the fulfillment of a duty to take remedial action to
correct discrimination, or (3) the fulfillment of a duty to take
affirmative action under Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, if it is
a government contractor as well as a recipient of federal financial
assistance. 292 Under these circumstances, the employer may invite
287. 45 C.F.R. § 84.13(a). The Executive Order 11,914 regulations are not quite as
specific. They prohibit only discriminatory employment tests, without mention of
"job-relatedness," and do not require the 'use of less restrictive tests found by
HEW to be available. ld. § 85.54. The Secretary's comments to these regulations
indicate, however, that tests that are not "job-related" are per se discriminatory.
43 Fed. Reg. 2132, 2135 (1978).
288. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.13(b), 85.54.
289. 42 Fed. Reg. 22676, 22689 (1977).
290. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.14(a), 85.55.
291. 42 Fed. Reg. 22676, 22689 (1977).
292. 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(b), 85.55. In its analysis of the more recently adopted Executive
Order 11,914 regulations, HEW comments that while its regulations may differ on
this point from those of OFCCP, there is no real inconsistency. According to
these comments, the HEW regulations require merely that the recipient postpone
inquiries or examinations directed towards the ascertainment of the nature and
severity of a handicap until after the employment decision. 43 Fed. Reg. 2132,
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individuals to identify themselves as handicapped if the invitation
includes the same safeguards required by the OFCCP invitation.
Neither the OFCCP nor HEW regulations comment upon the fact
that inquiries into mental or physical condition traditionally are
included in the medical history forms completed as part of a physical
examination, which may be required under some circumstances.
Presumably, however, inquiries essential to a thorough medical
examination are not unlawfu1. 293
HEW differs from OFCCP on a third point. Under the HEW
regulations, employers may condition an offer of employment on the
results of a medical examination conducted prior to the employee's
commencement of work only if the examination is given to all
entering employees regardless of handicap.294 In addition, as under
the OFCCP regulations, the results of such examinations must be
used in accordance with the employer's obligations under the
regulations and must be kept confidentia}.295 Thus, the HEW
regulations start out with a broad prohibition on pre-employment
inquiries or medical examinations directed towards the asc,ertainment of handicapped status, but create exceptions to this general
rule, while the OFCCP regulations contain no such broad prohibition.
2135 (1978). Thus, there does not appear to be a limitation on post-employment
inquiries. The restrictions on the use of information obtained from such
inquiries, and the requirement that such information be kept confidential, would
be applicable whenever they are made, however.
293. The job applicant is under an obligation to respond truthfully to all lawful and
relevant pre-employment inquiries, and proof that an applicant accepted for
employment has lied on application forms may constitute just cause for
discharge. The discharge of individuals for falsification of employment records
has been upheld against claims that the discharge was unlawfully discriminatory. See, e.g.,Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v_ NLRB, 539 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1976)
(finding no discrimination on basis of union activism).
294. 45 C.F_R. §§ 84.14(c), (d), 85.55. The proposed § 504 regulations of the SBA flatly
prohibit pre-employment physical examination unless the recipient is taking
remedial voluntary or affirmative action to hire the handicapped. 13 C.F.R.
§ 113.3(b)(2).
295. The discussion of pre-employment physicals in the comments to the Executive
Order 11,914 regulations strongly suggests that HEW permits physicals only
after an offer of employment has been made, and that the offer may be
conditioned on nothing other than successful completion of the physical. In other
words, any reference checks or skill tests should be conducted prior to the offer of
employment, if the employer intends to condition the offer on the physicaL exam.
43 Fed. Reg. 2132, 2135 (1978). The comments to the OFCCP regulations are
rather sparse, and contain no indication as to whether OFCCP contemplates
such a strict rule. This restriction serves to box the employer into an employment
decision based solely on physical condition, so that any claims of discrimination
by individuals rejected after a pre-employment physical could not be defended on
the ground that the applicant was unqualified for some reason other than
physical condition.
Although the HEW regulations state that pre-employment physicals may not
be given unless all entering employees are subjected to a physical, employers
who give such physicals only to entering employees in certain departments
probably would not be held in violation if there is a business justification for the
differentiation.
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The Maryland proposed regulations clearly contemplate the use
of pre-employment physical examinations and employment tests, but
likewise indicate that such devices should be directed towards
determining whether an applicant for a job meets certain criteria whether he has the physical and mental ability to perform the duties
of the position, is professionally competent or has the necessary
skills and ability to become professionally competent to perform the
job, has compensated for his limitation through prosthesis or
rehabilitation training, and, as mentioned above, whether he can do
the work without adverse consequences to himself or others.296 Like
the HEW regulations, the Maryland proposed regulations impose on
employers the duty to provide handicapped job applicants with the
opportunity to demonstrate their ability through testing methods
adapted to their handicap.297 Otherwise, the Maryland proposed
regulations do not comment upon pre-employment inquiries. In this
connection, however, employers should recognize that a specific
provision in the Maryland Allnotated Code prohibits them from
requiring a job applicant to answer a question "written or oral,
pertaining to any physical, psychiatric or psychological illness,
disability, handicap or treatment which does not bear a direct,
material and timely relationship to the applicant's fitness or
capacity to properly perform the activities or responsibilities of the
desired position."298
Those employers who give pre-employment physical examinations will no doubt be concerned about the extent to which they are
entitled to rely upon the opinion of a company doctor or the
physician to whom they refer job applicants for pre-employment
physicals. Initially, it should be recognized that the physician
cannot make "job-related" employment judgments in a vacuum. If
the physician is effectively making the employment decision to reject
job applicants on the -basis of physical problems, the regulations
mentioned above require that he be provided with sufficient
information to ascertain the job-relatedness of a particular impairment, such as job functions like weight lifting and other physical
effort requirements; exposure to conditions, such as noise, heat,
fumes, airborne particles, and various chemicals; and potential
hazards, such as whether the job involves work at great heights, in
close proximity to heavy machinery, or with dangerous tools. If, on
296. XVI COMAR § 14.03.04A.
297. Id. § 14.03.04B(2)(d).
298. MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95A (Supp. 1977), as amended by Law of April, 1978,
ch. 470, 1978 Md. Laws _
(Senate Bill 518; amendment effective July 1, 1978).
The provision does not, however, prohibit medical evaluation by a physician for
the purpose of assessing an applicant's ability to perform the job.
The Division of Labor and Industry of the Maryland Department of
Licensing and Regulation has taken the position that open-ended questions such
as "Have you ever been treated for alcoholism or delerium tremors?" or "Have
you ever been hospitalized?" would violate the provision. Letter from Harvey A.
Epstein, Commissioner, Division of Labor and Industry, to Maryland State
Chamber of Commerce (Dec. 29, 1976).
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the other hand, the physician merely provides the company's
employment office with a list of physical restrictions for each job
applicant, and does not make the decision to accept or reject, he need
not be provided with such detailed job information.
Regardless of the type of input that the physician has into
employment decisions, however, the question remains whether the
employer is entitled to rely on the opinion of its doctor that a job
applicant has physical limitations on his capacity to do work, or
whether it must also consider an opinion submitted by the
handicapped individual's personal physician. Only one handicap
discrimination case has specifically dealt with this issue. In
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Bureau of Labor,299 the Oregon Court of
Appeals was confronted with medical opinions by both the
complainant's physician and the company doctor differing on
whether the complainant was able to perform the work of a heavy
appliance salesman without serious risk of a heart attack. The court
ruled that the question before it was not which of the doctors'
opinions was more persuasive. The proper rule, it held, was:
[W]here an employer requires a job applicant to undergo a
medical examination by a licensed physician, and the
physician renders a reasonable and good-faith opinion that
the applicant's condition is not compatible with the
projected employment, the employer should not be held in
violation of the Act-for rejecting the applicant in reasonable
and good-faith reliance on the advice of the physician. 300
This interpretation of the standard against which an employer's
decision to reject an employee for medical reasons should be
measured is manifestly appropriate. The problems encountered by
the judicial system in dealing with the widely differing views of
physicians on almost every medical problem called into question in
medical malpractice litigation, amply illustrate the difficulties
involved in considering the opinions of more than one physician.
This interpretation also would be consistent with the great weight of
authority in arbitration decisions. Absent a collective bargaining
provision to the contrary, most arbitrators do not set aside company

299. 28 Or. App. 747, 561 P.2d 637 (1977).
300. Id. at 750, 561 P:2d at 639-40. Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir.
1977), indicates that a defendant's reliance on a medical opinion is entitled to
some deference under § 504 as well. The court refused to grant a preliminary
injunction under § 504 to children who had been denied participation in contact
sports, since the defendant had relied on the opinion of a school physician that
the children, who were sighted in only one eye, would run a high risk of eye
injury. The plaintiffs had come forward with little evidence to the contrary, and
the court ruled that there was insufficient likelihood of success on the merits of
plaintiffs' contention that they were "otherwise qualified" under § 504 to warrant
a preliminary injunction.
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decisions made in good faith reliance on medical advice from
company doctors.301

3.

Summary

As shown by the above discussion, there remains considerable
legal uncertainty regarding the proof that will be required to
validate a physical requirement for employment as "job-related,"
and regarding the "business necessity" sufficient to justify the
rejection of handicapped individuals who have the present ability to
perform the job sought. It is clear, however, that one of the major
purposes of the laws mandating equal employment opportunity for
the handicapped is to ensure that members of this new minority are
not excluded from employment on the basis of their handicaps,
unless the adequate performance of a given job necessitates that
applicants pass muster under the physical and mental standards
being imposed. Thus, employment decisions made on the basis of
anything other than present ability adequately to perform the job
without risk to co-workers and the public are subject to attack.
Experience may well temper the current negative attitude of
administrative agencies towards the consideration of factors such as
the medically significant probability that an individual's existing
disability will be aggravated or will subject him to a greater risk of
injury in the job sought. More credence may be given to such
justifications when employers establish that the employment of
individuals with specific disabilities in certain jobs not only
increases the business' risk of liability for injury, thus deferring
resources that might otherwise be used to increase production, but
also increases the risk that handicapped individuals will, because of
illness or injury, lose the independence that equal employment
opportunity laws are designed to help them obtain.
The methods an employer uses to ascertain the qualifications of
handicapped individuals thus far have received less attention from
the federal agencies than the job standards themselves, in part
because OFCCP has concentrated its efforts on handling individual
discrimination complaints. Such individual complaints u~ually
involve a challenge to the validity of the employer's qualifications
rather than a challenge to the procedure by which one's "qualified"
status is ascertained. Recently, however, OFCCP has shifted its
focus and indicated that it will begin to undertake compliance
reviews of affirmative action programs for the handicapped. 302
301. See F. & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 292 (3d ed. 1973).
Despite the justifications for permitting the employer to proceed on the
advice of its doctor, OFCCP and the Maryland Commission on Human Relations
consistently permit the complainant to submit another medical opinion, and, in
some cases, base findings of probable cause on the opinion of the complainant's
physician, even though the company had relied on the opinion of its doctor.
302. See note 28 supra.
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Agency auditors can be expected to review closely the preemployment inquiries and physical examinations utilized by the
employer.

C.

THE VALIDITY AND EXTENT OF THE DUTY To
MAKE "REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS"

As discussed previously, the OFCCP, HEW, and Executive Order
11,914 regulations require that before a determination can be made
on whether a particular handicapped individual is qualified for a
job, the "reasonable accommodations" that could be made for his
handicap must be considered. 303 A similar accommodation obligation is imposed by the Maryland Commission's proposed guidelines
on handicap discrimination. 304 The validity and effect of this
"accommodation" duty, as well as the expense and effort it requires,
have been the subject of controversy and confusion.
Initially, there is some question of whether an administrative
agency can enforce such a requirement, in the absence of a specific
legislative mandate for accommodation. When Congress and state
legislatures have intended that accommodations be made to the
needs of a particular minority group, their enactments have so
stated in no uncertain terms. Until 1972, for example, when
Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to require accommodation to the religious needs of employees,305 the authority of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the EEOC) to
impose such a requirement through administrative guidelines had
been severely questioned. In refusing to rehear its decision in Dewey
v. Reynolds Metals Company306 that the employer did not violate the
303. The duty initially arises out 'If the definition of a "qualified handicapped
individual," that is, one who can perform the tasks required "with reasonable
accommodation." See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1977); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(k); 85.32(a).
The nature of the accommodation duty is spelled out in more detail elsewhere in
the regulations. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1977); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.12; 85.53. The
same accommodation duty arises under OFCCP's regulations issued pursuant
to the Veteran's Readjustment Act. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-250.2, .6(d) (1977).
304. See XVI Co MAR § 14.03.04B. Some state laws include a statutory mandate for
accommodation, while others specifically prohibit the imposition of any such
requirement. See note 143 supra. The Maryland statute, however, omits any
mention of accommodation for the handicapped.
305. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp.
V 1975). The amendment added a new definition of religion, which had
previously been among the prohibited bases of discrimination. The new
definition specifically spells out the duty to accommodate as follows:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is
unable to reasonably accommodate an employee's or prospective
employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on
the conduct of the employer's business.
Id. (emphasis added). A similar amendment was added in 1973 to the Maryland
law. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 18(0 (Supp. 1977).
306. 429 F.2d 334, denying reh. of 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), afi'd without written
opinion by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971). The original Dewey
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Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating an employee who refused to
work on his sabbath, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
recognized the absence of any legislative authority for the EEOC
guidelines, stating:
Nowhere in the legislative history of the Act do we find any
Congressional intent to coerce or compel one person to
accede to or accommodate the religious beliefs of another.
The requirement of accommodation to religious beliefs is
contained only in the EEOC Regulations, which in our
judgment are not consistent with the Act. 307
The Dewey court further stated that the nondiscrimination duty did
not include any obligation to make accommodations, commenting
that "[t]he fundamental error of Dewey and the Amici Curiae is that
they eql!ate religious discrimination with failure to accommodate.
We submit these two concepts are entirely different."308
Since neither the Rehabilitation Act, nor the provisions of
Article 49B of the Maryland Annotated Code, impose upon
employers any specific duty to accommodate the needs of the
handicapped, it would appear that the administrative agencies
attempting to impose such a duty have erred in the same direction as
the EEOC in 1967. OFCCP, however, could argue to the contrary
that Section 503's requirement of affirmative action includes a duty
to accommodate the handicapped. Under the authority vested in it
by Executive Order 11,246, which similarly requires government
contractors to take affirmative action to employ and advance in
employment members of religious minorities,309 OFCCP has required
such contractors to make reasonable accommodations for the
religious needs of employees since 1973. 310 Congress, so the
argument would go, contemplated accommodations to the handicapped as a means of fulfilling the affirmative action obligation it
imposed subsequently under Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act. 311

307.
308.

309.
310.
311.

decision rested, not on the questionable validity of the EEOC guidelines, but on
the rulings, inter alia, that the employer had in fact made reasonable
accommodations and that the alleged discriminatory conduct had occurred prior
to the promulgation of the guideline. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 73 n.8 (1977).
429 F.2d at 334.
Id. at 335. The legislative history of the subsequent 1972 amendment that
incorporated the accommodation duty reveals Congress' recognition of the need
to provide a statutory basis for the duty: "The purpose of this subsection is to
provide the statutory basis for EEOC to formulate guidelines on discrimination
because of religion such as those challenged in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co."
118 Congo Rev. 7167 (1972). In Trans World Airlines, Inc. V. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63, 76 n.ll (1977), the Supreme Court viewed the subsequent amendment as a
ratification of the guideline justifying its application to pre-1972 conduct.
See note 23 supra.
See 38 Fed. Reg. 1933 (Jan. 19, 1973), codified as 41 C.F.R. § 60-50.3 (1977).
There is nothing in the legislative history of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act to
indicate, however, that Congress was aware that the Department of Labor
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With respect to Section 504, the argument can be made that,
notwithstanding Dewey, the nondiscrimination mandate of this
section also connotes affirmative rights that suggest, though
perhaps to a lesser degree, an accommodation duty.312 The Secretary
of HEW has justified the accommodation duty on the grounds that
the unique characteristic of the handicapped minority will, in many
cases, make equal treatment discriminatory.313
It must be remembered, however, that under both Sections 503
and 504, no duty arises except with respect to "qualified" or
previously had required accommodations for religion under an affirmative action
mandate. The only support of the accommodation duty is a letter, attached as an
appendix to the Senate Report on the 1974 amendments to the Act, to the
Secretary of Labor from Senators Williams, Cranston, Randolph and Stafford,
questioning the nature of the extenuating factors listed as grounds for mitigating
the accommodation duty in the Department of Labor's initial regulations
promulgated pursuant to Section 503. S. REP. No. 93-1297, 93d Congo 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 6373, 6427-31.
312. Cf. Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 538 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1975) (Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 established affirmative rights which could be vindicated by a private
cause of action). But cf. Snowdon v. Birmingham-Jefferson Co. Trans. Auth., 407
F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ala. 1975), aff'd 551 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1977) (no violation of
§ 504 in failure of mass transit authority to provide means of access to public
buses to those confined to wheelchairs when special efforts had been made to aid
handicapped persons other than those confined to wheelchairs, and when
modern technology had not progressed to point of doing any more).
313. See 42 Fed. Reg. ·22676 (1977).- The argument is that merely 'providing
handicapped individuals with the opportunity to participate in federally
financed programs is meaningless if there is no way they can take advantage of
the opportunity unless special arrangements are made. Cf. Lau V. Nichols, 414
U.S. 563 (1974) (under nondiscrimination mandate of Title VI of Civil Rights Act,
school board required to provide educational accommodations for non-english
speaking students). While there may be some merit to such an argument in the
context of federal programs that provide benefits and certain entitlements for
participants, it has no relevance to employment, which is only a by-product of
most federal programs. There is no entitlement or right to federally financed
employment. See Murgia V. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
The possibility of a' reverse discrimination suit resulting from affirmative
action for or accommodations to the handicapped is remote under the current
status of the law. The handicapped constitute a unique classification in that
there is no obvious correlative class protected by any law, other than the equal
protection clause of the Constitution, that can challenge affirmative action for
the handicapped as discriminatory. Where laws prohibit discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, age, religion or national origin, on the other hand, individuals
of one race, for example, may contend that affirmative action for persons of
another race results in discrimination against the first group. Under most state
laws, however, discrimination is prohibited not with respect to physical or
mental condition, but on the basis of a handicap or disability. One therefore
must be handicapped or disabled to be protected. Likewise, § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against otherwise qualified handicapped individuals. Thus, in the absence of any indications from the Supreme
Court that it will uphold a constitutional challenge to the imposition of an
affirmative action duty in the absence of a finding of discrimination, cf. Bakke v.
Board of Regents, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert.
granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3570 (1977), argued Oct. 12, or the unusual situation where
affirmative action for the handicapped violates the rights of another protected
minority, it is unlikely that a challenge to the validity of the accommodation
duty would be raised by anyone other than the employer on whom it is imposed.
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"otherwise qualified" handicapped individuals. The term "qualified"
ordinarily implies the absence of a need for any special accommodation. Its use of this terminology is yet another indication that
Congress. intended only to eliminate employment practices that
exclude handicapped individuals who are fully capable of performing the employment sought. It therefore appears that both OFCCP
and HEW have committed an error in logic by imposing upon
employers the duty to make reasonable accommodations for
handicapped individuals who might in fact be "unqualified," and
not entitled to the protection of the Act, were it not for such
accommodations. 314
NotwithstandIng their arguable lack of authority to impose such
a duty, it is clear that HEW, OFCCP, and the Maryland Commission
on Human Relations have deemed "accommodation" a proper means
for achieving nondiscrimination and affirmative action for the
handicapped, and that efforts to accommodate the needs of a
handicapped individual must be made prior to a determination that
the individual is not qualified for a particular job. Under the
OFCCP, HEW, Executive Order 11,914, and Maryland proposed
regulations, an employer must make such "reasonable accommodations" unless it can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the conduct of its business. 315
The OFCCP regulations state that, in determining the extent of
a contractor's accommodation obligation, factors such as business
necessity and financial costs and expenses may be considered. 316
While the Executive Order 11,914 regulations provide no explication
of the extent of the accommodation duty, the HEW regulations state
314. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (where in detailing the reasonable accommodation
duty, HEW states that the duty arises only with respect to the "known"
limitations of "otherwise qualified" [see note 44 supra] handicapped individuals)
with id. § 84.3(k) (where a qualified handicapped individual is defined as one who
can perform essential functions of the job "with reasonable accommodations").
Compare id. § 85.53 with id. § 85.32, and compare 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1977)
(requiring that reasonable accommodation be made "to the physical or mental
limitations of an employee" with id. § 60-741.2 (where OFCCP defines a qualified
handicapped person as "one who can do a job with reasonable accommoda·
tions").
315. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.6(d), -250.6(d) (1977); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.12, 85.53; XVI
COMAR § 14.03.03(b)(1).
316. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1977). An earlier version of the OFCCP regulations
included "resulting personnel problems," but this factor was later deleted as
"confusing and misleading." See 41 Fed. Reg. 16147, 16148 (1976). The earlier
version also listed various types of accommodations that might be requi'red,
including "providing access to the job, job restructuring, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices." Job restructuring was defined to include
"realignment of duties, revision of job descriptions or modified and part·time
work schedules." 40 Fed. Reg. 39887, 39889, at proposed § 60-741.5(c)(l) (1975).
These examples were deleted when the requirement that contractors provide
examples of proposed accommodations in their affirmative action program was
dropped, see 41 Fed. Reg. 16147, 16148 (1976), but nevertheless are indicative of
the type of accommodations OFCCP may expect.
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that the following factors can be considered in assessing whether a
particular accommodation would constitute an "undue hardship" on
a federally assisted program:
(1) The overall size of the recipient's program with
respect to number of employees, number and type of
facilities, and size of budget;
(2) The type of the recipient's operation, including the
composition and structure of the recipient's workforce; and
(3) The nature and cost of the accommodation needed. 317
The comments of the Secretary of HEW accompanying these
regulations further indicate that these factors will be measured in
relative terms and that greater efforts probably will be required of
larger establishments, in view of the larger number of handicapped
individuals affected. 318
The HEW regulations also set forth some examples of the types
of accommodations that may be expected, such as job restructuring,
part-time or modified work scheduling, providing readers or
interpreters, and making facilities readily accessible to and usable
by handicapped persons. 319 In a separate subpart of the regulations,
entitled "program accessibility," HEW mandates that recipients
make all programs or activities accessible to the handicapped within
60 days of the effective date of the regulations, June 3, 1977, except
where structural changes to existing facilities would be necessary. If
the latter is the case,- the recipient must develop within six months of
the effective date of the regulations a transition plan detailing the
changes required and must complete the changes within three
years. 3aJ Although not directly related to the employment aspects of
the regulations, these requirements clearly are indicative of the
intent behind the regulatory statement that "reasonable accommodations" to handicapped employees include making facilities readily
accessible to and usable by them.
The Maryland Commission's proposed regulations include a
similarly broad accommodation duty. Like the federal agencies, the
Maryland Commission has stipulated that business necessity may
be considered in determining whether a particular accommodation
imposes an undue hardship on
business. 321 The proposed
regulations also set forth a listing of the types of accommodations

a

317.
318.
319.
320.

45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c).
42 Fed. Reg. 22676, 22688 (1977).
45 C.F.R. § 84.1(b).
See id. §§ 84.21 to .22, 85.56 to .57. New facilities and alterations also must be
designed for accessibility by the handicapped. Id. §§ 84.23, 85.58.
321. XVI COMAR § 14.03.04B(I).
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that are contemplated in employment, including probationary trial
periods in employment for entry-level psoitions, and occupational
training and re-training programs, such as guidance programs,
apprentice training programs, and executive training programs. 322
The Commission's proposed regulations indicate that the
reasonable accommodation duty may require the employer to
facilitate access by handicapped employees to its work, toilet, eating,
resting, and recreational facilities. The employer may be required to
provide ramps for mobility-handicapped individuals, extra wide
doorways and corridors to provide passage for persons in wheelchairs and on crutches, and handrails in restrooms. Further required
accommodations may include the installation of public telephones,
water fountains, elevator buttons, and other amenities at a height
that is reasonably accessible to persons in wheelchairs, and the
waiver of any no-pet requirements to permit the use of seeing eye
dogs. 323
Under all of the above-mentioned regulations, the employer has
the burden to demonstrate that a particular accommodation for the
handicapped constitutes an undue hardship. The decisions rendered
to date in cases involving violations of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and of state fair employment practice laws
indicate that this burden may be onerous. For example, in Barnes v.
Conve~se Coliege,324 a South Carolina federal district court recently
granted a preliminary injunction sought under Section 504 to compel
the college to provide and compensate a sign language interpreter
for a deaf student. Although the court found "obvious inequities" in
the imposition of such a requirement on the college,325 it deemed
itself bound to enforce a Section 504 regulation that required the
provision of auxiliary aids for students with impaired sensory
skills. 326 Section 84.12(b) of the HEW regulations, which sets forth
the reasonable accommodation duty for employers, likewise mandates, among other things, the provision of interpreters and readers
for handicapped employees. It appears, then, that under Section 504
at least, the accommodation duty may require significant expendi-

322. Id. § 14.03.0413(2).
323. Id. § 14.03.04H.
324. 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977). See Crawford v. Univ. of North Carolina, 440 F.
Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977). Cf, Davis v. Southeastern Community College, No.
77-1237 (4th Cir., filed March 28, 1978), reu'g, 424 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D.N.C. 1976)
(instructing court on remand to review applicability of Section 504 regulations
requiring modifications in academic program to plaintiff who had been denied
admission to nursing training program due to hearing impairment, noting that
"precedent supports the requirement of affirmative conduct on the part of certain
entities under § 504, even when such modifications become expensive.") [d., slip
op. at 11.
325. 436 F. Supp. at 638-39.
326. 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d).
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tures to provide special privileges for handicapped beneficiaries or
employees of federally assisted programs. 327
Some decisions rendered by state courts in interpreting fair
employment practice statutes indicate that employers also may be
required to change employment practices in order to accommodate
the handicapped - to the possible detriment of other employees. For
example, in Holland v. Boeing Company,328 a Washington county
superior court held that the Boeing Company illegally discriminated
against a plaintiff who suffered from cerebral palsy by transferring
him, during a reduction in force, to a job that he could not
adequately perform because of his disability. The plaintiffs
inadequacy in his new job resulted in poor evaluations, culminating
in his rejection for a better position and his eventual downgrading.
The court mentioned several options that should have been
considered by the defendant as alternatives to the transfer of the
plaintiff. Another able-bodied person could have been transferred to
the job, and, if further reductions had occurred, the plaintiff could
have been transferred to open jobs in other departments that later
were filled by other workers: he could have been laterally transferred
to a suitable job under the company's collective bargaining
agreement; other able-bodied employees could have been transferred
to other jobs, leaving open positions that the plaintiff could fill; a
surplus could have been declared within the plaintiffs classification
with the result that layoffs would have taken place in order of
seniority so that the plaintiffs relative seniority would have
protected his job; finally, the company's past practice of creating
jobs for individuals in some types of circumstances could have been
applied in this case. 329 In short, the court saw in the plaintiffs welldocumented presentation of alternatives a variety of means by
which the defendant. could have accommodated the handicapped
individual, including alternatives that could have been exercised
only at the expense of other employees.
The case further indicates, as do the HEW and Maryland
proposed regulations, that an individual need not be capable of
327. There are some indications to the contrary. In a recent public statement, David
S. Tatel, Director of HEW's Office for Civil Rights, commented, for example, that
despite the fears of college administrators that all buildings must be made
accessible in three years pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 84.21- .23, the intent of HEW is
to require merely that programs be made accessible, which would involve
structural changes in some, but not all, buildings. See Statement by David Tatel,
Director, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, 1977 (available from HEW's Office for Civil Rights).
A new bill, introduced in the House on November 18, 1977 by Rep. Jeffords,
would authorize grants to states to fund studies regarding the costs of
compliance with § 504; require the Secretary of HEW to report to the Congress on
such studies; and authorize grants to pay the cost of removing architectural,
communications and attitudinal barriers in order to comply with § 504. See H.R.
10,100, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
328. 12 F.E.P. Cas. 975 (Wash. Super. Ct., King County 1976).
329. Id. at 978.
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performing all jobs in a promotion or seniority sequence, or even all
the tasks involved in a particular job, in order to be deemed
"qualified". Although the OFCCP regulations do not comment on
this point, the HEW regulations specifically state that an individual
need be capable only of performing "essential" job functions,330 and
the Maryland proposed regulations suggest the elimination of minor
job functions as one means of accommodation. 33l
These types of accommodation requirements have not been
limited to cases involving allegations of statutory violations. Federal
courts reviewing charges that job standards created constitutionally
impermissible "irrebutable presumptions" similarly have suggested
the necessity for reasonable accommodation to the needs of
handicapped job applicants. One characteristic common to these
cases is the courts' thorough analysis of the job in question, with a
view towards determining whether special arrangements could have
been made for the handicapped individua1. 332 For example, the trial
court opinion in Gurmankin v. Costanzo,333 striking down a school
board policy excluding blind persons from teaching sighted students,
mentioned several means by which the special problems incurred by
blind teachers could be avoided, and indicated the court's opinion
that the utilization of such alternatives would not impose an undue
burden on school authorities. Specifically, the court noted that
problems associated with the use of a black board could be avoided
by using students to write material on the black board, or by
utilizing mineographed materials in lieu of the black board;
problems associated with proctoring exams could be avoided by
using students or teachers with a free period as exam proctors; the
blind teacher could use a reader to assist in reviewing student papers
and educational material; and sighted instead of blind teachers
could be assigned to playground and lunchroom supervision. 334 The
court further indicated, as do the OFCCP and Maryland proposed
regulations,335 that handicapped job applicants must be given a fair
chance to explain how their problem reasonably could be accommodated. 336
Similarly, in Hoffman v. Ohio Youth Commission,337 the district
court's decision that the case was moot nevertheless was punctuated
with a point-by-point analysis of the employer's reasons for rejecting
the blind plaintiffs application as a youth counselor for delinquent
boys. The court concluded that many of the reasons were related to
secondary aspects of the job and that alternative means for
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(K)(1); 85.32.
XVI COMAR § 14.03.04B(2)(a).
See note 95 supra.
411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aii'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977).
ld. at 986.
41 C.F.R. § 60-741.5(c)(1) (1977); XVI COMAR § 14.03.04(B)(3)(g).
411 F. Supp. 982, 988 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aii'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977).
13 F.E.P. Cas. 30 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
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overcoming such secondary problems should have been pursued
prior to the plaintiff's rejection. 338
The initial response of the courts to the notion of reasonable
accommodation to the needs of the handicapped, whether considered
pursuant to a constitutional or statutory claim, clearly has been to
impose rather stringent requirements upon employers. The ripple
effect of a recent decision by the Supreme Court, rendered in the
context of the Title VII duty to accommodate the religious needs of
employees, may curtail this trend to some extent. In Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,339 the Court reversed an Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals holding that TWA had not satisfied its duty to
accommodate the religious needs of an individual who was
discharged because he refused to work on Saturday. The court of
appeals had suggested, first, that TWA should have accommodated
Hardison's religious beliefs by permitting him to work a four-day
week, utilizing in his place on the fifth day a supervisor or another
worker who was assigned to duty elsewhere, even though this might
have caused other shop functions to suffer. Second, the court of
appeals stated that TWA could have used other available personnel
to fill Hardison's job on Saturdays, even though this alternative
would have necessitated additional premium overtime pay. Third,
the court held that TWA could have permitted a swap of jobs
between Hardison and another employee on Hardison's sabbath,
even though this would have involved a breach of the seniority
provisions of its union contract. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that each of these alternatives constituted an "undue
hardship" for TWA.340
The Court laid down three basic guidelines for assessing
whether a particular religious accommodation constituted undue
hardship. First, the Court ruled that "reasonable accommodation"
does not require an employer to deny the shift and job preferences of
some employees in order to accommodate the religious needs of
others.341 Second, it held that employers were not required by the
accommodation duty to carve out a special exception to a negotiated
seniority system in order to help employees meet their religious
obligations. 342 Finally, the Court held that requiring an employer to
bear more than a de minimis cost to institute an accommodation
constitutes an undue hardship.343
Although the TWA decision was rendered in the context of the
employer's duty imposed by Title VII to make reasonable accommo338.
339.
340.
341.

Id. at 35.
432 U.S. 63 (1977).
Id. at 77.
Id. at 81. See Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977)
(plaintiffs request for a guarantee of no work on Saturday was per se
unreasonable and granting it would result in an undue hardship).
342. 432 U.S. at 83.
343. Id. at 84.
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dations to the religious needs of employees, the Court did not base its
decision on first amendment considerations. The majority decision
concentrated instead on defining the extent of "undue hardship"
sufficient to alleviate the accommodation duty. It therefore appears
that the analysis is equally applicable to any statute or agency
regulation that requires accommodation only where there would be
no resulting "undue hardship" to the employer on which the
obligation is imposed. Such is the case, of course, with all of the
regulations that mandate accommodation to the handicapped.
Agencies attempting to require accommodations that unduly
interfere with business operations therefore should be reminded of
the TWA decision.
Unfortunately, the controversial accommodation duty is one of
the least explicated aspects of the equal employment opportunity
laws for the handicapped. Notwithstanding initial judicial and
administr.~tive indications as to the breadth of the obligation, which
portend expensive and disruptive results for business, employers
have several grounds for challenging, first, the underlying validity
of the obligation imposed by agency regulations absent a statutory
mandate, and second, any attempt to require significant interference
with the rights of other employees or more than a de minimis
expenditure. 344 The employer who seeks to avoid the high costs of
litigation in this area, however, is well advised for the present to
make whatever accommodations its business can tolerate and to
document all accommodations, thereby establishing a record of good
faith compliance with the law. The best way for an employer to
defend itself against charges that it has acted unreasonably in
failing to make a particular accommodation is to present evidence
that it gave the aggrieved employee the opportunity to suggest
accommodations, that it gave due consideration to all accommodations suggested, that it made other reasonable accommodations
when implementation did not result in undue hardship, and to
present evidence of documentation of the justification for failure to
make the accommodations in question.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The gains in status achieved by racial minorities and females
upon obtaining legislative support for their goal of equal opportunity
in employment have prompted America's handicapped citizens to
enlist the aid of Congress and state legislatures to assist in their
efforts to achieve employment equality. Their efforts have been
rewarded by statutes requiring federal contractors to take affirma344. It has been suggested that any requirement for significant expenditures is also
challengeable as a taking of private property for public use without just
compensation, violative of the fifth amendment. See, e.g., Epstein & Manson,
First Questions on the HEW Handicap Regulations, 51 J. AMER. Hasp. Ass'N 57,
60 (1977).
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tive action to employ the handicapped, and prohibiting recipients of
federal financial assistance from discriminating against this group,
by protective legislation in most states, and by judicial receptiveness
to discrimination claims asserted under constitutional doctrines or
the Reconstruction Era civil rights acts.
As occurred under statutes protecting the job rights of other
minorities, the administrative agencies charged with enforcement of
the recently-enacted employment opportunity laws for the handicapped have construed their mandates broadly and have imposed
onerous standards for compliance. Since the surge in litigation that
usually results from the recognition of minority rights has not yet
had time to fully develop, there has been no significant guidance
from the courts on substantive problems such as the scope of the
class of individuals who can be characterized as "handicapped"
within the meaning of the law, the factors that may be considered in
ascertaining whether these individuals are "qualified" for a
particular job and the standards for proof of that fact, or the validity
and extent of the administratively imposed duty to make "reasonable accommodations" for the handicapped. The few scattered cases
indicate, however, a judicial tendency to approach administrative
interpretations with the same deference, to apply the same
standards of proof, and to vocalize the same rationalizations for
doing so that characterize opinions rendered under laws pertaining
to the equal employment rights of sexual and racial minorities.
Yet, as this artiCle has pointed out, there are distinctions
between the handicapped and the other minorities for whom the
primers on anti-discrimination law were written. Handicap discrimination is fostered, not by the invidious motives that resulted in
discrimination against blacks, females, and immigrants, but by
myths that advanced medical knowledge has only recently begun to
dispel, by ignorance as to the effects of a disability, by misconceptions as to the work capacity and needs of the afflicted individual,
and by benign or compassionate attitudes. Moreover, handicapped status is largely a matter of degree, and handicaps take a
variety of forms, many of which are not as obvious as the badges of
race, sex, age or national origin, and some of which are the result of
the victim's own volition. Unlike racial and sexual characteristics,
physical or mental condition is usually, rather than rarely, related in
some way to work capacity. Finally, although some severely
handicapped individuals have been excluded from virtually all
employment, many individuals with minor or obscure impairments,
covered under expansive interpretations of the law, have not been
victimized by pervasive discrimination. While employers may have
erroneously presumed that the physical or mental condition of these
individuals precluded adequate performance in one job, the presumption was not carried over to all jobs, so that these individuals have
not suffered from a general and broad-based deprivation of
opportunities for employment or for advancement.

278

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 7

Although there is a paucity of legislative history from which to
infer the intent of the drafters, the differences between the structure
and phraseology of the equal employment laws for the handicapped
and those protecting other minorities may have resulted from
cognizance of the characteristics and problems that are peculiar to
the handicapped minority. Thus, administrative directives to
employers that effectively preclude consideration of an applicant's
physical or mental condition in employment decisions, except where
the employer can establish the necessity for doing so, may exceed
the authority granted by the statutes, which call only for the
elimination from consideration of nonjob-related handicaps. The
former is more costly for employers to accomplish, as well as more
difficult for agencies to police. Similarly, since most of the laws
specifically limit the protected class to qualified handicapped
individuals, the enforcement agencies may have erred in assigning
proof burdens, and in imposing an obligation to make costly and
disruptive accommodations for handicapped applicants who otherwise would not be able to meet performance standards.
As developments proceed in this area of the law, the courts may
be persuaded by these legal and factual distinctions to re-evaluate
the mandates asserted by administrative agencies. Experience under
other equal employment opportunity statutes has taught that
inflationary interpretations often hinder, rather than speed implementation, and that judicial and administrative attitudes become
more balanced as they perceive this effect. This evolution is
hastened when enforcement authorities recognize that employers
have familiarized themselves with the legislative and judicial
developments, have honestly assessed their attitudes and employment practices, and have made earnest efforts to comply with the
spirit of the law.

